











CANADA AND CANADIAN DEFENCE



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THE DEFENSIVE POLICY OF THE DOMINION
IN RELATION TO THE CHARACTER OF HER
FRONTIER, THE EVENTS OF THE WAR OF
1812-14, AND HER POSITION TO-DAY

BY

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PREFACE

SINCE the Imperial Defence Conference in London of 1909 closed its proceedings, many of the questions which it was convened to consider, its recommendations, and their result, have been widely discussed ; but in connection with the defence of the Dominion of Canada—a chief link in the chain of Imperial defence—there is much which has been but little, if at all, touched upon, yet which, in the interests of the Empire, should be more completely understood by British subjects generally.

It is in the hope of contributing in some degree to explain the general nature of the problem of Canadian defence that these pages have been put together by the writer, a great part of whose early life was spent in Canada.

The solution of the problem should, it is conceived, be sought, and will be found, by considering the character of the frontier of Canada ; the lessons of the last war (that of 1812-14) fought upon it ; the changes, affecting Canadian defence, which have since taken place ; the circumstances and position of the Dominion to-day ; and to what all this points.

An effort to do this is here made ; and it may be added that the important issues both for Canada and the Empire which may, some day, hang upon successful Canadian defence, are very apparent.

C. W. ROBINSON.

September, 1910.

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"I HAVE told Ministers repeatedly that a naval superiority on the lakes is a *sine qua non* of success in war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object should be solely defensive."

(*The Duke of Wellington to Sir George Murray, December 22, 1814,*
"Wellington Despatches," Gurwood, vol. xii., p. 224.)

"Upon Kingston and Montreal, by their position and intrinsic advantages, rested the communication of all Canada, along and above the St. Lawrence, with the Sea Power of Great Britain. . . . There then was the direction for offensive operations."

(*That is, for offensive operations against Canada in 1812-14—*
Mahan, "Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812,"
1905, vol. i., p. 305.)

"The conditions of modern warfare make it probable that great naval and military events will immediately follow, even if they do not precede, a declaration of war. If, therefore, organizations have to be improvised, staffs created, transport and equipment provided, and plans matured, after the outbreak of hostilities, the value of any assistance, however willingly and enthusiastically given, will be greatly lessened, even if such assistance be not altogether belated."

(*From the Blue Book as to the Imperial Defence Conference, 1909.*)

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CHAPTER I

National defence as a subject—The Imperial Conference of 1909 and its outcome—Relations of Canada to Great Britain and the Empire—Her past contributions to Imperial defence—Two main objects of her land forces—Some advantages of a Canadian Navy—Its sphere of action—Danger from political party pressure—The present a fitting moment to consider Canadian defence—Proposed method of doing so—Duke of Wellington on the *sine quâ non* of success in war on the frontier of Canada.

ALTHOUGH to any nation upon the near prospect of war the subject of its defence becomes all-absorbing, especially if invasion is to be dreaded, it is difficult—at all events, throughout the British Empire—to arouse serious interest in it in time of peace. This is probably partly because some defensive details require a professional training to understand them; but, nevertheless, defensive questions, in their broader aspect, are mere common-sense questions, which can be perfectly grasped in their main and important principles by every educated citizen of a civilized State.

It is for this reason to be regretted that proposals for national defence, even when officially brought forward, are so commonly approached by the

majority of the public in the attitude often unwisely adopted towards those for the insurance of life or property in general—viz., that they are to be some day looked into, but in the meantime put aside, and that the premium to be paid seemed most unattractive. Were they to be more constantly in the thoughts of the people of a nation, the hands of those who are responsible for national defence would be greatly strengthened.

It is, therefore, a matter for serious congratulation that a few months ago the naval aspirations of a Continental Power drew—for the moment, at all events—an exceptional degree of attention towards Imperial defence; and it became recognized from one end of the British Empire to the other that the whole question in both its naval and military aspects must be frankly faced by the Mother-Country and her dominions beyond the seas, for the security of their mutual interests and respective territories.

With regard to Canada, this feeling developed into a resolution, passed by the Dominion House of Commons on March 29, 1909, recognizing "the duty of Canada, as the country increased in numbers and wealth, to assume in a larger measure the responsibilities of national defence, and approving of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service in co-operation with, and in close relation to, the Imperial Navy."¹

¹ Blue Book as to the Imperial Conference with the representatives of the self-governing dominions on the naval and military defence of the Empire (1909).

The Canadian Government further suggested that its Defence Ministers should come to London, in order to confer with the Imperial naval and military authorities upon various technical matters.

As the result of this, as well as of communications received from other self-governing dominions of the Crown, the Imperial Defence Conference was subsequently convened, and sat in London in July and August, 1909.

At this Conference it was pointed out that the ideal upon which the military organization of the Empire should be based involved acceptance of the following principles:

"1. That without superiority at sea the *Empire cannot be maintained.*"

"2. That it is the duty of each self-governing portion of the Empire to provide, as far as possible, *for its own territorial security.*"

"3. That schemes of mutual assistance in time of need should be prepared upon a definite system."

Finally, the result of the Conference may be summed up in the words of its President, Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister,¹ that the outcome had been this:

With respect to naval matters, an agreement that any fleet to be built up by one of the dominions "must be of a certain size, in order to offer a permanent career to the officers and men engaged in the service; the personnel² to be trained and disciplined under regulations similar to those established in the Royal Navy, in order to allow

¹ Statement in the House of Commons, August 26, 1909.

² Until Canada can entirely supply this herself, certain officers and men required are to be lent by Great Britain.

of both interchange and union between the British and Dominion services; and that, with the same object, the standard of vessels and armaments should be uniform."

With respect to army matters, a plan for "organizing the forces of the Crown (wherever they are) so that, while preserving the complete autonomy of each dominion—should the dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire in a real emergency—their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous Imperial Army."

The recommendations of the Imperial Defence Conference are now being translated into action. Canada has determined to commence the formation of a navy of her own, instead of contributing in money or in ships (as New Zealand preferred) to the strength of the British fleet; and although some have questioned the wisdom of this particular decision, there has been apparently a consensus of agreement in this—that the issue of the Conference will have an important bearing upon the growth of the Dominion to the stature of a nation, much more powerful than of yore in her naval and military resources, and in the patriotism of a people not only free, but trained to arms and prepared for war.

In the recommendations of the Conference lies the assurance that between Great Britain and Canada there is at last an open and mutual recognition of two far-reaching principles

The first is that, while the Dominion is to have the entire control of her own forces, these, in their organization, armament, and training, are to be

capable of immediately taking their place as portions of one Imperial sea and land force.

The second, embodied not in so many words but in spirit, is that the Mother-Country and Canada, among the other oversea dominions, are mutually dependent—at all events, for the greatness of their future—upon their union.

The steps which, under expert advice, are being taken towards the creation and development of a Canadian Navy—to be the nucleus, it is hoped, of a more powerful one in the future—will no doubt be modified from time to time, as experience suggests. It is enough to say here that a certain number of war-vessels¹ will be built, or acquired, manned, and armed at the Dominion expense, and, as far as may be possible, in Canada and by Canadians. These vessels will probably be stationed on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard, for the protection in war of the coast and commercial routes leading to it, and to police the seas in time of peace.

The double seaboard of Canada, on the Atlantic and Pacific, renders the provision of a fleet unit of the same kind as that of Australia unsuitable at this moment. Adequate dockyards and ship-yards will be constructed wherever necessary. Not only Halifax and Esquimalt,² as at present, but later

¹ At present eleven in number—viz., four cruisers of the improved *Bristol* class, one of the *Boudicca* class, and six destroyers of the improved river class. For this service there is to be an appropriation this year of 3,000,000 dollars (about £600,000). The navy is now being organized by, and is under the command of, Rear-Admiral C. E. Kingsmill, Director of the Naval Service of Canada.

² The maintenance and garrison of these ports have now been taken over by the Dominion Government.

on Quebec, Montreal, St. John¹ (New Brunswick), Sydney, Prince Rupert on the Pacific, and points upon the great lakes, may become, in varying degrees of importance, Canadian naval stations. Training-ships will be acquired, or have already been so, a naval college established, and it is hoped a due provision of naval *matériel* of war accumulated at secure points.²

The personnel to man these vessels is to be looked for eventually in the creation, by voluntary enlistment, of a naval force for a term of years, and a naval volunteer force, with a reserve.³

In the land forces⁴ the standard or patterns of arms, equipment, stores, and transport, especially for the units of first-line transport, are to be those of the home regular army, of which the field-service regulations and training manuals are to be adopted as the basis of the organization, administration, and training of the troops.

The above, with the establishment of a local Canadian section of the Imperial General Staff, the interchange between the home and Dominion services of officers, men, and units, with the training together of those services to the extent which may be found practicable, complete the important points aimed at by the Imperial

¹ It has been determined, apparently, to grant subsidies for building dry docks at Quebec (Levis) and St. John.

² The *Niobe* and *Rainbow* already secured are available for this service, and a naval college is to be established at Halifax.

³ Among the trained seamen on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and the fishermen of the Maritime Provinces of Canada, there is excellent material for the personnel of a Canadian fleet.

⁴ At present, apparently, to be organized into one division of all arms and one mounted brigade, capable of taking their places in the Imperial Army.

Defence Conference of 1909 in respect of Canadian defence.¹

The second principle which is embodied in spirit in the recommendations of the Conference—viz., that the Mother-Country and Canada, among the other oversea dominions, are mutually dependent for their future greatness upon their union—has been expressed by Lord Charles Beresford in the following words :

“Whether we like it or not, we stand or fall together. You cannot hurt one of the dominions without hurting the Imperial whole ; you cannot hurt the Mother-Country without knocking the heart out of the Imperial whole.”²

This community of interests, however, wants to be more widely understood than it is ; and as it has a bearing upon the strength and security of Canada, it is not departing from the subject of Canadian defence to refer further to it.

Let us first consider the importance of Canada to England.

In conversation, after the rebellion in Canada of 1837-38, the Duke of Wellington said :

“If you lose Upper Canada, you lose all your Colonies in that country ; and if you lose them, you may as well lose London.”

¹ The presence this autumn in England of the “Queen’s Own Rifles” from Canada, at the instance and cost of their Commanding Officer, Sir H. Pellatt ; of a British Cadet Team in Canada, at the invitation of the Dominion ; and the appointment of an officer of the New Zealand forces to command a brigade at Aldershot, form interesting first steps, but, it is to be hoped, merely first steps, in the direction of united and uniform training and interchange of personnel.

² Speech at the Jubilee Press Conference in London, July 26, 1909.

Sir Archibald Alison also writes in 1843 :

"According as these [the North American] Provinces¹ remain attached by durable cords to the parent State or are severed from it, they must ultimately become either an unbounded source of its strength or the immediate cause of its ruin."

What is meant by this, it may be assumed, is not that Great Britain, even though deprived of her possessions in the Western world or compelled to ransom her capital from an enemy, could not continue an important Power, but that her position as the head of a world-wide Empire, with its prestige and influence for good, would have passed away—certainly temporarily, and probably for all time.

It required exceptional foresight to see seventy years ago the value of Canada to the Mother-Country to-day. Then the shortest route from Great Britain to China and Japan did not lie, as now, across Canadian territory. Then the granaries of Western Canada did not exist, nor was their future possibility even dreamt of. Then the anticipated difficulty of the Mother-Country—the food of her people in war, which these granaries can almost entirely supply—was not urgent. Then Sea-power on the Pacific, and the Pacific ports of Canada, had not the same meaning for Great Britain which the growth of Australia and New Zealand and the rise of Japan have now given to them. Then the increasing power and prosperity of the United States of America, of United Germany,

¹ The North American Provinces, Newfoundland excepted, became united in the Dominion of Canada in 1867.

and of United Canada herself, had not illustrated the value of *Union* as they have within the last generation.

To-day all is more clear, and the principle involved has been recently still more forcibly put in these words: "If Canada is to be abandoned, we might just as well abandon England. If we care for the Empire, the one is as essential and important to us as the other."¹ It has become increasingly evident that, with Canada in the hands of a hostile Power, the interests of Great Britain must most materially suffer.

The policy of a generation or two ago, which in effect said to Canada and other Colonies, "Go or stay: it makes no difference to us," had this good effect—that it forced forward local defence; but in other respects it was a mistaken policy, and did not embody either the truth, or the views of the greater minds of England.

One can better realize the influence which the Canadian Dominion may possibly have upon the future destinies of the Empire from the fact that it has been estimated that her population, at the present rate of its increase, would, before the close of this century, number 100,000,000—*i.e.*, more than double what is now that of the United Kingdom.² Moreover, her resources in mineral

¹ "The Defence Problem from the Imperial Standpoint," by Mr. L. S. Amery, editor of "*The Times*" *History of the War in South Africa*, *National Defence Magazine*, May, 1909, pp. 717, 718.

² Speech of Lord Strathcona, Canadian High Commissioner in London, at Winnipeg, August, 1909. The number of immigrants to Canada in the years 1909-10 was about 209,000, of whom some 104,000 came from the United States, 45,000 from the Continent of Europe, and 60,000 from the British Isles.

and agricultural wealth are being developed to a degree heretofore unprecedented.

If, on the other hand, we turn to the importance to Canada of British connection, and to the probable future of Canada, how could that future be either so secure or so brilliant beyond the pale of Empire as within it?

Lord Milner has thus depicted what that position is now, and may become, as one of the partner nations of the Empire:¹

"I have said that Canada is not unique in being a great country, but she is unique in being one of a group of countries which have a strong foothold in every corner of the world. That group only needs to hold together and to be properly organized in order to command, with a comparatively small cost to its individual members, all the credit and all the respect, and therefore all the power and all the security, which credit and respect alone can give a nation among the nations of the world.

"Without any loss of individuality, without any excessive strain upon her resources, it is within her power to enjoy all the glory and all the benefits of that great position, not only on this continent, but throughout the world. . . . Canada would be greater, far greater, as a member—perhaps in time the leading member—of that group of powerful, though pacific, nations than she ever could be in isolation."

Canada also, if within the Empire, possesses a position as a sea-power which she cannot hold if outside of it. This has been recently alluded to

¹ *Imperial Unity*, by Viscount Milner (1909).

by Captain Phillimore, R.N., in his expressed view that she seemed some day destined to form the "body of that huge octopus, British Sea-Power."¹

Placed between the Atlantic and Pacific as naval partner, not only with Great Britain, but also with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, she may become this, and—to use the words of Lord Milner—even be "the leading member of the group," but necessarily not in isolation.

If outside the British Empire, what, from her geographical position, must seemingly be Canada's future? Apparently, either to be protected by, allied with, or absorbed by, the United States, or to become what is termed an "independent" nation.

The last alternative is the only one which we need dwell on here. "Protection" (whether through the Monroe Doctrine or in any other shape) or "absorption" represent at present the aspirations of no portion of Canada, and are never likely to do so, unless a mistaken commercial policy changes in time the current of existing feeling.

But "independence" is an ideal of another character, and, within due limits, admirable so long as the substance, and not the shadow only, of it is grasped.

The growth of a self-reliant, independent feeling, in either men or nations, is not to be discouraged to any advantage if they are to become great, and in this sense it is not to be regretted that Canada

¹ Prize Essay by Captain R. T. Phillimore, M.V.O., R.N., *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, August, 1900.

should control her own forces, and retain, as she has done (with the complete assent of the Mother-Country) the power to decide, according to circumstances, whether her navy and army are to be employed or not employed beyond her own borders. Her history shows that she will stand by the Empire ; and the fact that it is left to her voluntary decision as to the extent to which Canadian forces are to be used, except for Canadian defence and in a Canadian quarrel, at all events removes all ground for an assertion—which has been at times made—that within the Empire she cannot be truly independent, because she is liable to have to fight for a cause of which she may disapprove.

In the present position of Canada within the Empire there is already, in fact as well as theory, complete and real "independence." Voluntary partnership is not dependence ; the free preference by a free people for a Constitutional Monarchy, instead of any other form of government, is not dependence ; sharing in common with others the expense of an Imperial policeman—in other words, of her naval and military defence—though an excellent business bargain, is not dependence.

More complete freedom could not be found in any "alliance" as compared with the "partnership" of Empire, for alliances in all cases invoke mutual obligations and mutual ties. When made with a nation under another flag, they are never based upon the principle of giving something for nothing ; and it may be added that occasionally, though they may be on the whole a source of strength, one of the parties to them has to pay heavily for them.

It is well to remember that the position, wealth, and resources of Canada, although the latter are as yet but partially developed, are such that they may possibly be coveted by other Great Powers less fortunately dowered; and that, were she not in possession of such sea and land forces as would rally around her if within the Empire, her safety from invasion must rest more or less upon the forbearance of rivals — an insecure foundation. "Communities which want, and cannot have except by force, will take by force, unless they are restrained by force."¹

The more the close connection between Great Britain and Canada is considered, the more it will appear that, from the standpoint of each nation, neither can, in its material interests alone, afford to separate from the other.

Before the late Conference was convened Canada had not consented to move in the direction of monetary contributions towards naval defence, or proposed the formation of a Canadian fleet; but it must be conceded that she has within the last fifty years most effectively contributed to Imperial defence generally by the construction of railways from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, which give British troops a shorter line to the East (to which we shall later on allude); by the cutting of canals and deepening of water communication between the sea and the great lakes; by attention to her local land forces, which have

¹ Mahan, *Interest of America in Sea-Power*, p. 263. See *Gates of our Empire*, by T. Miller Maguire (1910).

furnished contingents in recent British campaigns ; by the establishment of the Kingston Military College, which has turned out excellent British officers ; by the encouragement of rifle-shooting ; and last, but not least, by taking over from the Home Government the maintenance and defence of the important posts of Halifax, in Nova Scotia, and Esquimalt, on the Pacific.

What has been agreed to, as the result of the Conference, is in addition to the above.

Occasionally it has been said that no special credit is due to Canada, in the sense of a contribution to military defence, for the construction of railways¹ from ocean to ocean, because these were commercial undertakings for commercial purposes, but the facts remain that their strategic importance had been clearly foreseen. Sir John Macdonald, in proposing the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, said :

"I recommend this great undertaking, not on financial grounds—though I believe its future financial success is assured—but for high reasons of State policy, because the railway, when completed, will join together the west and the east of the Dominion of Canada, will secure a predominant share of the trade with China and Japan, and will provide a safe passage for British troops should the Mediterranean route ever become blocked by the enemies of Great Britain."²

¹ One only, the Canadian Pacific, is yet in full operation ; but another, the Grand Trunk Pacific, will probably be so next year (1911) ; and a third, the Canadian Northern, is under construction (see Chapter VI.).

² *Imperial Outposts*, by Colonel (now Major-General) A. M. Murray, (1907, p. 156).

Probably in no other way could the money, from a military point of view, have been as profitably expended; and, owing to the commercial prosperity and emigration to Canada which have followed upon the measure, the defensive resources of the Dominion have been materially increased.

In any case, it cannot be otherwise than a subject of congratulation to-day, from a military standpoint, that it was decided to devote the money to this purpose, instead of to the construction of battleships, which would probably be now on the scrap-heap, or fortifications in Canada, which time would have since rendered partially obsolete.

The main objects for which the sea and land forces of Canada exist may be said to be two:

One is to maintain the unity of the Empire, for which the United Empire Loyalists, the first settlers of Upper Canada, fought in 1775-83.

The other is to secure the Canadian frontier from aggression, so that Canadian soil may never be occupied by an enemy, the lives of the Canadian people protected, and Canadian property preserved from spoliation.

In the Imperial co-partnership each of these objects is of extreme importance both to Great Britain and Canada, but it is desirable to keep them distinct in the mind; for the fact that there is, and must be, a distinction between them, occasionally overlooked, has been in the past at the root of some divergent views between the Mother-Country and the Dominion as to what is requisite for Canadian defence.

To secure, if possible, the second object as well as the first is of much consequence to Canada, for upon her and her people must fall the brunt of any hostile occupation of her territory. In one sense, indeed, it appeals more widely—*i.e.*, to all classes and shades of opinion—than the first; for there are in Canada, as in England, some to whom ideas of Empire have little attraction, while to all the advantage of security for life and property is apparent.

It is true, and has been proved true, that Canada might be, in parts and temporarily, overrun and occupied in war, her richest districts harried, her cities and towns, if they opposed the invaders, destroyed; and yet that, through the final triumph of the Imperial arms, she would be preserved to the Empire. Still, it is but human nature that those tax-payers living in Canada, by whom is meant not only French and British Canadians, but immigrant settlers from the British Isles, from the continent of Europe, and also from the United States of America (of whom there are very many thousands),¹ will look coldly at defensive proposals which, although they may make it more difficult to permanently conquer Canada, include nothing approaching to a guarantee against the successful invasion of her frontier.

This the Dominion Government and Dominion politicians must take into account.

It is to be received with satisfaction upon many

¹ The Annual Report on Emigration recently (1910) presented to the American Senate shows that 453,834 emigrants from the United States have crossed the border to Canada since 1901—*i.e.*, an average of about 50,000 a year.

grounds that Canada has determined to commence the formation of her own navy, and retain in her hands its control, with the appropriation of the moneys voted by the Dominion Government for naval defence.

The Dominion of New Zealand may have been wise in adopting a different course, but New Zealand is not Canada, and there is no analogy between their situations.

It has been objected that the vessels now building as the nucleus of a Canadian Navy would be at the mercy of any first-class battleship or cruiser, and no doubt for some time to come Canada must be dependent upon the battleships of the British fleet for her protection against the more powerful ships of war of any hostile nation; but there must be a beginning to everything.

This dependence, however, exists, and points fairly to its being reasonable, as many in Canada have urged, that the Dominion, until she has first-class battleships of her own, should, in addition to forming a Canadian Navy, assist to some extent the heavily-burdened taxpayer of the United Kingdom to pay for the British fleet.

The Hon. G. E. Foster, Member for North Toronto in the Dominion House of Commons, thus spoke in the debate upon naval defence¹ with regard to the preference, felt by himself and others, for the building up of a Canadian Navy, over a "contribution"—meaning by this a contribution in other forms.

¹ House of Commons Debates, Ottawa, March 29, 1909.

"The interest that we take in a contribution is not the interest that I desire for Canada. I want to see something grafted on the soil of Canada's nationhood, which takes root, and grows, and develops, until it incites the spirit of defence in this country. . . . The first Canadian-owned vessel built and equipped in Great Britain,¹ and sent out to defend our coasts, would become the nucleus and the training-ground of Canadian stokers, Canadian sailors, and Canadian officers, and by-and-by perhaps of a Canadian Admiral on the Canadian coast."

Lord Charles Beresford, in speaking before the Imperial Press Conference, and alluding to the self-governing dominions, says (June 26, 1909):

"I believe the right plan would be for you to begin by having your own fleets, under your own control, and under your own management, as long as there is a standardization in every ship you have in the whole of the five nations."

And in a leading article upon a "Navy for Canada" on April 16, 1909, the *Standard of Empire*, published in London, has the following remarks:

"The Canadian battleships and cruisers will not be capable of being put down, without deduction, to the credit side of the British Admiralty accounts, and that seems to us a particular advantage. A British Prime Minister will not be able to substitute a Canadian or Australian unit for one which would have to come out of the British taxpayers'

¹ It has since been determined to build in Canada as far as possible, which should prove a great stimulus to shipbuilding and mechanical industry in the Dominion.

pocket. We shall not rely upon these overseas ships to defend the shores of Britain, for they will not be always immediately available. But they will constitute a number of allied navies prepared to come to the assistance of the Mother-Country in the home waters, to aid her in guarding the great trade routes, and to set free part of the force she keeps in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans. There will not be one British Navy, but three or four, and the enemies of the Empire will have to reckon with them all."

Thus, in favour of the creation of a Canadian Navy there are solid arguments.

It is to be noted¹ that it was one of the principles laid down at the Conference as the basis of the defence organization of the Empire that it was the duty of each self-governing nation to provide, as far as possible, for its own territorial security. Primarily, the sphere of action of the Canadian Navy must be its own waters and bordering seas; but, nevertheless, it is not to be tied to that sphere, which would greatly reduce its power and its usefulness.

How the Canadian Navy or Army would in any particular case be employed upon the outbreak of war must depend upon the character of that war, and must be decided at the time between the Home and Canadian Governments; but it may be anticipated that for the first few days or even weeks of war the security of the Canadian frontier must necessarily depend upon the readiness of the Canadian sea and land forces to maintain it.

¹ See p. 3.

One important provision of the Bill creating the Canadian Navy is that, in the case of emergency, the Dominion Government may, by an Order in Council,¹ place the fleet at the disposal of His Majesty the King (in whom the command-in-chief is vested) for general service with the Royal Navy; and the Prime Minister for Canada, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, when asked whether "emergency" meant war in Canada or abroad, is stated² to have thus replied:

"War anywhere. If Great Britain is at war with any nation of the world, then Canada is liable to invasion, and Canada is at war."

The value of the future Canadian fleet to the Empire, and for the security of the Dominion frontier, must naturally and mainly depend upon whether, when created, it is kept up, in spite of all political pressure, in full efficiency as regards personnel, armament, equipment, and stores, and prepared for instant war; to secure which, skilled and impartial inspection is absolutely essential, and will, it is assumed, be arranged for.

It probably is not so much the conviction that any threatening war-clouds are about to burst before the Canadian Navy has come into being that has made some prefer to its creation a money contribution or the gift of a battleship. It is rather the fear that even pride in a national fleet may not be sufficient in Canada, as at times it has not

¹ That is, without waiting until Parliament had been assembled, though it was to be so immediately afterwards.

² Report of debate in Dominion House of Commons (*Morning Post*, January 13, 1910).

been so in England, to prevent political exigencies or political patronage from interfering with its efficiency.

If French and British together will alike concur in putting the Dominion Navy beyond the sphere of party, and placing it, where it should be, "in the front rank of the navies of the dominions of their great Empire,"¹ then it may be anticipated that it will not only take, but hold, that rank, and become a pillar of Imperial strength. If it becomes the plaything of politics, it naturally can never do so.

The present moment appears an opportune one² to examine into what is essential to the security of the Canadian frontier; and this, it is thought, can be done in no more effective way than by—

First, describing the character of that frontier; then dwelling upon the lessons which the most recent attempt to conquer Canada in 1812-14 has taught; and, finally, by considering the changes affecting defence which have taken place in Canada since 1814, with how far the experience of the past can, under different conditions, be usefully applied to Canadian defence to-day.

Very much is to be learnt from the war of 1812-14, but in the interval—nearly a century—which has elapsed since that period both Canada and the science of war have made rapid strides.

¹ Speech of Mr. Borden, Leader of the Opposition in Canada, before the Dominion Travellers' Association, December, 1909.

² See Preface.

The communications throughout the Dominion both by land and by water have greatly altered; a far larger area of territory may now become the theatre of conflict than was the case in that war; the interests Canada has to defend are wider; her resources, as well as those of her possible enemies, are greater; her cities richer, and a more valuable prize to an invader; while she is also a party now to a Convention with a friendly Power which had not then come into force.

We do not propose to enter into unnecessary technicalities, or into details of organization or composition and strength of forces, or the character of defensive works.

Although these details intimately relate to defence, they form a large subject in themselves, and are to be more advisedly dealt with by those possessed of that confidential information and knowledge of what is really practicable, as viewed from all points, which official position alone gives.¹ Our object here is confined to discussing broadly what relates to Canadian defence, both in the hope of assisting to widen interest in the question and of securing to those who have to take up the above details a more general and complete support. The opinions expressed, though no doubt all may not agree in them, are based, whenever possible, on facts contained in published documents and papers, or which can otherwise be readily verified.

¹ And on matters of this character the Report of Sir John French, carrying the weight conferred by this position, by war experience, and by his recent inspection of the Dominion forces, will be of special value.

CHAPTER II

Character of the boundary-line of Canada—Her inland waters—Hudson Bay, the St. Lawrence, and the great lakes—Naval combined with military power essential for her defence—The United States of America.

THE Dominion of Canada is very largely bounded by water. It includes all the Arctic islands—except Greenland, which is Danish—also Anticosti, Prince Edward Island, and Cape Breton, on the Atlantic, with Vancouver and Queen Charlotte Islands on the Pacific.

In tracing below, in sufficient detail for our purpose, her boundary-line,¹ we must consider the British possession of Newfoundland, with its dependency of Labrador, as if within that line, although Newfoundland, as yet at all events, is not technically a portion of the Dominion. In connection with defence she cannot be separated from it.

What is to be especially noticed² is that the boundary-line or frontier of Canada, thus understood, is on the north and east formed by the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, running round past Hudson Straits and Nova Scotia to the Bay of

¹ There have been some modifications in this line since the declaration of American Independence in 1783. See Chapter VI. as to this.

² Here refer to map facing p. 136.

Fundy ; on the south it marches from this bay, with that of America, completely across the continent. At first it separates New Brunswick from Maine, then, bending westward, and afterwards southward,¹ it eventually strikes the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Kingston, following thence the navigable channel of that river through the great lakes of Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior, to Lake of the Woods, whence, striking the 49th parallel of latitude, it runs along that to the Pacific Ocean. On the west it is formed by that sea as far north as Alaska, and thence to the Arctic Ocean by United States territory again.²

Thus for some 4,000 miles, from the Bay of Fundy westward to the Pacific, and from the southern point of Alaska to the Arctic Sea, the Canadian boundary adjoins the United States.

But if we look at the course of the St. Lawrence from Lake Superior to the Atlantic, we shall see that that river, with the vast lakes through which it passes, forms for defensive purposes a water frontier to the south of Canada for a distance of about halfway from the Pacific to the Atlantic—*i.e.*, from the west of Lake Superior to Gaspé, on the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

Therefore, in addition to her ocean frontier to the west, north, and east, Canada, along the eastern half of her southern border, possesses in effect a water frontier of between 1,800 and 1,900

¹ Till it reaches and runs along the 45th parallel of latitude.

² Although Canada forms, geographically, a large portion of North America, the term "America" is used throughout these pages in its commonly-accepted signification—*i.e.*, to mean the United States of America. Alaska was purchased from Russia by the United States.

miles,¹ across which, from Montreal eastward, owing to the actual boundary-line there running south of the St. Lawrence, she can push her outposts on Canadian territory beyond that river towards Lake Champlain.

What such a length of water frontier as from 1,800 to 1,900 miles means, can be realized by our mentioning that if, from the mouth of the Thames, a line were drawn round the United Kingdom—*i.e.*, northward round Scotland, westward round Ireland, and southward along the English Channel to the Thames again—it will come to just about this distance.

Let us now touch briefly upon the character of the inland waters of Canada.

Hudson Bay, about 1,000 miles long by 600 broad—*i.e.*, larger than the Black Sea, the Baltic, or the Adriatic—communicates with the Atlantic through Hudson Straits. This bay has hitherto been used comparatively little for commercial purposes by settled Canada, being too remote in accessibility, though not in mere distance; but now it is about to be connected by rail with the great Canadian trans-continental lines.

As each year goes by, although for some months it is closed by ice, it will become more and more during the open season a main channel by which the produce of the granaries of Western Canada will reach the British Isles, for it is both a water (and therefore the cheapest) channel, and the shortest channel.

¹ The course of the St. Lawrence throughout its windings to the actual sea is estimated as 2,384 miles (*Stanford's Compendium of Geography*).

The River St. Lawrence, rising not far from the source of the Mississippi,¹ enters Lake Superior as the "St. Louis"; between Lakes Superior and Huron, rushing with a rapid current, it becomes the "Sault St. Marie"; between Lakes Huron and St. Clair, the "St. Clair"; between Lakes St. Clair and Erie, the "Detroit"; between Lakes Erie and Ontario, the "Niagara," pouring over the Niagara Falls; between Lake Ontario and the Atlantic, the "St. Lawrence." But geographically it is the one great river St. Lawrence.

Canada is largely a country of wood, river, and lake, and it may assist to convey the idea of the extent and volume of fresh water along the southern frontier of the Dominion (including the American lakes of Champlain and Michigan) to say that it amounts to "one-half of the fresh water of the globe."²

The St. Lawrence, except from about December to April, when ice closes it, is navigable for ocean steamers as high up as Montreal.³ The great lakes also, though some of their shallows and bays are in winter frozen over, remain in their central portion open water throughout the year, and their size admits of fleets manœuvring upon their surface.

"Fresh water," exclaims Kipling, "has no right, as it does here, to roar in on mud and sand beaches, between vast headlands, that run out for leagues into haze and sea-fog."⁴

¹ See map facing concluding page.

² *Chambers's Encyclopædia of North America.*

³ And by canal and the lakes for vessels of considerable draught to the head of Lake Superior.

⁴ Rudyard Kipling (*Morning Post*, March 26, 1906).

The larger Canadian lakes of Superior, Huron, Erie, and Ontario—the two first of which have a surface area approaching to that of Ireland—vary in length and breadth, as can be seen from the map. The measurements of their circuits, following the sinuosities of the coastline, are given thus in the *National Encyclopædia*, or *Dictionary of Universal Knowledge*: Superior, 1,740 miles; Huron, 1,000 miles; Erie, 658 miles; and Ontario, 467 miles. The mean depth of the most shallow is 84 feet.

Thus, were it not that the lakes and the greater part of the St. Lawrence are of fresh, and not salt, water, Canada would be for three-fourths of her entire circumference sea-girt, and she is to that extent water-girt.

Of that eastern portion of her southern boundary which comprises the great lakes it is, for defence purposes, to be noted that towards both flanks lie the American lakes of Champlain on the east and Michigan on the west; also that at the western end of Lake Erie the boundary turns northward, at a right angle, through Lake Huron, so that the possession of ascendancy upon that lake (Huron) lays the flank and rear of Upper Canada open to attack.

Lastly, that the United States territory of Michigan forms the western shore of Lake Huron, to which lake access is gained from Lake Michigan through the Straits of Mackinac.¹

¹ The full name is "Michilimackinac"—usually abbreviated to Mackinac, and sometimes Mackinaw.

But there are two special features affecting defence to be noticed in connection with this water frontier.

One is that the St. Lawrence, although below Quebec it varies from ten miles to thirty miles in width, narrows above it to two miles, and in places to much less.¹ It is interrupted by rapids and waterfalls at certain points, such as by the rapids and falls of Sault St. Marie between Lakes Superior and Huron, by the rapids and falls of Niagara, and the rapids between Kingston and Montreal. All these, however, are now turned by canals,² which are being steadily deepened, so that large ocean-going vessels of over 10,000 tons burthen, which can now navigate the upper lakes, will ultimately be able, without breaking bulk, to bear freight from Lake Superior to Great Britain and Europe.

The other is, to quote from Dr. Parkin,³ that "for some months of every year an icy finger-thrust from the North touches these waterways, and all navigation (*i.e.*, through navigation) ceases."

The St. Lawrence and the canals between lake and lake become frozen over, ports may be closed by ice, and vessels cannot ascend from the sea. Then, to all intents and purposes, as far as defence is concerned, this water frontier becomes in parts a land one. Moreover, at all seasons, with the artillery and small arms of the present day, the Canadian and American shores are at points of it

¹ Where it issues from Lake Ontario, it is over two miles wide.

² In the war of 1812-14 these canals (see Chapter VI.) did not exist.

³ "The Railway Development of Canada," by Dr. G. R. Parkin, C.M.G. (*Scottish Geographical Magazine*, May, 1909).

within effective range of each other, while more than one important bridge¹ spans the St. Lawrence.

Thus it arises that Canada on her southern frontier, which adjoins that of the United States, has, even along the water portion of it, several stretches of country requiring for their defence a strong land force as well as a naval one, and these stretches border very important cities. In addition, she has a land frontier from Lake Superior westward to the Pacific for many hundred miles.

Therefore it seems that the natural character of her frontier throughout indicates this :

First, that for the protection of her extended stretches of ocean, inland sea, lake, and river, and her water-borne commerce, Canada needs above all things *naval power* ; and this is strengthened by the fact that the country, comprising the silver and mineral districts between the southern shore of Hudson Bay and the great lakes, will (as we have said) within a few years be opened up. It will soon be traversed by rail from north to south, as well as from east to west, and the defence of that bay and of Hudson Straits will become a question to be taken into account.

Next, that at the present day some portion of this naval power, whether embodied in the war-vessels of Canada or of Great Britain—if it is to have any certain access before an enemy to the Atlantic ports, Montreal, or the Pacific ports, or

¹ For instance, the Victoria (near Montreal), and others at various points. Tunnels also exist under the river at Port Huron (which is termed the St. Clair), and another is just being completed near Detroit.

through the easily-obstructed canals to the great lakes—must not at the outbreak of war be at any distance from the Canadian frontier.

Further, that for the security of that frontier Canada requires, in addition to naval power, a land force, which, owing to the increasing extent of her territory to be defended and its growing importance, must be one of considerable strength; and,

Lastly, that from the nature of her southern boundary along the water portion of it, the land force for its defence must be one working always in very close concert with the navy.

The reference made to the southern frontier of Canada adjoining the United States of America leads us to emphasize here that the view under which we are now writing is not that anything is likely to disturb the friendly relations existing with that Power.

On the contrary, it is because Great Britain, Canada, and the United States are on their present cordial footing of friendship, as well as that they understand each other's aspirations and feelings fully, and that of late years so many citizens of the United States, crossing the frontier, have become good citizens of Canada and made the Dominion their home, that it becomes now both possible and desirable to write unreservedly as to Canadian defence.

It may, indeed, under the national combinations of the future, though these are too uncertain to discuss, be very important to the United States that the frontier of Canada should not lie too open

to attack; and Great Britain and America appear intended, for many reasons, to be closely united in friendship; but, however this may be, every Government and every nation has its own duties to perform, and one is to prepare for the defence of its frontier if attacked, no matter by whom.

How severe a condemnation would be justly passed by any court of law or equity upon a trustee—and Governments are national trustees—who neglected to safeguard a ward's interests, even from the closest friends, upon the ground that the cordial relations which prevailed made it unnecessary. And for a Government to put aside preparation for national defence upon any such pretext, is quite as unjustifiable towards a nation.

It is most improbable that any good is ever done (although harm may be so) by those British subjects, however well-meaning, on both sides of the Atlantic who proclaim to their American cousins that on no account would Great Britain or Canada go to war with America, for their hearers must either doubt their sincerity or sense of honour, and this engenders want of confidence, if not a contempt, which can never promote cordiality. Under certain circumstances America might, and must, go to war with Great Britain, and Great Britain might, and must, go to war with America; but those circumstances, it is hoped, will never now arise.

A frontier left too open to invasion is a fruitful cause of war in itself, and has produced bad feeling between Great Britain and the United States on more than one occasion in the past. It may be

said, for instance, that the temptation of an inadequately guarded frontier encouraged the so-called Patriot raids of 1887-88 on the Canadian border, and the Fenian raids of 1866; and, in proportion as that border is known to be efficiently protected, these incidents are in the future less likely to recur.

In these matters it is frankness which most frequently among friends prevents misunderstanding. Mr. Roosevelt, late President of the United States, has in this respect invariably set a good example, and the present President, Mr. Taft, is reported very recently to have said, and most reasonably said, that he himself could see no inconsistency in speaking in favour of peace by arbitration, while also using every effort to obtain from Congress two more battleships yearly till the Panama Canal was opened.¹ Similarly no inconsistency is here felt in anticipating peace with America while discussing what seems desirable for the security of the frontier of her friend and neighbour, Canada.

America must be unavoidably and constantly alluded to merely because she, and no other Power, happens for a long distance to adjoin that frontier, and also because certain lessons in Canadian defence can be learnt only from the war in which she was engaged with Great Britain in 1812-14.

¹ At the Hotel Astor, New York, March 22, 1910 (from the *Morning Post* of March 24, 1910).

CHAPTER III

The war of 1812-14 on the Canadian frontier—Comparatively little known, and why—Its importance and the lessons it teaches—Origin of the war—Situation in Canada when it opened—The respective forces—Naval strength on the lakes—Principal posts—Communications—Strong and weak points on both sides.

WE now turn to the war of 1812-14¹ upon the frontier of Canada. It is desirable to draw the attention of military students to this war, the events of which should be more widely known than they are. One reason why they have been comparatively little studied is that from 1808 to 1815 public attention was absorbed by the more engrossing contest which was being fought out with France in Europe upon Peninsular battlefields and elsewhere. Another is that the forces engaged were, when compared with Continental armies, small, and therefore the incidents of the war do not illustrate the larger battle tactics of massed armies of the three arms.

In addition to this, the war was one which, to her great disgust, had been forced upon Great Britain. As Sir Charles Lucas writes,² her

¹ For the operations of this war see map facing concluding page, with the enlarged inset on it of the Niagara district.

² *The Canadian War of 1812*, by Sir C. P. Lucas, now Assistant Under-Secretary for the Colonies, p. 255 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1906).

"Government and people were loath to enter into it; they were glad to be quit of it; and they willingly tried to forget it."

Nevertheless, it is one teaching many valuable lessons, especially as to the defence of a water frontier of lake and river; the combined action of naval and land forces necessary to maintain it; the importance of early preparation and continuous energy in war; and the disadvantage of a merely passive, as compared with an active, defence.

Many men of capacity and experience have dwelt upon the importance of this war.

Mr. Roosevelt, for instance, writes:¹

"This war should be studied with unceasing diligence. At every step can be seen that great truth that success is only for those who know how to prepare it. . . . As these lakes [those of Ontario, Erie, etc.] were fitted for the manœuvring of ships of the largest size, the operations upon them were of the same nature as those on the ocean."

And Captain Mahan, R.N. :²

"The lake campaigns emphasized the teaching of history as to the influence of the control of the water upon the course of events; although on a small scale, the lakes were oceans, and the forces which met on them were fleets. . . . As in the Civil War half a century later, so in 1812 the power of the water over the issues on land not only was not comprehended by the average official,

¹ *Naval War of 1812*, by Theodore Roosevelt, edition of 1889, pp. 131-140. The 1889 edition is quoted from throughout in this work. A somewhat abbreviated edition has been published recently (1910).

² *Sea-Power in Relation to the War of 1812*, by Captain A. T. Mahan (1905).

but was incomprehensible to him. . . . They illustrate the too often forgotten truth that it is by the power of massing superior forces, which the control of these lakes here conferred, that military issues are decided."

Sir C. P. Lucas, also referring to it,¹ writes that the record of its operations is, "in the point of view of military history, full of interest and instruction"; in that of colonial history, "one fruitful of issues of vital importance"; and that it is one to which "the British Empire owes a debt which can never be overestimated."

The contest, lasting for two and a half years, terminated practically in favour of Great Britain, inasmuch that all efforts—and many were made—to conquer Canada, or permanently occupy her soil, were defeated. There were certain reverses, more particularly upon the lake waters, but several victories, some of them commemorated by clasps to the Peninsular War medal, side by side with those for Peninsular battles, and others as battle honours upon the colours and appointments of regiments.²

The determined manner in which forces of British regulars, combined with the local regiments and patriotic militia of Canada, and aided by some loyal Indian warriors,³ could fight, was illustrated again and again.

If there should still remain, as perhaps there

¹ *The Canadian War of 1812.*

² "Fort Detroit," "Chateauguy," and "Chrystler's Farm" form clasps, and also (with "Queenstown," "Miami," and "Niagara") battle honours. "Bladensburg," too, was given as a battle honour, but this last battle was not fought on the Canadian frontier.

³ These were principally under two celebrated chiefs, Brant and Tecumseh.

does, some truth in what Kingsford, in his *History of Canada*, wrote some years ago—that “the events of the war of 1812 have not been forgotten in England, for they have never been known there”¹—it would be a satisfaction should this brief reference to what then took place contribute to make them better known.

This account, however, does not purport to be a history of the entire events of the war, but merely such a broad general outline of its more important features as will suffice to make its course and design intelligible, and bring out those points upon which it is, for military reasons, of consequence to dwell.

Before entering, in the next chapter, upon the events of the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, it is desirable to say a few words as to the origin and commencement of the war and the situation on the borders of Canada at that time.

War was officially declared by America against Great Britain on June 18, 1812. It was not a popular one with many of the better class in the United States, nor with all the States of the Union, notably New England and Massachusetts. On the day hostilities were proclaimed several ships in Boston Harbour displayed their flags half-mast high; but this did not prevent the Democratic, or War, Party, which was then dominant in the Senate, from forcing it on, and carrying it by a vote of 198 to 13, while before its declaration troops had been marching towards the Canadian

¹ Vol. viii., p. 579.

frontier. That frontier was then very inadequately prepared for defence (which of itself encouraged aggression), and it was also believed that the great body of the inhabitants of Canada would make little, if any, resistance, but would welcome the invaders as deliverers from the yoke of Great Britain.

Mr. Jefferson, ex-President of the United States, wrote:¹

"The acquisition of Canada as far as Quebec will be a mere matter of marching, and give us experience for the attack on Halifax, and the final expulsion of England from this continent."

And Mr. Henry Clay said in Congress:

"We have the Canadas as much under our command as England has the sea. I am not for stopping at Quebec, or anywhere else, but I would take the whole continent."

The cause of hostilities can scarcely be defined in a few words, but in essence it was this:

Napoleon, with whom Great Britain was then at war, had, by a decree termed the Berlin Decree, issued in 1806 in order to ruin British commerce, declared all neutral vessels that had touched at a British port liable to seizure. To this Great Britain—having become, since the destruction of the French fleet by Nelson at Trafalgar in 1805, dominant at sea—retaliated by Orders in Council, declaring that no ships which had not touched at a British port should be permitted to enter a French one. Napoleon further declared the British

¹ Auchinleck's *History of the War of 1812-14*; and *Life of Brook*, by Lady Edgar (1904), p. 259.

Islands to be in a state of blockade, and prohibited all neutral nations from trading with them, and Great Britain then declared all French ports to be in a state of blockade.

This told severely against the commerce of America (a neutral nation) with France, and the repeal of the Orders in Council was demanded by the United States. There were, moreover, other causes provocatory of war, such as the right claimed by Great Britain to search neutral vessels for deserters from her own service; the sympathy which America entertained for France, who had been her friend in the revolutionary war of 1775-88; and the dislike felt for England as the heritage of that war.

The British Orders in Council were repealed, but this concession did not avert hostilities, which had been declared already, or stay them afterwards.

Great Britain was not prepared for this contest, her hands being already full with the struggle against France; and the few regular troops in Canada, with the Canadian Militia and the flotillas on the lakes, had, in consequence, to conduct the defence of the Canadian frontier for a considerable period without adequate reinforcements of men or *matériel* of war from the Mother-Country.

In population, resources, and armed strength, Canada was at a great disadvantage with respect to her enemy, the country which then constituted Upper Canada (from the River Ottawa westward¹) having only been settled about twenty years before,

¹ Now the province of Ontario.

largely by the United Empire Loyalists.¹ Between the circumstances of Canada and the United States now and then there is a great difference. The Canadian Dominion has now a population of between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000, very rapidly increasing, and a land force of permanent corps and active militia, having a peace establishment of between 50,000 and 60,000, and a war establishment of about double that strength—to be possibly increased to 100,000 in first line and 100,000 in second line, with a reserve of a nominal strength of about 1,000,000.

The United States has, judging by the census of nine years ago, a population of some 90,000,000,² with a land force, largely militia, limited to a peace establishment of 100,000; but capable of great expansion within a few months—possibly to nearly 2,000,000 of trained and untrained men.

But in 1812 Canada had a population estimated at between 800,000 and 400,000 only, of whom 80,000 were in the Upper Province; and the United States one of between 6,000,000 and 8,000,000. Colonel George Denison writes³ that in the war of

¹ The United Empire Loyalists were those who, during the war between Great Britain and her Colonies in America in 1775-83, had been loyal to the Crown. At the conclusion of peace and declaration of American independence large bodies of them settled in what is now the Dominion of Canada.

² Including the whole of the States and territories. A great portion of the population is now non-Anglo-Saxon—in New York probably over one-half; in Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, etc., over one-third. (See *The Valour of Ignorance*, by Homer Lea.)

³ Lecture at Shaftesbury Hall, Toronto, December 17, 1891, by Colonel George T. Denison, President of the British Empire League in Canada since 1896.

1812-14 "800,000 Canadians defended their country against the attacks of a nation of 8,000,000."

Of regular troops, including Canadian fencible regiments, there were in Canada not more than 7,000; of militia, perhaps 15,000; of Indian braves fighting for Canada, about 4,000; the whole of the forces being under Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Lower Canada and Commander-in-Chief, with headquarters at Montreal.

The regular army of the United States numbered about 36,000, and—on paper, at all events—there was a force of militia and volunteers of over 100,000.¹

Fortunately, at the opening of the campaign, the command in Upper Canada was held by Major-General (afterwards Sir Isaac) Brock, Lieutenant-Governor of that province, with headquarters at York (Toronto), a man of ability and resource; and of the few armed vessels which were on the Canadian lakes, those under the British flag had complete ascendancy upon the water.

Military equipment and supplies of all kinds had been allowed to dwindle down in Canada to a discreditable extent. General Brock writes thus on February 12, 1812, shortly before hostilities broke out:

"I have not a musket more than will suffice

¹ Historians differ much as to all the above details of population, strength, etc. An approximate mean has been taken between the figures given by Kingsford, MacMullen, Hannay, Bradley, and others. Sir G. Prevost, on October 5, 1812, estimates all the Indian warriors spread over the Michigan territory, with those adjoining it, at between 8,000 and 10,000, but not nearly that number came into the field in Canada.

to arm the militia from Kingston westward"; and again on July 8, 1812, after war had been proclaimed: "The King's stores are at so low an ebb that they can scarcely furnish an article of use or comfort."

It should be remarked, as this is not always understood, that the British vessels on the lakes formed no part of the Royal Navy of England. They were ships—schooners, sloops, brigs, etc.—built, bought, or hired by the Canadian Government, and then armed; and they were manned by scratch crews, composed partly of seamen, partly of men accustomed to boats and acquainted with the lakes, and often partly by soldiers (regulars and militia). Nevertheless, they formed the only naval force for the defence of the Canadian southern lake and river frontier; and it was not until after a long delay that a few British naval officers and seamen were sent out to organize, command, and fight in them.

It will give a sufficient idea of their general character and strength to say that when the war opened the British had on Lake Ontario about five¹ armed vessels, mounting in all eighty-four guns; on Lake Erie about the same number, but mounting perhaps fifty guns. On these two lakes the Americans had only an armed brig or two (one being of sixteen guns). On Lakes Champlain, St. Clair, Huron, Superior, and Michigan neither side had any armed vessels of consequence.

These were the days of sailing ships, when it frequently took several days working up rivers or

¹ Roosevelt gives the number as six.

crossing the lakes against baffling winds; and the present canals turning the rapids of the St. Lawrence, between the great lakes, were not then in existence, the first to be built being the Rideau Canal, in 1826.¹

There were only some small locks for batteaux at the Cascade, Coteau, and Long Sault Rapids (see map facing p. 122), so that cargoes had to be taken out, carted by land, and reloaded beyond these rapids, causing much delay and expense.

Gunboats could not at this period ascend the St. Lawrence into the lakes. They had to be sent out, if at all, in pieces, and put together on their shores.

There were no armed vessels under steam upon the lakes, but a beginning had already been made of introducing steamers (paddle-wheel) upon the rivers. The *Accommodation* was put on the St. Lawrence by Mr. John Molson in November, 1809, her passage from Montreal to Quebec taking sixty-six hours, during thirty of which she was at anchor; and she was soon followed by others. Between four and five miles an hour was good speed.

As the war went on the naval and military strength of the forces engaged on both sides increased, altering also from time to time; but for the purpose of this account, we need not allude very often to the details of these variations.

The defending army constituted but a mere skeleton force for such an extended border, and

¹ As to Canadian canals and the various rapids they turn, see Chapter VI.

was scattered from Quebec, via Montreal (with posts towards Lake Champlain), to York (now Toronto); also along the Niagara frontier, between Lakes Ontario and Erie, and at Amherstburg, near the latter lake, with a post at St. Joseph's, north of Lake Huron, where there was a small work.

Of the principal posts, beginning from the east, it is convenient to mention :¹

Quebec, the ancient Canadian capital, held then, as now, a commanding position upon the St. Lawrence. It was for that period adequately fortified, having been a good deal strengthened between 1807 and 1812, when Sir James Craig was Governor. It was never attacked during the war.

Montreal, at the head of ocean navigation, and the focus of trade between the Upper and Lower provinces, was scarcely fortified at all.

Kingston, the chief military post of Upper Canada, and the naval station on Lake Ontario, with a dockyard, was defended by batteries, block-houses, and earthworks, and was thus fairly strong.

York (Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada, but then a small place, was weakly defended by batteries, but these could be easily turned, and thus it was practically an almost open town.

Fort George, at the mouth of the Niagara River, where it enters Lake Ontario, was an earthen work, with at first only a few light guns mounted upon it. Between York and Fort George was a fairly

¹ See map facing concluding page. The posts mentioned here are only those associated with incidents of the war. There were others, such as Halifax (Nova Scotia), etc., which were not attacked.

good military position at *Burlington Heights*, close to Hamilton.

Fort Erie, where the Niagara River issues from Lake Erie, was a work of some strength.

Amherstburg, the naval post (on the River Detroit) for Lake Erie, was protected by a small earthen work (Fort Malden) and some batteries.

On the American side of the frontier (from the east):

Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain, which lies on the most direct route from New York, through Albany, to Montreal, was protected by batteries.

Sackett's Harbour, nearly opposite Kingston, was the American naval station on Lake Ontario, with a dockyard and facilities for building ships. It was protected by earthworks.

Oswego, a fair harbour, lay to the south of it.

Fort Niagara, at the mouth of the Niagara River, was a work of solid construction, mounting some heavy guns, but was to some extent commanded by Fort George opposite.

Fort Schlosser was a small work on the American or east bank of the Niagara, a little higher up than Queenston,¹ on the Canadian side.

Presqu'île,² on Lake Erie, was, after the war had begun, made into the American naval post on that lake, where vessels were built. It was protected by a battery and blockhouse, but it had this disadvantage, that at its entrance was a bar, upon

¹ The usual name given to this village is "Queenston," but officially on the colours of British regiments, and in the Army List, it is spelt "Queenstown."

² Sometimes spelt "Presquile" and "Presque Isle."

which there was not sufficient depth of water to admit of a large ship built inside being taken over with her guns and stores on board, ready for service. These had to be put on board afterwards on the open lake.

Between this and Pittsburg, in the United States, there was water communication, and to Pittsburg stores were sent from Washington and Philadelphia.

Fort Detroit, on the Detroit River, north of and opposite to Amherstburg, was an important American work, with bastions, a deep ditch, and parapets 20 feet high, mounting thirty-three guns of various calibres. Its situation facilitated the control of the passage between Lakes Erie and St. Clair.

Mackinac (or Michilimackinac), at the north end of Lake Huron, and a trading post, was defended by a small work, and commanded the entrance to Lake Michigan, being not very far from the Canadian post of St. Joseph's, further north.

The British communications along the frontier of Canada by land were at this period most indifferent; and there were, of course, no railways. In the depth of winter it was difficult to carry on military operations with any regularity, for although, when the sleighing was good, military transport could be carried through with comfort, heavy drifts interfered greatly with it, while even the main roads in the spring and during wet weather were deep in mud, very uneven, and unsuitable for the conveyance of heavy warlike stores. The mail took about one month in transit between Montreal and York (Toronto), a distance of some 800 miles.

General de Rottenburg, commanding in the Niagara district, writes on July 7, 1813: "The roads have been much neglected, and are the worst I ever saw anywhere."

And Sir G. Prevost writes to Lord Bathurst, on August 14, 1814, that the enemy, having got command of Lake Ontario, "were able to perform in two days what our troops, going from Kingston to reinforce the right division—i.e., on the Niagara frontier—require from sixteen to twenty of severe marching to accomplish; their men arrive fresh, while ours are fatigued, and with an exhausted equipment. The route from Kingston to the Niagara frontier exceeds 250 miles, and passes in several places through a tract of country impracticable for the conveyance of extensive supplies."¹

Therefore, the easiest, best, and occasionally only dependable, communication between the Upper and Lower Provinces was by water, which made it all the more essential to retain naval ascendancy on the St. Lawrence and the lakes, apart from the fact that the chief cities and towns lay on the northern bank of these waters.

The voyage from England to Quebec was usually one of several weeks, but with exceptionally fair winds it was made occasionally much quicker.²

To sum up, when the war opened the prospects

¹ Cruikshank's *Documentary History of the War*, I., p. 177.

² The writer's father made, in September and October, 1815, a passage in the sloop-of-war *Morgiana*—eighteen guns, Captain Newton—from Quebec to Portsmouth in twenty-two days, out of which three and a half days were spent in fishing for cod off the banks of Newfoundland and taking in wood, so that the actual time under sail was eighteen and a half days.

of a successful defence of her frontier by Canada were gloomy in the extreme.

The points most in her favour were the spirit of her people, outraged by a war, unprovoked by and forced upon them; the resources of England, with her dominance at sea (although her power was then being heavily strained); the temporary ascendancy of the British flotillas on the lakes (though their strength was but feeble); and also certain weaknesses of her enemy.

These were mainly that the Americans, though they had commenced the war, were not fully prepared themselves for warlike operations; they had misunderstood the views of the bulk of the Canadian people, including the French, and their loyalty to Great Britain; their militia disliked being forced from their homes to fight; discipline was sometimes lax; and few of their officers had experience or recent acquaintance with war.

CHAPTER IV

Campaigns of 1812-13, and what they teach—American plan of campaign, 1812—Opening events—British capture Fort Detroit and Mackinac—Battle of Queenston Heights—La Colle—British military policy—Campaign of 1813—British lose ascendancy on Lake Ontario—American plan for 1813—Americans capture York, Fort George, Fort Erie, and march on Burlington Heights—Stony Creek—British regain ascendancy on Lake Ontario—Americans fall back—Situation on the lake—Sackett's Harbour—Position on the Niagara frontier—Anxiety as to pending naval battles—Reinforcements and supplies fail Barclay on Lake Erie—British defeat on that lake—Retreat of Proctor—Moravian town—Roosevelt on the opposing fleets—Americans burn Niagara—British take Fort Niagara and destroy various villages—Operations towards Lake Champlain—Chateaugay—Chrysler's Farm—Situation at close of 1813—Remarks on the operations.

WE now turn to what the campaigns of 1812 and 1813 teach us.

The American plan of campaign for 1812 was with one force of about 8,000, under General Hull, to invade Western Canada, from the State of Michigan, near Detroit, and seize Amherstburg, the British naval depot for Lake Erie; with another to occupy the Niagara frontier; and with a third to move against Montreal, in order to cut off Upper Canada from Lower Canada and the sea.

The force under General Hull, which was the first to advance and cross the Canadian frontier, met with serious resistance from the troops near

Amherstburg, under Colonel Proctor,¹ and, disappointed in receiving no welcome from the inhabitants, withdrew again to Fort Detroit.

Brock in the meantime, having control of Lakes Ontario and Erie, and therefore being able to move his men by water across them, had been approaching with a small force from York to oppose him, and on August 16, by a daring passage of the Detroit River, succeeded in compelling Hull to capitulate at Fort Detroit. Here about 2,500 men, 88 guns, 2,000 stand of arms, and a brig-of-war were surrendered to Brock, and the Michigan territory passed under British control.

In addition to advancing against Fort Detroit, Brock had also, upon his own responsibility, ordered the officer commanding at St. Joseph's, north of Lake Huron, to sail for Mackinac and endeavour to seize that post. This was successfully carried out, and the passage between Lake Michigan and Lake Huron was thus secured.²

Then, crossing Lake Erie, he established posts along the Niagara frontier, and strengthened Fort George with heavy guns from Fort Detroit.

On October 12, 1812, an attack upon the Niagara frontier was made by General van Rensellaar, with about 4,000 men, a body of whom, effecting a passage of the river in boats, succeeded in gaining the heights of Queenston; but in the battle which ensued they

¹ Colonel Proctor distinguished himself at this period of the war (early in 1813), and was promoted Brigadier-General.

² The importance which Brock attached to the possession of Fort Detroit and Mackinac strikingly evinces the correctness of his military judgment. As to their strategic value, see pp. 69, 72, and 82.

were attacked by reinforcements under General (afterwards Sir Roger) Sheaffe, brought up from Fort George and elsewhere, and defeated with severe loss. General Wadsworth, Colonel Scott (afterwards for many years Commander-in-Chief of the American Army), and several hundred prisoners were taken, many of the assailants being driven over the cliffs into the river below.

Brock, with his Aide-de-camp, Colonel Macdonell, had been killed early in the day, "having died to preserve what Wolfe died to conquer";¹ but these fresh victories of the war gave breathing-time to Canada.

The advance of the American force upon Montreal was but weakly pushed, and was driven back near La Colle,² north of Lake Champlain.

Possibly these successes produced overconfidence, for although, in December, 1812, about 80 seamen and 120 shipwrights had arrived in the Upper Province, having been engaged at Quebec, and shipbuilding was then carried on at Kingston, York, and Amherstburg, the Americans built far more strenuously at Sackett's Harbour.

Brock had before his death been anxious that that post should be attacked, with a view to the destruction of the buildings and plant there; but the enterprise was not approved of, and Sackett's Harbour was left unmolested. On the American side, however, the Secretary of War, General

¹ *Battle of Queenston Heights*, by Ernest Cruikshank (1890). Brock's monument on Queenston Heights marks the scene of this battle. Some colours captured at Fort Detroit and Queenston Heights now hang in the chapel and hall of the Royal Hospital at Chelsea.

² Sometimes spelt Lacolle.

Armstrong, had clearly recognized the importance of that post and of naval ascendancy on the lakes; for before the war broke out he had written thus: "Resting, as the line of Canadian defence does in its whole extent, on navigable lakes and rivers, no time should be lost in getting a naval ascendancy on both; for, *ceteris paribus*, the belligerent who is first to obtain this advantage will (miracles excepted) win the game." Brock had also desired to attack Fort Niagara, although this he was less anxious for, as the work was commanded by Fort George, and could therefore, he considered, be taken whenever necessary.

Unfortunately, it was at this time the policy of Great Britain to avoid every enterprise of an active—i.e., offensive—character, as the Government still clung to the hope that, the Orders in Council having been repealed, peace would be soon arranged, and this policy was pressed upon Sir George Prevost in Canada, who urged it upon his subordinates.

It was a natural policy, and from the highest point of view a right policy in intention, but it failed in its chief object (peace), and in its effect became injurious to the interests of Canada. Preparations for war were, in consequence of it, carried on after Brock's death in but a half-hearted manner; and no naval officers, mechanics, or seamen were promptly sent out to Canada to organize and strengthen the naval flotillas on the lakes. Too much reliance was placed upon a peace being arranged, and this had its reflex in a lesser degree—and unfortunately so—in Canada. War had commenced, and that being so, no cessation in

the preparations for continuing the contest should have taken place, and no measure bearing vitally upon the control of the lakes deferred.

Making full allowance for all the difficulties—and they were many—surrounding the Home and Canadian Governments, the criticism of historians seems justified—viz., that supineness at this period characterized and condemned the operations of the British; and that the importance of maintaining ascendancy on the water, if theoretically admitted, was not at heart, or thoroughly, understood.

CAMPAIGN OF 1818.

During the winter of 1812 the American naval commander, Commodore Chauncey, had organized at Sackett's Harbour a flotilla, which came out upon the lake in April, 1818, in strength superior to the British flotilla, which then took refuge in Kingston, and Lake Ontario passed under American control.

The American plan of campaign for this year much resembled that for the year before.

One Western force, between 7,000 and 8,000 strong, under General Harrison, assembling at Sandusky on Lake Erie, was to reoccupy the Michigan territory, endeavour to retake Detroit, and capture Amherstburg.

A second, about 10,000, under General Dearborn, from Sackett's Harbour, with a force from Buffalo and the fleet on Lake Ontario co-operating, was to take York, Kingston, Fort George, and Fort Erie.

A third, under General Wade-Hampton, was to move from the east of Lake Champlain against Montreal, in concert with the second, which it was

anticipated would very soon be able to combine with it in that enterprise.

In the end it was resolved not to attack Kingston, but to feint against it only, while moving upon Montreal.

The events of this year opened with a gallant British enterprise against Ogdensburg, above Montreal, on the American side of the St. Lawrence, carried out by Major George Macdonell (afterwards distinguished also at Chateauguay), with a small force as a reprisal for raids on the Canadian shore.

The St. Lawrence was frozen hard, and, crossing on the ice with field artillery, Macdonell succeeded in taking a battery, capturing some guns, and destroying three or four vessels with a quantity of stores.¹

Next, a joint American naval and military expedition, under Commodore Chauncey and General Dearborn, sailing for York, took that town,² then the capital of Upper Canada, on April 27, 1813. The small defending force made a most creditable resistance, and heavy loss was caused to the Americans by the explosion of a magazine; but the defence was totally inadequate in strength to protect the place; the public and some private buildings were burnt, a vessel on the stocks was lost to the British, and General Sheaffe, in command, fell back with the small regular garrison to Kingston.

The expedition next sailed for the western end

¹ This affords one illustration of how the water frontier of Canada to the south becomes, at certain points and at times in a military and defence sense, a land one (see Chapter II.).

² Now Toronto, the capital of the province of Ontario.

of Lake Ontario, and after some fighting on May 26 and 27, effected a landing to the west of Fort George, the British troops, under General Vincent, having, in face of this superior force, been compelled to abandon Forts George and Erie, and fall back towards the position of Burlington Heights, near Hamilton. The enemy followed, overrunning the Niagara district near the lake, and there was now the danger that the force in the west, near Amherstburg, would be cut off from York and Kingston.

Thus very grave results had quickly followed upon the loss of British naval control over Lake Ontario.

But, happily for Canada at this crisis, which was an important one in the war, a sudden change took place in the fortunes of the contest, and the tables were reversed, largely owing to the recovery of that lost control of the water.

To explain this we must mention that as the American troops were nearing Burlington Heights, a most successful night attack was planned and carried out against them by Colonel Harvey, of General Vincent's force,¹ near Stony Creek² on June 6, 1818, in which two Generals of Brigade, Chandler and Winder, and nearly 200 officers and men, with some guns and twelve batteaux laden with baggage, fell into the British hands.

The British were not strong enough to follow

¹ Afterwards General Sir John Harvey, Governor of Nova Scotia, a distinguished officer who served subsequently at Waterloo.

² It is interesting to note that last year (1909) the Countess Grey, wife of Earl Grey, Governor-General of Canada, unveiled a monument at Stony Creek to the soldiers who fell in this attack.

up the pursuit, in the face of the American supports; but the following day their flotilla on Lake Ontario appeared off the shore, and bombarded the American camp. The enemy, then perceiving that they had no longer command of the lake on their flank, and discouraged by their reverse at Stony Creek, retreated towards Fort George.

This sudden change in the ascendancy on Lake Ontario had arisen in this way.

In May, 1818—and it is a point to be borne in mind that this was eleven months, or nearly a year, after the declaration of war—Sir James Yeo, of the Royal Navy, with 450 officers and seamen, had arrived at Kingston from England to take charge, as Commodore, of the naval defence of the lakes. In June, 1818, also (a full year after hostilities had opened), Captain Barclay, R.N.,¹ with about twenty-five seamen, had reached Amherstburg to supervise and command on Lake Erie.

Sir James Yeo, on his arrival at Kingston, infused great energy into the shipbuilding and naval organization going on there, with the result that while the American flotilla was near Fort George, he issued on Lake Ontario with a British one able to dispute the supremacy of its waters with Chauncey. On May 27, while the Americans were landing near Fort George, a British joint naval and military expedition sailed across the lake from Kingston for Sackett's Harbour to reconnoitre, and if possible take, that post, but the attempt was not pushed with determination, and after some

¹ An officer of distinction, who had lost an arm at Trafalgar.

fighting, and the half-destruction of a vessel on the stocks, was in the end abandoned.

What might have been comparatively easy months, or even weeks, before was not so now.¹ Subsequently to that, Yeo proceeded to the west end of the lake, arriving, as we have said, on June 8, after the attack at Stony Creek, and bringing reinforcements of men, equipment, and stores for the British troops.

After the Americans had retired upon Fort George, much desultory fighting went on upon the Niagara frontier throughout the summer and autumn of 1813 in the "Beechwoods" and elsewhere upon Canadian territory. The incidents which took place, illustrative of wood-fighting and minor warfare, are interesting, but cannot be detailed here. Colonel FitzGibbon distinguished himself at the Beaver Dams, and Laura Secord, wife of a loyalist, to whom a monument has been put up on the spot in recent years, earned for herself a place in Canadian story. The enemy did not renew the attempt to advance northwards to Burlington Heights.

With regard to Lake Erie, Captain Barclay, on reaching that lake, found no adequate supplies there of any kind; and by that time Captain Perry, of the American Navy, a most energetic officer, had made considerable progress in getting together a flotilla at Presqu'île, which, however, so long as

¹ The post of Sackett's Harbour had been left almost entirely defenceless up to March, 1813, but now had been strengthened (see Mahan, *Sea-Power in Relation to the War of 1812*, vol. ii., p. 681).

Barclay's vessels could blockade the port, was unable to come over the bar into deep water in face of his guns.¹

But the naval assistance sent from England had not arrived in time to be of the service it would have been earlier in the war in securing and maintaining superiority upon the waters of Lakes Ontario and Erie; and henceforth the words "Too late" are for Great Britain written large upon the naval operations of this war. What men could do the naval officers and those under them did, but they, as well as British and Canadian interests, were sacrificed to earlier procrastination.

It is useful to note how, at this period of the war, the control of the water affected the operations on land. On Lake Ontario, Yeo, although able to keep the lake, was in no preponderating strength. So evenly matched were his and Chauncey's squadrons, and so much hung upon the issue of a naval battle which would decide ascendancy on that lake, that neither naval commander ventured to engage at what seemed a disadvantage. Throughout part of June, July, and August, the one watched the other, both manœuvring occasionally to bring on a battle which each believed his opponent was anxious to avoid; and in the meantime, as this decisive engagement might be fought at any moment, the ships could not be used, as they otherwise would have been, in convoying vessels with stores, or carrying reinforcements by water,

¹ See p. 44. The most powerful of his ships could not do so with her guns on board.

either to Captain Barclay on Lake Erie, or to the land forces on the Niagara frontier and in the west.

In consequence, the land communications being, as we have said, extremely indifferent, this detrimentally affected the British operations throughout the theatre of war.

The despatches and letters contained in Cruikshank's *Documentary History of the War* enable one to picture clearly the state of expectation prevailing at this period in Canada with both armies while this anticipated naval battle on Lake Ontario was pending.

The land forces, and also Captain Barclay on Lake Erie, were pressing Yeo to assist them, but he felt unable to comply; Barclay had long been anxious to attack Presqu'île with a joint naval and military force, but could neither get men, equipment, nor supplies sufficient for that object; Proctor, in command at Amherstburg, was appealing in vain to General De Rottenburg on the Niagara frontier for support; the American General Brown (opposed to De Rottenburg on that frontier) was imploring Chauncey to co-operate with him, who refused; and the American General Harrison, in the west, was delaying his advance upon Detroit until Perry had secured control of Lake Erie. He had collected his force at Sandusky, had suffered a partial reverse on the River Miami (or Maumee), in an engagement with Proctor's troops, who had attacked him there; and had gained also a partial success; but his instructions from the Secretary of War were to defer further operations

until his communications would be safe, through Perry having obtained ascendancy on the lake.

All thoughts were now turned towards the naval situation on Lakes Ontario and Erie, and in the meantime the British land forces on the Niagara frontier and in the west, as well as Captain Barclay's flotilla, were falling into great distress for want of equipment and of food.

Captain Fulton, Aide-de-camp to Sir G. Prevost, writes, on June 18, 1818, that the 49th Regiment on the Niagara frontier were "literally naked."

And General De Rottenburg, on July 14, that the 41st Regiment was "in rags, and without shoes."

Captain Barclay, on Lake Erie, was an especial sufferer, because, in addition to the interruption at this period of the communications by water, Sir G. Prevost writes to Lord Bathurst on July 20: "The ordnance, ammunition, and other stores for the service of Lake Erie had been deposited at York (Toronto), but unfortunately were either destroyed or fell into the enemy's hands."

The extracts from correspondence which we give below show with what great anxiety the issue of the expected naval struggle for ascendancy was regarded.

Colonel Harvey, the hero of Stony Creek, writes on June 11, 1818: "Our position, so long as our fleet on Lake Ontario is triumphant, is a secure one. Should any disaster—which God forbid!—befall that, we have no longer any business here, or in this part of Canada."

On July 1, General de Rottenburg declines to

reinforce General Proctor, for operations against Presqu'île, both because his men were without supplies and unfit to march, and also because, in the event of a naval disaster on Lake Ontario, he would (he wrote) be under the necessity of "retreating to Kingston to strengthen that point"; and he adds that Proctor, in that event, should be cut off and unable to join him (De Rottenburg) at Burlington Heights, must retire on Lake Huron.

Captain Barclay writes on July 16 to Sir George Prevost: "The whole line under General Proctor (about Amherstburg) must lay open to the enemy in the event of their being able to make His Majesty's squadron [on Lake Erie] retire."

And Sir J. Yeo to Lord Bathurst from Kingston on the same date: "Every military operation, or success, depends entirely on whoever can maintain the naval superiority on this lake [Ontario]."

Thus it is evident that not only the naval commanders, who might, perhaps, have been viewed by some as influenced by professional feeling, but the military equally with them, regarded naval ascendancy on both Lakes Ontario and Erie as of extreme, indeed almost vital, consequence to the success of the defence.

At last Captain Barclay felt it necessary to relax the blockade of Presqu'île on Lake Erie, in order to sail to Long Point on that lake, and there meet some expected supplies (which did not, however, arrive at the time anticipated). Perry at once took advantage of his absence to cross the bar, place guns on board his largest vessel, and come

out with his flotilla upon the lake. When Barclay, therefore, sailed back to renew the blockade, he was obliged instead to take refuge from the stronger American squadron in the port of Amherstburg.

His position now was worse than before, because no supplies could reach him safely over the waters of the lake, even from Long Point; but he worked strenuously to complete the *Detroit*, his flagship, just launched, placing on board of her some guns from the land forts, and at last, feeling (to use the words of Sir George Prevost) "compelled from circumstances of imperious necessity to seek the superior forces of the enemy," he sailed out to bring Perry to battle. He had six vessels mounting sixty-three guns, to Perry's nine mounting fifty-four only, but the latter's guns were of far superior power. At this time not a day's flour was in store for his men, who were on half-allowance, and his equipment was in several respects infamously bad.¹ His crew numbered among them over 200 soldiers, chiefly obtained from Proctor, 85 Canadian-lake men, and only 50 seamen, some of whom had come up but three days before.

In the battle which ensued (September 10, 1818) the American flagship was obliged, early in the action, to strike her flag, Perry removing to another vessel, and victory then hung in the balance, but in the end the American squadron, skilfully com-

¹ For instance, the *Detroit's* port-holes had to be hastily and clumsily fitted to receive the shore guns, for which they had not originally been intended; and throughout the subsequent action the gunners, being without matches or tubes fit for use, had to fire pistols at the priming to set the guns off. (From the Proceedings of the Court Martial upon Captain Barclay, who was honourably acquitted for the loss of his squadron.)

manded by Perry, was triumphant, and the British flotilla was practically destroyed, Captain Barclay being severely wounded,¹ and most of his superior officers placed *hors de combat*. The British loss was about 185, the American 128.

Mr. Roosevelt writes² as follows most generously as to Barclay, Perry's opponent in this action :

"Captain Barclay handled his ships like a first-rate seaman. It was impossible to arrange them so as to be superior to his antagonist, for the latter's force was of such a nature that in smooth water his gunboats gave him a great advantage, while in any sea his two brigs were more than a match for the whole British squadron. In short, our victory was due to our heavy metal."

And also in another passage :

"The chief fault to be found in the American accounts is that they sedulously conceal the comparative weight of metal, while carefully specifying the number of guns. The superiority of the Americans in long-gun metal was nearly as three to two, and in carronade metal greater than two to one."

Roosevelt describes the opposing squadrons thus :

<i>Broadside.</i>						
American	...	...	...	...	...	936 pounds.
British	...	...	...	...	...	459 "
<i>Cross.</i>						
American	...	...	...	...	...	532
British	...	...	...	...	...	440

After this battle, the Americans being now supreme on Lake Erie, General Harrison advanced

¹ Losing the use of his remaining arm.

² *Naval War of 1812*, pp. 273 and 281.

from Sandusky, and the dispirited and disheartened troops under Proctor (whose nervous system had now, apparently, broken down, unfitting him for such a command) retreated before him from Amherstburg along the River Thames. During this retirement, which was very indifferently conducted, discipline became relaxed, and in an action near Moravian-Town (October 5) the British force was defeated and dispersed, Tecumseh, a brave Indian chief, being killed. Proctor's scattered troops afterwards gained Burlington Heights, concentrating there with another British column.

Harrison did not advance further, but returned towards Amherstburg, and later on in the war proceeded to the Niagara frontier.

The decisive naval battle expected on Lake Ontario never took place. After Barclay's defeat on Lake Erie there were some indecisive engagements on the former lake between portions of Yeo's and Chauncey's squadrons, with varying results; and, eventually, the American flotilla becoming rather the stronger, Yeo, who must naturally have felt more than ever the importance of preserving his squadron from unnecessary loss, remained mainly within Kingston Harbour, over which Chauncey kept up a blockade, not, however, entirely effective.

Roosevelt,¹ summing up the relative operations of Yeo and Chauncey in this year (1818), considers that on Lake Ontario the Americans were dominant from April 19 to June 8, and the British superior from that date to July 21.

¹ *Naval War of 1812*, p. 251.

From this to September 28 the fleets were contending for the supremacy, and from September 28 to the end of the operations the Americans held control. It is also estimated that Chauncey's (the American) fleet was able to co-operate with the American land forces (a very important matter) for over twice the length of time that Yeo's was able to aid the British land forces (*i.e.*, for 107 days as compared to 48).

On the Niagara frontier the Americans, as the season for active operations drew towards a close, did little but raid the Canadian border, and, on December 10, burning the small town of Niagara, retired to their own bank of that river. This burning of Niagara and turning the inhabitants out of their houses when snow was on the ground was done upon the official pretext that "the frontier (American) must be protected by destroying such Canadian villages in its front as would best shelter the enemy in winter," and it is only necessary to allude to it here because this action with respect to an undefended town, together with the burning of buildings at York, and of houses, farms, etc., on the border, caused an extremely bitter feeling throughout Canada, and led to subsequent retaliatory measures on the part of the British both on the American bank of the Niagara River, and elsewhere on the theatre of war outside Canada, such as on the Delaware and at Washington.

Towards the middle of December, 1818, General Sir Gordon Drummond, an officer of much determination and enterprise, assumed command on

the Niagara frontier, and, crossing the river, took the American post of Fort Niagara by storm (December 19), which remained from that time to the close of the war (in December, 1814) in British occupation. Afterwards, moving thence along the northern bank of the Niagara, he burnt or destroyed Lewiston, Black Rock, Buffalo, with much of the shipping there, and Fort Schlosser.¹ In the direction of Lake Champlain also the British had succeeded, towards the close of July and early in August, in destroying a quantity of stores at Plattsburg and some of the enemy's smaller vessels on the lake.

The American land forces which were to have advanced towards Kingston and Montreal were not successful. They had waited for the co-operation of the more western column, which they did not receive; and, owing to the friction between their two chief leaders, Generals Hampton and Wilkinson, and their mutual jealousy of the Secretary of War, they moved without concert and slowly. Hampton, in an attack upon a British force, was defeated at Chateauguay by Colonel de Salaberry (October 26, 1818), and a division of Wilkinson's, passing down the St. Lawrence below Kingston, was followed and attacked by armed vessels from that post,² as well as by troops on land under Colonel Morrison, and defeated near Chrystler's

¹ See enlarged plan of the Niagara district on the map facing the concluding page.

² This shows that the blockade of Kingston by Chauncey was not, at all events at this moment, thoroughly effective.

Farm¹ on the north bank of the river (November 11, 1813). As the result of this, no attempt was made upon Montreal, and the enemy evacuated Canadian territory in this quarter entirely.

At the close of the campaign, Amherstburg, in Western Canada, remained in American hands ; and Fort Niagara, on United States territory, as also the post of Mackinac, in those of the British ; but the attempt to permanently occupy any portion of Canada, except about the Amherstburg border, had failed in 1813 as in 1812.

REMARKS UPON THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1812 AND 1813.

On considering the campaigns we have above touched upon, one can see that the want of energetic measures and preparation for war in the winter of 1812 lost the British the command of Lake Ontario in April, 1813. Then followed the burning of York, the loss of Forts George and Erie, and the retreat from the Niagara frontier ; but at this juncture the temporary recovery of ascendancy on the lake by Commodore Sir J. Yeo, with the night attack at Stony Creek, were followed by the retreat of the Americans. Further, the British ascendancy on Lake Ontario not being supreme, and the land communications very bad, led to the misfortunes of Captain Barclay and the naval defeat on Lake Erie, which at once entailed the retirement of Proctor from the west, and of De Rottenburg

¹ Occasionally spelt "Crystler's Farm," but as above on the clasp to the Peninsular medal.

from the Niagara frontier, to prevent being cut off from Kingston.

The importance of the control of the lakes could scarcely have been more strikingly brought out than by these events.

The most general criticism made against the American operations is that for the sake of distracting the defence, they invaded, or attempted to invade, the frontier at too many points, with too many columns; and that it would probably have been better to have massed against Kingston or Montreal.

We close the account of what occurred in 1812-1818 with the following comments by President Roosevelt, Captain Mahan, General Sir James Carmichael Smyth, and General Armstrong (Secretary of War of the United States during the war), which are of great interest.

The former writes,¹ referring to the want of assistance afforded to Captain Barclay on Lake Erie:

"It is a matter of wonder that the British and Canadian Governments could have been so supine as to permit their existing force to go badly armed, and so unenterprising as to build but one additional ship (*i.e.*, at Amherstburg) when they could easily have preserved their superiority."

And Captain Mahan thus alludes² to the inadequate British efforts made to maintain that naval ascendancy on the lakes with which the war had opened, as well as to the importance of that

¹ *Naval War of 1812*, p. 143.

² *Sea-Power in its Relations to the War of 1812*, vol. i., pp. 377, 378, 302-306; also vol. ii., pp. 123-125.

ascendancy, and also to the American plan of operations and its defects :

“ The difficulties of obtaining supplies, mechanics, and seamen in that then remote region imposed great hindrances upon the general British preparations. There nevertheless remained in their hands at the opening of the campaign of 1813 the great advantage over the Americans, first of the separation of the latter's divisions, enforced by the British holding the bank of the Niagara ; and, secondly, of the almost insuperable difficulty of crossing the Erie bar¹ unarmed, if the enemy's fleet kept in position near it. That the British failed to sustain their original advantages condemns their management.”

“ No substantial reinforcements reached Canada until long after the ice broke up,² and then in insufficient numbers. British naval preparations had been on an inadequate scale, receiving no proper professional supervision. The American Government, on the contrary, had had the whole winter to prepare, and the services of a very competent naval organizer. . . . The British frontier which the United States was to assail extended from Montreal on the east to Detroit on the west. Its three parts were : Montreal and the St. Lawrence on the east, or left, flank ; Ontario in the middle, centring at Kingston ; and Erie on the right. . . . Canada depended wholly upon the sea, and it touched the sea at Montreal. The United States, with its combined naval and military strength (crude as the latter was), was at the

¹ At Presqu'île.

² *I.e.*, till the late spring or early summer of 1813, the war having broken out in June, 1812.

beginning of 1818 quite able in material power to grapple two out of three parts—Montreal and Kingston. Had they been gained, Lake Erie would have fallen, as is demonstrated by the fact that the whole Erie region went down like a house of cards the moment Perry triumphed on the lake.¹

" . . . The destruction of the British naval force [on Lake Erie] decided the campaign in the north-west, by transferring the control of the water. Its general military results were in this respect final. Nothing occurred to modify them during the rest of the war. Detroit and the Michigan territory fell back into the hands of the United States."

" . . . From Lake Superior to the head of the first rapid of the St. Lawrence, the control of the water was the decisive factor in the general military situation. . . . Immediately below the last lay Montreal, accessible to sea-going vessels from the ocean—to that point, therefore, the sea-power of Great Britain reached, and there it ended."

"Mackinac, Detroit, Kingston, and Montreal, these four places, together with an adequate development of naval strength on the lakes, constituted the essential elements of the military situation at the opening of hostilities. Why? Mackinac and Detroit, because being situated upon extremely narrow parts of the vital chain of water communication, their possession controlled definitely all transit. Upon Kingston and Montreal, by their position and intrinsic advantages, rested the communication of all Canada along and

¹ In the victory over Barclay's squadron.

above the St. Lawrence with the Sea-power of Great Britain. . . .

"When the boundary on Lake Champlain was reached (by the United States Armies), Montreal was but forty miles distant."

Sir James Carmichael Smyth, who, after the close of the war (1825), was sent to Canada by the Duke of Wellington to report upon Canadian defence, considers¹ that as soon as the American flotilla had become supreme on Lake Ontario,² a concentrated attack should have been made upon Kingston, the British naval post on that lake.

Finally, General Armstrong, referring to the capture of Forts George and Erie in 1813, and the advance towards Burlington Heights, says:³

"It only wounded the tail of the Lion—Kingston or a point below it seized, all above perishes because the tree is girdled."

The above criticisms must necessarily carry great weight; and this may be added to them, that if the execution of the American plans had devolved upon experienced leaders of trained troops, acting in close concert under one command, whatever may have been the intrinsic defects of the plans themselves, a larger measure of success would, humanly speaking, have attended them.

In no future war can it be anticipated that the errors of this war will be repeated by any enemy.

Further remarks upon the above campaigns are deferred to the conclusion of the entire story of the war.

¹ *Précis of the Wars of Canada*, by Sir J. Carmichael Smyth.

² Which it was when the campaign of 1813 opened, and York (Toronto) was burnt.

³ Cruikshank's *Documentary History of the War—Campaign on the Niagara Frontier, 1813*, part iii., p. 146.

CHAPTER V

Campaign of 1814, and what it teaches—American plan of campaign—Opening operations—British again in the ascendant on Lake Ontario—Changing character of the war—British offensive operations—Expedition to Maine—American invasion of Niagara frontier—Occupation of Fort Erie—Correspondence between Brown and Chauncey—Battle of Lundy's Lane—Failure of American expedition to Mackinac—British operations against Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain, and naval reverse on that lake—Bladensburg—Washington—Effect of British reverse at Plattsburg—Termination of the war—New Orleans—Remarks upon the campaign and the war generally—As to ascendancy on the water, and importance of Lake Ontario—Wellington on the defence of Canada—As to naval and military co-operation, and an active, not passive, defence—Impressions left by the war.

IN this chapter we consider what the campaign of 1814 teaches, and certain lessons of the whole war.

The campaign of 1814 opened under conditions very different in many respects from that of 1813.

The American plan of campaign, also, for this year, though it had points of similarity with that of the two preceding ones, was less ambitious in extent, and rather more concentrated against the central portion of Canada, from Fort Erie on the Niagara frontier to Kingston inclusive.

There was, as before, to be an advance against Montreal and Lower Canada from the direction of Lake Champlain, but this was to be at first apparently rather of the character of a demonstration in force—which might, under favourable

circumstances, be pushed further — than a more determined effort.

In the extreme west the American hold upon Amherstburg and the western district was to be strengthened ; but the main efforts of the campaign were to be directed to recover what had been lost ; to establish a firm footing on the Canadian shores of the Niagara and of Lake Ontario ; and to reduce Kingston.

In pursuance of this plan, Fort Niagara, on American soil but now in British occupation, was to be recaptured ; and so was Mackinac,¹ between Lakes Huron and Michigan. Fort Erie and Fort George, too, which in the previous campaign had been taken, but afterwards evacuated, were to be seized once more.

Then, if all went well, and Chauncey's naval ascendancy on Lake Ontario could be maintained, there was to be an advance to Burlington Heights ; and a portion of the Niagara force, joining with the eastern one at Sackett's Harbour, was to be directed against Kingston.

The American flotilla on Lake Erie² was to be partly employed in the expedition to Lake Huron, and partly in other services on the Niagara River

¹ The comparatively remote post of Mackinac (or Michilimackinac), captured by Brock's orders in 1812, proved its strategic value in controlling the passage between Lakes Michigan and Huron ; and its garrison did very good service in this war, as will appear later on. Its possession by the British did much to interfere with American trade with the Indians, and to keep the Indian tribes staunch to the British

² There was at this period no communication between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario as there is now, through the Welland Canal turning the Falls of Niagara, so that the flotilla on Lake Erie could not aid that on Lake Ontario.

near Fort Erie, above the Falls, and in the transport of troops and supplies—i.e., in co-operation with the land forces.


On Lake Champlain the British flotilla had been, since June, 1813, able to hold its own and dispute the control of the lake, but it was not in any dominant strength. Isle aux Noix afforded it a harbour in case of necessity.

Early in the spring an American force, under General Wilkinson, about 5,000 strong, advanced from Plattsburg across the Canadian frontier, but was driven back near La Colle (March 30, 1814) by the garrison of that post, aided by two sloops and two gunboats which had come up the River Richelieu. After this the Americans withdrew, abandoning the idea of further operations here, and eventually entered Sackett's Harbour, leaving posts at Plattsburg and other points on Lake Champlain, while they awaited the result of the movements of the more western forces.

Fighting also went on in the district north of Lake Erie in repelling raids in that direction; but Drummond's regular troops, with the Canadian Militia, succeeded in pushing back the enemy towards the River Detroit.


There was, however, a considerable delay before the main operations on the Niagara frontier commenced; and to explain why this occurred and the different phase upon which the war was now entering, it is well, before describing further movements, to make some preliminary remarks.

A point to be noted is that at the opening of



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this campaign, though not at the commencement of earlier ones, Fort Niagara, an American work and on American soil, was in British hands, and that the whole eastern bank of the Niagara as far as Buffalo had been swept by Drummond in the previous December. A determined opposition to the passage of the river was to be anticipated, and before attempting it one question as to which there were opposing views had to be decided—*i.e.*, whether to attack and carry Fort Niagara if possible as a preliminary to this passage, or to watch it merely until Forts Erie and George on the Canadian side had fallen. The decision as to this would, to some extent, affect the strength and arrangement of the invading force.

Next, the American plans were upset by Sir James Yeo having recovered the naval ascendancy once more upon Lake Ontario. In the fluctuating progress of shipbuilding, he had, by the construction of two new and comparatively powerful vessels, become stronger than his adversary Chauncey, and had come out from Kingston upon the lake on May 4, 1814.

A combined British naval and military expedition was then undertaken against Oswego (although it was not deemed advisable to attack Sackett's Harbour). Oswego was captured (May 5), the fort and barracks there were burnt, seven guns taken, and some vessels also with a quantity of stores destroyed. Shortly afterwards, however, on a cutting-out expedition in the neighbourhood, the British on their part fell into an ambuscade and lost severely.

The American flotilla under Chauncey on Lake

Ontario was now, in its turn, overmatched upon that lake, and kept within Sackett's Harbour, where it was watched by the British flotilla under Yeo.

Thus the fortune of war had again changed upon the waters of Lake Ontario, and this affected the execution of the American land operations intended to have been carried out in close combination with Chauncey's squadron. The experience, moreover, of 1813, after Stony Creek, must have made clear to the Americans the risk and difficulty of moving towards Burlington Heights while a British flotilla was dominant upon Lake Ontario on their right flank. Lastly—and this is perhaps the most important point of all—not only was the strength of Great Britain's Sea-power beginning to tell severely upon her enemy on the ocean, but her whole policy in the conduct of the war had been altered from "defensive" to "offensive," and that Sea-power was now being put forth in close concert with her land forces against the whole American seaboard.

Soon after the commencement of the war (in 1812-13), British frigates had suffered several reverses upon the ocean at the hands of American frigates,¹ which were of a more powerful class, as well as very well fought by their commanders. The reason of this mainly was that Great Britain, after Trafalgar in 1805, had permitted her naval forces to dwindle down in several respects, and had now to suffer for it; but in total strength and general power she was still much superior to America upon

¹ Relieved by a few successes, notably in the engagement between the *Shannon* and the *Chesapeake* off Boston Harbour, June 1, 1813.

the ocean, and, gaining experience from these reverses, had so asserted that superiority that American commerce was suffering very greatly, while the American people, heavily taxed, were becoming tired of the contest.

The Peninsular War also had now been brought to a close. Since the British victory of Vittoria (June 21, 1813), with the subsequent passage of the Pyrenees and invasion of the South of France by Wellington, the anxiety and strain of that war had been relieved, and on April 13, 1814, just after the Battle of Toulouse, officers from Paris had reached Wellington's camp to notify Napoleon's deposition and the conclusion of peace. Thus that splendid Peninsular army which under him had done such service in Portugal and Spain had become available for other fields, and some of its brigades embarked at Bordeaux shortly after the peace to take part in the American War. Of these, 16,000 men were despatched to Quebec.

Their influence upon the operations on the Canadian frontier is not to be duly estimated by the actual fighting part which they were able to take in Canada, because, as will be narrated in its proper place, they were not made use of in Lower Canada to any full extent.

They landed in July and August, 1814, some of the regiments being sent to the Niagara frontier, a brigade to Kingston, and the remainder encamped south of Montreal, between the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu.

It had now been determined by the British

Government to begin an offensive campaign against the northern part of the state of New York, seize Plattsburg, if possible, on Lake Champlain, and carry the war into the enemy's country. With this view, Lord Bathurst wrote as follows to Sir George Prevost, Commander-in-Chief in Canada, on June 8, 1814:

"The object of your operations will be, first, to give immediate protection to, and, secondly, to obtain, if possible, immediate security for, His Majesty's possessions in America. The entire destruction of Sackett's Harbour and of the naval establishments on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain come under the first description. Should there be any advanced position on that part of our frontier which extends towards Lake Champlain, the occupation of which would materially tend to the security of the Province, you will, if you deem it expedient, expel the enemy from it, and occupy it by detachments of troops under your command, always, however, taking care not to expose His Majesty's troops to being cut off by too extended a line of advance. At the same time, it is by no means the intention of His Majesty's Government to encourage such forward movements into the interior of the American territory as might commit the safety of the force placed under your command."

Sir George Prevost's reply to this letter was that the instructions should be obeyed, but that only defensive measures would be practicable until the complete command of Lakes Ontario and Champlain should be obtained, which could not be expected before the September following.

On August 14, 1814, Sir George Prevost writes to Lord Bathurst: "While Kingston is blockaded, your lordship must be aware that no movement against Sackett's Harbour can take place." Thus Yeo was not at this moment in ascendancy on Lake Ontario.

An expedition was also sent from Halifax under Sir John Sherbrooke and Rear-Admiral Griffiths against the coast of Maine, in July and August, 1814, which coast was taken possession of from the Penobscot River to New Brunswick, and held till the close of the war. About the same period another under Vice-Admiral Cockburn and General Ross proceeded to Chesapeake Bay (as mentioned further on), partly to carry out a raid upon Washington which was successfully accomplished, and partly to detain upon that seaboard American troops which might otherwise be sent to oppose Sir George Prevost in Lower Canada.

It had become very evident that the war was assuming an entirely different aspect, and henceforth as a fact Great Britain's power both by land and sea had a preponderating influence upon the contest, and hastened its termination.

The news of the conclusion of peace with France, although the United States could not, of course, tell with certainty the exact effect which this would have upon the operations in Canada and against the American borders, left it undoubted that America must now prepare to defend herself from attack in many quarters.

The American Army was every day improving in

strength, organization, and discipline; but, on the other hand, the Government could not venture to now commit it entirely to the conquest of Canada, where also it was practically certain that the defending forces would soon be materially reinforced from the Mother-Country; and the shadow of anticipated events produced largely the hesitation and delay which in the early summer of 1814 marked the American plans for the invasion of the Niagara frontier, the execution of which did not actively commence until July.

We now pass on to the events of 1814 upon this frontier.

Early in July General Brown, commanding the American force, crossed the river from Buffalo with two strong brigades, occupied Fort Erie, which surrendered with its small garrison of under 200 men, and advanced by Queenston upon Chippewa, the British retiring, but disputing the ground.

Brown now wrote thus¹ to Chauncey, urging him to co-operate with him, and the correspondence illustrates the difficulty experienced during the war in arranging combined action between the naval and military forces. It may be said, too, that upon the British side very urgent communications calling for assistance were at times sent from Drummond to Yeo, and occasionally in vain, in 1813-14.² Some-

¹ See Cruikshank's *Documentary History of the War—Campaign of 1814*.

² Thus on August 18, 1814, he writes: "The wants of the right division in provisions, ammunition, and stores have become great and urgent," and begs him to push up the lake. Again, also, on November 13, 1814, but without success.

times these requests were complied with, sometimes not. It, in fact, depended mainly upon whether the navy was, or was not, dominant upon the water, instead of being only able to keep the lake while watching and manœuvring against the enemy.

Brown to Chauncey.

"July 13, 1814.

"I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field, and march in any direction over his country, your fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara, and carry Burlington Heights, and York, and proceed direct to Kingston and carry that place. For God's sake, let me see you."

Chauncey to Brown (in reply).

"I shall afford every assistance in my power to co-operate with the army whenever it can be done without losing sight of the great object for the attainment of which this fleet has been created—the capture or destruction of the enemy's fleet. But that I consider the primary object, and I shall not be diverted from my efforts to effectuate it by any sinister attempt to render us subordinate to, or an appendage of, the army."

Brown still advancing, Sir Gordon Drummond hastily came up from York, and moved forward, though inferior in strength, to oppose him; and one of the most closely contested and sanguinary battles of the war was now fought at Lundy's Lane ¹ (July 25, 1814). The contest was continued

¹ The Americans term this battle "Bridgwater," and have occasionally claimed it as a victory themselves, perhaps because they were

until after dark, and both sides lost severely; but the Americans could not drive the British back, and the next day, destroying their heavy baggage, they retreated towards Fort Erie. This British victory was a soldiers' battle of desperate downright fighting with the bayonet, and a most determined courage was shown on both sides.

Drummond now endeavoured to carry Fort Erie, which the enemy had occupied, by storm (August 15); but, failing, invested it for some time.

We need not refer further to the operations in this part of the theatre of war. Chauncey yet again in the autumn recovered the ascendancy on Lake Ontario; but finally lost it to Yeo on October 10, by the launch of the British ship *St. Lawrence*, of 100 guns, at Kingston, which greatly strengthened Yeo's fleet.

In the end the Americans blew up the works at Fort Erie (November 5) and retired across the Niagara. No decisive naval battle had been fought on the waters of Lake Ontario when the peace put an end to hostilities.

The expedition sent to recapture Mackinac from the British was unsuccessful. It was not despatched until July, and the attacking troops were driven off by the defenders of the post.

Later in the year (September) there was some

not driven from their ground in the battle itself (though they evacuated it afterwards), and also took some guns in it, which were subsequently recovered. Roosevelt says frankly as to this battle: "Lundy's Lane, though reflecting as much honour on the Americans as on the British, was for the former a defeat and not a victory."

fighting upon the waters of Lake Huron, between American vessels left to prevent supplies reaching Mackinac, and British ones from Matchedash Bay, whence these supplies were sent.

In this, two American schooners of Perry's former fleet on Lake Erie were taken; and two others were captured near Fort Erie, on the Niagara frontier. This reduced the American flotilla, which in 1818 had been victorious over Barclay, in the number of its smaller vessels on Lake Erie, and as winter approached it went into harbour at Presqu'île.

At this point, and before entering upon the events which, in consequence of Lord Bathurst's instructions to Sir George Prevost, took place in the direction of Lake Champlain, it is convenient to say that the experience of this war had fully shown the difficulty of supplying the important post of Mackinac either by land from York to the Georgian Bay (Lake Huron), or from the River Ottawa through Lake Nipissing, and across some miles of wilderness.¹

A depot of supplies had been formed at Matchedash Bay, close to Penetanguishene, but in October, 1814, the necessity of establishing a military post and dockyard near this spot was strongly urged, and would no doubt have been carried out had the war continued.

Mackinac at the peace was given back to

¹ This difficulty of communicating with Lake Huron from York (Toronto) has now been removed by the construction of railways, and communication from Montreal and Ottawa will be further facilitated by the projected Georgian Bay Canal when that is completed.

America, but the importance of the straits was fully demonstrated in the war.

Towards Lake Champlain a British force of three brigades, under Sir George Prevost, crossed the boundary at Odell Town on September 1, 1814, and marched towards Plattsburg with the intention of destroying the works there, consisting of redoubts, blockhouses, and batteries. This force reached the north bank of the River Saranac, close to Plattsburg, on September 6, where they halted to close up the troops, and erected batteries opposite those of the enemy on the river. The Americans, as the British advanced, took up a position at Plattsburg, south of the Saranac (the bridge over which they partially destroyed), where the river enters the lake. Here both their troops and their flotilla, if the latter came sufficiently inshore, could be covered by the land batteries.

It was now arranged between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, the naval officer commanding the British flotilla intended to co-operate on Lake Champlain, and which was at this time a short distance down the Richelieu River, that the latter should, when the wind permitted, come up, enter Plattsburg Bay, and (in order to draw off American attention from the movements of the British land forces at Plattsburg) attack their flotilla. Directly this attack commenced these forces were to open fire upon the American works from the north bank, threatening a passage there, and at the same time a brigade which was to be detached higher up the Saranac, to cross at a ford,

was to assault and storm the works from that direction.

This enterprise was one of the most unfortunately conducted of the war.

The strength of the two fleets in vessels and guns on the morning of September 11, 1814, when, in pursuance of this plan, the British flotilla sailed to attack the American, was fairly equal; but it has been given so differently in various accounts that it is necessary to say something in explanation of this.

Roosevelt contrasts the two flotillas, after careful examination, thus:¹

British (Captain Downie).

Vessels, 16.
Crew, 837.
Guns, 92.
Broadside, 1,192 pounds.

American (Captain MacDonough).

Vessels, 14.
Crew, 882.
Guns, 86.
Broadside, 1,194 pounds.

But Captain Downie had only just taken over the command of the British flotilla, and was unknown to his officers and men, while his vessels were most indifferently equipped and manned,² and in a very incomplete state of preparation for battle.

Under these circumstances he was called upon to carry out a task to accomplish which with success required not only bravery and average seamanship, but manœuvring power, cohesion, and discipline of a high order, and such as can only be looked for as the result of long and careful training.

This task was to sail up under a wind not too

¹ Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, pp. 378-80. Sir James Carmichael Smyth places the American guns as eighty-three, the British as ninety (*Précis of the Wars of Canada*).

² Partly with soldiers.

favourable,¹ and so bear round a point of land into Plattsburg Harbour as to engage on reasonably favourable terms a flotilla of equal strength, anchored in a selected position, from which its guns could bring a concentric fire upon his vessels.

Before Downie had even come into close action one of his vessels had grounded; and during the battle others (gunboats) either could not or did not engage in the main fighting line in support of their consorts at all.

Some writers do not apparent'y include in the relative strength of the two flotillas those vessels which did not take part in the actual decisive fighting, although they were intended to do so, and therefore give their strength much as follows:²

British.	American.
Vessels, 8.	Vessels, 14.
Broadside guns, 38.	Broadside guns, 52.
Weight of metal, 766 pounds.	Weight of metal, 1,194 pounds.
Crews, 537.	Crews, 950.

Downie himself was killed early in the day; his flagship, the *Confiance*, had soon to strike her colours; and the British flotilla was decisively defeated, the losses on both sides being severe.

In the meantime, although fire was opened from the north bank of the Saranac upon the American batteries on the shore of Plattsburg Bay, no assault was delivered.

The British brigade ordered to cross the Saranac at the ford was composed of regiments which,

¹ Though apparently favourable at first, some gunboats could not make their stations under it.

² See MacMullin's *History of Canada* (1868, p. 314); Alison's *History of Europe* (edition of 1848), vol. xix., p. 159; James's *Naval History*, vol. vi., p. 346.

under Wellington in the Peninsula, had carried by storm many strongly-defended positions; but its hour of march had been fixed much too late at headquarters,¹ and a mistake in direction also was made at a fork of the road by a staff officer, which caused a slight (though apparently only a slight) delay. Thus, some time before it had reached the batteries to be attacked, the British flotilla had been defeated on the lakes.

Orders were then sent to the brigade to immediately retire, Sir George Prevost having decided that the possession of the enemy's works would not now offer any compensation for the loss which might be sustained in taking them.

Accordingly, the troops were withdrawn, and shortly afterwards the army fell back to Montreal.

A naval court-martial, which assembled in connection with the loss of Downie's squadron, found that the British attack would have been more effective if part of the gunboats had not withdrawn² from action, and the wind prevented others from taking up their stations; and while honourably acquitting the surviving officers except one, the court considered that the disaster was caused by circumstances some of which reflected upon the conduct of the land operations. In consequence of this, Sir James Yeo was called upon to formulate definite charges. These were in substance that

¹ One—though no sufficient—cause of this seems to have been that it was never anticipated that after the British fleet began to bear down upon the Americans the contest would be so soon decided. In the naval battle between Barclay and Perry on Lake Erie it had lasted for at least four hours. Here it was over in far less than that time.

² They were considered by many to have done so immediately and far too precipitately.

the Commander-in-Chief, Sir George Prevost, had induced Captain Downie to attack by leading him to expect co-operation from the land forces, which was not given; that he had not assaulted the works at the same time as the naval action began, and as he had given Downie to understand that he would; that he had disregarded the signal for co-operation which had been previously agreed upon; and that he had not made a land attack either during or after the naval action, whereas, if he had, the squadron might have been saved.¹

These charges were communicated to Sir George Prevost, who was to be given an opportunity to answer them before a court-martial which was directed to assemble in England in January, 1815, and he was brought home for that purpose. This court-martial, however, never sat. The health of Sir George had completely broken down under the strain of the war and the anxiety and mortification entailed by its latter events, and he died a few months afterwards in England, aged forty-eight, without having been heard officially in his defence.

The order for the troops to retreat without assaulting the works at Plattsburg caused much indignation and heartburning in Canada; but what

¹ Had the attack of the brigade which had crossed up the Saranac been delivered as Downie's flotilla came into action, and been successful, the moral effect alone upon the American flotilla of the loss of their supporting shore batteries would probably have been great; but had the attack been carried through *after* the naval action only, what effect it might then have had in saving the British flotilla from such complete destruction turns rather upon a point which was much disputed—viz., whether the American flotilla was within range of shore guns. The weight of evidence seems to be that it was so, but only within long range.

it is more especially necessary to draw attention to here is the importance, under trying circumstances to a fleet, not only of ships and guns, but of preparation, equipment, crews, and training; and that, after the destruction of Downie's fleet, further offensive operations along the shores of Lake Champlain and towards Albany must have been attended with grave risk of troops being cut off, until the British could recover naval ascendancy on that lake.

Referring to the necessity of having command of the lakes, in order to operate with permanent success in their neighbourhood, Mahan writes :¹

"The Battle of Lake Champlain, more nearly than any other incident in the war of 1812, merits the epithet decisive. The moment the issue was known Prevost retreated into Canada, entirely properly, as indicated by the Duke of Wellington's words before and after."²

The events on Lake Champlain practically closed the important operations of the war on the Canadian frontier, though it had been, and was still being, actively carried on elsewhere.

In August, 1814, a British naval and military expedition from the Atlantic seaboard proceeded from Chesapeake Bay up the River Patuxent, under Rear-Admiral Cockburn and Major-General Ross; and the troops under the latter marched upon Washington, the capital of the United States. After a victory at Bladensburg³ (August 24),

¹ *Sea-Power in Relation to the War of 1812*, vol. ii., p. 381.

² Alluding to Wellington's letter to Sir G. Murray (p. 93).

³ Two colours taken here now hang in the chapel of the Royal Hospital in Chelsea. For this victory General Ross was granted the

General Ross entered that city, burnt some of the public buildings, in retaliation for earlier incidents in the operations against Canada, and then retired.

Of this daring raid—for such it may be termed—Jomini, the well-known French military writer upon war, thus speaks :

“The English performed an enterprise which may be ranged among the most extraordinary—that against the capital of the United States of America. To the great astonishment of the world, a handful of seven or eight thousand English were seen to descend in the midst of a State of ten millions of souls, penetrate a considerable distance, besiege the capital, and destroy the public establishments there—results which history may be searched in vain for another example of.”

An attack made on Baltimore after this was to some extent successful, but in it General Ross was killed, and, after severe loss on both sides, the troops withdrew.

The British reverse at Plattsburg possibly affected in some degree the conditions of the peace which was concluded before the close of the year. Negotiations with a view to the cessation of hostilities had been going on at this period for some time, and Commissioners had assembled at Ghent, endeavouring to arrange its terms ; while Lord Castlereagh desired to obtain such a modification of the Canadian frontier line as would give to Canada greater control of the lakes.

hereditary distinction of bearing the words “of Bladensburg” after his name.

He wrote to the Peace Commissioners of Great Britain at Ghent, on August 14, 1814, to the effect that the views of the Government were strictly defensive; that territory, as such, was by no means their object; but that Great Britain considered herself "entitled to claim the use of the lakes as a military barrier." It was apparently the design to at least stipulate that no fortifications should in future be erected on the southern shores of the great Canadian lakes.

At this period America was even more anxious than Great Britain for peace. Two-thirds of her mercantile class were in serious financial difficulties, and much distress prevailed in her manufacturing districts.

"The extreme embarrassment," writes Mahan,¹ "under which the United States as a nation laboured in 1814 was mainly due to commercial exclusion from the sea"—in other words, to the effect of British naval power upon the ocean.

British successes on land at this moment would have greatly strengthened the hands of Great Britain in the peace negotiations, but the reverse at Plattsburg weakened them. A treaty was signed at Ghent, December 24, 1814, under which the territories of each party to the war were to remain as they had stood when hostilities opened, the exact course of the boundary-line of 1788 being left to be hereafter determined by a mixed Commission of the two nations.

Under this Amherstburg was handed back to

¹ Mahan: *Sea-Power in Relation to the War of 1812*, vol. ii., p. 355. Also *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh*, by the Marquess of Londonderry (1853), vol. x., p. 89 *et seq.*

Canada, and Fort Niagara and Mackinac to the United States.

After the declaration of peace, but before the notification of it had been communicated to the British forces before New Orleans, the latter were repulsed in an attack upon the lines of that place (January 8, 1815), and this, with the subsequent surrender to the British of Fort Bowyer on the Bay of Mobile, practically concluded the events of the war.

REMARKS.

Again in this campaign, as in that of 1813, the influence of the control of the water upon land operations is strikingly brought out. We see it in the way in which the constantly fluctuating ascendancy on Lake Ontario—now in the hands of Chauncey, now in those of Yeo—bore upon both the British and American land movements near that lake, and we see it in the retirement of the army after the naval defeat on Lake Champlain.

Lake Ontario is, comparatively speaking, a more important lake, with regard to the defence of Canada, than Lake Erie; and, fortunately, the Canadian shore of Lake Ontario afforded facilities for a good naval port—Kingston. The success of an enemy upon Lake Erie cannot, so long as Lake Ontario and the country to the north of it, including the eastern shore of Lake Huron, are in British hands, reduce Canada, or cut off the country east of Toronto from Montreal and the sea.

After Perry's naval victory on Lake Erie in 1813, the control of that lake had passed entirely

into American hands ; but there was no American ascendancy upon Lake Huron, and no decisive superiority on Lake Ontario. Thus that victory, though it was disastrous for Canada, was not crushing. Of all the lessons of the war, this is perhaps of the greatest value with respect to the defence of the Canadian frontier.

Had Yeo's flotilla been destroyed on Lake Ontario early in 1814, as Barclay's had been on Lake Erie in September, 1813, and Downie's was in the following September on Lake Champlain, it can be seen how serious the consequences would probably have been for Canada.

On the other hand, the destruction in 1813 or 1814 by the British, of Sackett's Harbour on Lake Ontario or of Chauncey's flotilla, would have been a very heavy blow for the United States.

By writers of much repute upon this war both Yeo and Chauncey have been blamed for not having brought matters earlier to a decisive issue on Lake Ontario.

To Sir James Yeo, however, upon whose shoulders, after Barclay's defeat, lay a heavier burden of responsibility comparatively than that borne by Chauncey, Canada owes this great obligation—that he never at least allowed the complete and undisputed supremacy on Lake Ontario to pass finally to his rival.

Whether he could have safely given more assistance than he did to Barclay on Lake Erie, or to Downie on Lake Champlain, or to Drummond in the autumn of 1814, are matters most difficult to determine.

We have dealt fully enough now upon the value in the defence of Canada of ascendancy upon the lakes and the St. Lawrence, to make it easily intelligible why President Maddison, of the United States, wrote, as he did in 1812 :

"The command of the lakes by a superior force on the water ought to have been a fundamental part of the national policy the moment the peace of 1788 took place."

Also why Wellington wrote thus in 1814, and later in 1825 :

Wellington to Sir George Murray.

"PARIS, December 24, 1814.

"Whether Sir George Prevost was right or wrong in his decision at Lake Champlain is more than I can tell, but of this I am certain—he must equally have retired to Kingston,¹ after our fleet was beaten, and I am inclined to believe he was right.

"I have told Ministers repeatedly that a naval superiority on the lakes is a *sine qua non* of success in war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object should be only defensive, and I hope, when you are there, they will take care to secure it for you."

Wellington to Lord Bathurst.

1825.

In this communication, Wellington, commenting upon recommendations which had been submitted to him as to the defences of North America, alludes

¹ Kingston possibly was written in haste for Montreal, to which place Sir G. Prevost fell back.

to the necessity of establishing connecting communications between Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick ; and of erecting military works at Quebec, Halifax, Montreal, Kingston, and Niagara. He further expresses the opinion that naval stations should be maintained on the great lakes, and then adds :

“ I do not entertain the slightest doubt that if the connections and works proposed by the Committee are carried into execution, His Majesty's dominions in North America ought to be, and would be, effectually defended and secured against any attempt to be made on them hereafter by the United States, however formidable their power, and this without any material demand upon the military resources of the country ; so, on the other hand, I am convinced that if these or some measures of this description are not adopted, and if measures are not taken at an early date to manifest the determination of the King's Government to hold these dominions at all hazards, we cannot expect the inhabitants, upon whose loyal and gallant exertions we must in the end depend for their defence, will do otherwise than look for the security of their lives and property to a reasonable submission to the United States. Even by the greatest exertion of the military resources of His Majesty's Government in time of war, these dominions could not be successfully and effectively defended without the adoption of the greater part of the measures proposed. But if they are all adopted, and attention is paid to the militia laws in these countries, and care taken to keep alive the

military spirit among the population, the defence would not be a more severe burden upon the military resources of the Empire in war than such defence has proved to be during the late war."¹

The above recommendations upon which the Duke of Wellington comments are no doubt connected with the report of Sir James Carmichael Smyth, R.E., who, in the year 1825, was sent out to examine into the question of Canadian defence, when the Duke was Master-General of the Ordnance. This report was in 1826 printed "for the use and convenience of official people only," but was subsequently, in 1862, embodied in *Précis of the Wars in Canada*.²

It is of interest to see in this work that Sir James Carmichael Smyth dwells a good deal on the importance of Kingston, which he considered to be a better harbour than Sackett's Harbour, on the American side.

"There seems no good reason," he writes, "why we should not command a naval superiority on Lake Ontario," and the Bay of Quinté he describes as "the finest basin in the world."

His opinion was that if Montreal Island was fortified, Kingston strongly held, and communication between these points established, back of the frontier (which the Rideau Canal, commenced in 1825, was

¹ This paper by the Duke of Wellington was discovered among the public records at Ottawa a few years ago, and was published in the *Morning Post*, London, April 2, 1904. The date of year only on which it was written is given.

² By Sir James Carmichael Smyth, who was Commanding Royal Engineer upon Wellington's staff at Waterloo.

intended to supply), the British position on Lake Ontario would then be much strengthened; that Montreal was the key of Canada; that if a harbour opposite, at the mouth of the Chateauguay River, were fortified, it would be a great advantage; and that Isle aux Noix, St. John's, and Chambly should be held as advanced posts, to detain an enemy upon the south side of the river.

Although the circumstances of Canada have in several respects altered since 1814, the opinions of the Duke of Wellington and Sir James Carmichael Smyth remain of great value to-day.

The Duke's remarks, made in 1825, were written, it is to be noted, after the "Rush-Bagot" Convention of 1817 (see Chapter VI.), and so apply to the present situation of Canada under that Convention. They clearly advocate the maintenance of naval stations upon the lakes—*i.e.*, apparently stations which in war could become such—although under that Convention armed vessels, beyond the number authorized, could not be built upon their shores or serve upon their waters.

It is interesting also to notice that the Duke of Wellington, who, as an Imperialist, was far in advance of his time, speaks of the Empire and the "dominions" of North America, thus using terms which to many will appear as if written not eighty-five years ago, but subsequent to the period when, under Lord Beaconsfield's administration, the Queen became Empress of India; and after Canada had become a Dominion.

With respect to the importance of close co-opera-

tion between the navy and the army, especially along a frontier such as the lake and river one of Canada, it has been recently said that "the whole history of the British Empire is an illustration of the fact that the two services are interdependent, and that its safety hinges upon their combined action and co-operation."¹

In a special manner do the events of the war of 1812-14 which we have related above illustrate this.

They indicate, moreover, how important it may become at times that over the two services should be some supreme authority, competent at a crisis to give prompt directions to both, and with decision enough to do it.

In this war the naval and military commanders, each zealous for his country's service, were yet so hard pressed in their respective spheres that they very frequently felt unable to aid each other without evident danger to those interests which they individually had to safeguard.

It is under these circumstances that joint and prompt action for the common good can only be secured by a supreme head, capable and ready to assume the responsibility of ordering it; but the necessity for this supreme exercise of authority must arise less frequently in proportion as each service has been trained to understand the wants of the other, to work with the other, and to realize how essentially combined action contributes to their effective power.

Mahan thus comments upon the action of

¹ Blue Book on the Imperial Conference, London, 1909.

Chauncey in connection with the operations on Lake Ontario:¹

"The destruction of the enemy's fleet is the means to obtain naval control; but naval control in itself is only a means, not an object. The object of the campaign was to acquire ascendancy on the Niagara Peninsula. Naval control would minister thereto, partly by facilitating the reinforcement and supply of the American Army, and conversely by impeding that of the British."

Roosevelt also says:²

"His (Chauncey's) ideas of the purpose for which his command had been created were erroneous, and very hurtful to the American cause. . . . The real purpose was to enable Canada to be successfully invaded, or to assist in repelling an invasion of the United States. These services could only be efficiently performed by acting in union with the land forces."

And Sir George Prevost writes to Lord Bathurst, October 18, 1814:

"Military operations are unavoidably combined with naval co-operation, and unconditionally dependent upon it. This conviction has excited a struggle for ascendancy on the water that has drawn forth on both sides an array of vessels that could never have been anticipated on these inland waters; and the naval commanders have, I am afraid, been led to consider themselves as directing squadrons which, by a trial of strength, were to decide the fate of the war, forgetting their necessary

¹ *Sea-Power in Relation to the War of 1812.*

² Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, p. 365 et seq.

identity with the land force for the general prosperity of the common cause."

It can be seen that the land forces could no more secure the command of the lakes without the navy than the navy could terminate the war without the army.

The war of 1812-14 on the Canadian frontier has left impressions in some quarters on both sides of the Atlantic which it seems well to mention.

One is that in war with a Power upon her southern border, Canada, in that direction, must necessarily be overrun, although British successes elsewhere may ultimately secure victory in the war.

Now, it would be palpably over-sanguine to contend that Canada, with her extended frontier, marching with that of another Power, could be absolutely secured against temporary occupation of her soil at all points; and such a view would be over-sanguine even if held with respect to England and the invasion of her borders, although she is an island.

But, nevertheless, that the Canadian southern frontier must of necessity be overrun is not apparently the teaching of this war; and the idea that it is so—that Canada, her borders, and her cities, must inevitably, and whatever she may do, be expected to bear the brunt of hostile occupation—has a tendency with some to create hopelessness and indifference to the subject of Canadian defence generally.

In reality the teaching of the war is rather that,

with reasonably adequate, well-equipped, and well-commanded naval and military defensive forces, Canada need not be overrun.

In 1812, although Hull for a few days entered Canada on the west, he was quickly driven out, and all attempts at invasion in that campaign failed.

In 1813 (April and May) it seems improbable that York (Toronto) would have been burnt, or the Niagara district overrun, had not ascendancy on Lake Ontario been lost through want of energetic preparation to maintain it; and when in June, 1813, it was regained, the invaders were compelled to fall back. Later on, it is true that, owing to the failure to retain absolute supremacy on that lake, and the dependence of the land forces at that time upon water communication¹ for all supplies, these forces could not act effectively, and then after Barclay's defeat and Proctor's retreat, the Western District was again occupied.

But in the following year (1814) the invasion of the Niagara frontier was repulsed with loss, and so were all efforts in the direction of the St. Lawrence below Kingston and towards Montreal.

The war seems principally to convey the following lessons, in addition to what has been so plainly laid down by the Duke of Wellington, as to the *sine qua non* of naval superiority on the lakes, viz. :

The importance of a bold and active defence, as illustrated at Detroit, Queenston Heights, Stony

¹ For remarks as to how subsequent changes bear upon this, see Chapter VI.

Creek, Chrystler's Farm, and in Drummond's operations on the Niagara frontier; and beyond this, as we have before said, the importance of Lake Ontario and the value of naval and military co-operation.

The failure of the attacks on Sackett's Harbour in 1813 and Plattsburg in 1814 prove nothing to the contrary. In neither was the attack pressed home, and at Plattsburg there was in reality no naval and military co-operation, but a striking absence of it, and the effect which vigorous and combined operations would have produced was, in consequence, not tested.

To expect that even the most enterprising General must be invariably successful in such a game of risks as war is too much. Occasionally, as with Drummond at Fort Erie, and with Wellington at Burgos, in the Peninsula, he may fail, owing to various circumstances, but the teaching of all history, as of this war, is that, as a rule and on the whole, a bold defensive policy, as compared with a merely passive or timid one, will win. It is certain also that to allow any portion of a defensive force, through want of timely preparation, to fall into the condition of Barclay's flotilla on Lake Erie, or the forces of De Rottenburg and Proctor in September, 1813, or to be indifferently equipped and trained, as was Downie's flotilla on Lake Champlain, and then require it to meet an enemy, is to court defeat.

Another impression left by the war, and which in past years, at all events, one heard expressed in

Canada, is that, should Great Britain be involved in a contest with even one great naval Power—not to say two—it would be impossible to trust with any confidence to her reaching the Canadian Atlantic or Pacific coasts, still less the great lakes, with an adequate portion of her fleet and military reinforcements in time to prevent invasion. This, it is urged, would require a promptitude of initiative action, perhaps even previous to a declaration of war, which no British Government under the conflict of party politics, and the probable disinclination to precipitate hostilities, could be counted upon to take. It is not forgotten that in 1861, in what is termed the "Trent Affair," the Government of Lord Palmerston did take prompt action; but this is looked upon as affording no precedent which other Governments will necessarily, or probably, follow.

In the war of 1812-14 it will have been noted that no reinforcements of consequence—naval or military—reached Canada until nearly a year after the declaration of war.

Moreover, it is understood to be the naval policy of Great Britain (and a sound one strategically) that the points to which she would send her fleet in the event of war must depend entirely upon where the most decisive blow can be struck by it in the interests of the Empire as a whole; and it is believed—probably rightly—that no British Government, whatever might be its desire, could bind itself, or ever would bind itself, to give assistance from the British Navy to Canada within several weeks or months—perhaps six months—after the outbreak of hostilities.

But Canada is within a very few days' steam (under a week) of Europe. Troops cannot be transported safely across the Atlantic without an escort of armed vessels, and naval or military action at the present day, to be effective, must be prompt.

General Langlois, formerly member of the Higher War Council of the French Army, thus expresses himself recently¹ with respect to what is termed the *Entente Cordiale* with France:

"The *Entente* between England and France is advantageous to the latter, but on the express condition that the British expeditionary force can be landed on our coast on or before the fifteenth day of mobilization—otherwise it will be too late."

Perhaps a kindred thought has risen at times in the minds of some in Canada. In no portion of the Empire is there more complete confidence in the power of the Imperial Navy, or a greater admiration for the naval service. It is not the power which is questioned, but the prompt exertion of it. They would like to feel that naval protection from Great Britain could be expected with confidence upon the coast of Canada within a definite and a short time.

The above impression is mentioned because it is not based upon mere illusion, and probably has had its influence in damping enthusiasm to some extent in the past when the subject of naval contributions has been brought forward, as well as in stimulating the desire to build up a Canadian Navy.

What that navy may develop into in the future

¹ *The British Army in a European War*, by General H. Langlois. Translated by Captain C. F. Atkinson (1910).

time alone can show, but the operations and course of the war of 1812-14 seem abundantly to illustrate that, at that period even, in a war involving the Dominion, there was plenty of sphere for such a navy (as well as for the British Navy) upon the water frontiers of Canada, and also for a strong defending army upon Canadian territory.

What the changes affecting defence have been since 1814 we touch upon in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

Changes affecting defence since 1814, and their influence—The Canadian boundary-line—The Rush-Bagot Convention—The situation on the lakes—The general introduction of steam and electricity—Canals—Railways—Increased importance of cities, towns, etc.—Change in modern weapons and warfare—Methods, but not necessity, of defence altered.

AMONG the changes affecting the defence of the Canadian frontier which have taken place since the war of 1812-14, it is convenient to mention first some alterations made in the boundary-line of Canada.

This is now, on the south, as far west as the Mississippi, much what it was in 1812-14, and much as it had been defined (as far as was then practicable) in 1788, after the declaration of American Independence; but there have been modifications.

In 1788 the country traversed by this line was unsurveyed, and in parts entirely unexplored.¹ The course of certain rivers and watersheds laid down as forming the boundary, and even the identity of the St. Croix, one of these rivers, became afterwards matters of controversy, leading to various arbitrations, treaties,² commissions, and conventions,

¹ It is stated that the existence even of the Rocky Mountains, or, as they were then termed, the "Stony Mountains," was then only known as a matter of vague report.

² The boundary line in Passamaquoddy Bay from the mouth of the St. Croix to the Bay of Fundy has only recently been settled by treaty ratified at Washington, August 20, 1910.

most of which have taken place since the peace (under the Treaty of Ghent) of 1814. On the north-west, also, in 1867, the United States purchased the territory of Alaska from Russia, out of which grew the Alaska Boundary Commission of 1898.

Occasionally the disputes leading to, and the decisions of, these arbitrations, etc., have produced irritation and bitter feeling between the United States and Canada. It is needless to dwell on this here, but necessary to allude to the Ashburton Treaty of 1842¹—one which, rightly or wrongly, caused much heartburning in the Dominion.

Under this, some seven-twelfths of the territory between Maine and New Brunswick, to which Canada laid claim, was awarded to the United States, and only five to her, the result being that the communication between Quebec and Halifax was made more circuitous—non-British territory being interposed within a few miles of the most direct route.

Rouse's Point, also, commanding the junction of Lake Champlain with the River Richelieu, became an American post.²

In that part of the boundary-line between Lake Superior and the Pacific Ocean there have been, too, under various treaties, certain alterations; but the principal point to draw attention to here is that in 1812-14 the district west of Lake Superior was too little known, as well as too difficult of

¹ See Alison's *History of Europe: Continuation, 1815 to 1862*, vol. vi. (1865).

² Some interesting particulars with respect to the award of Rouse's Point to the United States, taken from *Lake George and Lake Champlain*, by W. Max Reid (New York, 1910), are given in Appendix II. This post was subsequently strongly fortified.

access, too rugged and thinly populated, to become the theatre of war on any scale in an invasion of Canada. Necessarily, as years go on this immunity from attack of so important a region will grow less and less. Indeed, the time has already arrived when the defence of this part of the frontier, west of Lake Superior, including the cities which are near it, must be seriously considered. Such defence demands free access on the ocean to the Canadian Pacific ports, and therefore naval power on Pacific waters.

In the same way, the defence of the frontier between Canada and Alaska, and of that towards Hudson Straits, which in 1812-14 did not in any way call for attention, must in the future do so.

Before passing on to other matters, it may be useful to mention that a complete summary of all the alterations which have been made in the International boundary between Canada and the United States is given in *A History of Canada, 1763 to 1812*, by Sir C. P. Lucas, appendix, pp. 821-851 (1909). The various treaties, etc., are also referred to in *Documents Illustrative of the Canadian Constitution*, by William Houston, M.A., Librarian to the Ontario Legislature (1891); and in *British and American Diplomacy affecting Canada, 1782 to 1899*, by Thomas Hodgins, Q.C. (Toronto, 1900).

One of the most important of all arrangements and agreements affecting Canadian defence which have come into force since 1814 is what is known as the "Rush-Bagot Convention."

Under this Convention, entered into on behalf

of America and Great Britain in April, 1817, by Mr. Richard Rush, Acting Secretary of State for the United States, and Sir Charles Bagot, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, it was agreed that the naval forces maintained by the United States and Great Britain on the great lakes were to be confined to the following number and description of vessel on each side :

On Lake Ontario, one vessel.

On the upper lakes, two vessels.

On Lake Champlain, one vessel.

Each of these vessels not to exceed 100 tons burthen, and its armament not to be heavier than one 18-pounder cannon.

All armed vessels on the lakes, beyond what is here authorized, were to be forthwith dismantled, and no other vessels of war were to be built or armed upon them. The naval force so limited was to be restricted to such services as would in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party.

The Convention to be terminable after six months' notice by either side.

This Convention amounts, in its spirit, to partial and mutual disarmament on the lakes, the vessels authorized being sufficient for protection and revenue purposes only. It has been continuously in force to the present day, and has worked in the interests of peace.

In its limitations with respect to tonnage and armament of vessels it may, perhaps, want some revision to suit modern changes;¹ but if so, there

¹ For instance, the 18-pounder gun is now out of date.

should apparently be little difficulty in carrying this out by mutual agreement.

As a matter of fact, it has been, if not loosely, at all events most liberally interpreted already, and what seems required is that under any alterations its spirit should be adhered to. This, it may be assumed, was not only to avoid as far as possible friction and rivalry between vessels and their crews under the two flags on these lakes, but also to insure that the armed strength of the flotilla, which, from being available in either their ports or on their waters, could at any moment be placed upon the latter, should give no undue ascendancy to either nation.

The abrogation of this convention has been at times suggested, and action in this direction would no doubt be welcomed¹ by those shipbuilding firms upon the lakes who from their locality find themselves under the treaty shut out from contracts for the construction of gunboats and war-vessels; but it would probably be a political blunder to terminate it, and one which would ultimately cause serious expense to both nations in land fortifications and armaments.

What has aroused remonstrance in Canada at times, both against the Dominion and the Home Governments, has been the permission given by them on more than one occasion for warships borne on the strength of the United States Navy—not, it is true, built upon the lakes, nor for service upon

¹ And more and more so as communication by the St. Lawrence and canals to the ocean becomes further deepened and available for larger war-vessels.

them, but for use as training-ships for the Naval Militia of States of the Union¹—to pass up from the sea unarmed to stations on the lake shores, their armament for such training being sent separately, by rail or otherwise, to those posts, thus keeping within the letter, while, in the opinion of some, evading the purpose, of the Convention.

It appears that the *Hawk* and the *Dorothea* were so permitted. Also, in 1907, the gunboat *Sandoval* passed up through the Canadian canals to Charlotte, on Lake Ontario; and the *Nashville* also, in 1908, receiving her armament at Buffalo, on the Buffalo River, at the head of the Niagara River, near the exit of Lake Erie.

Those American armed vessels, also, serving on the lakes under the Convention are stated to have become in recent years more powerful than those flying the British flag.

But how this may be at the present moment is, of course, a matter perfectly evident to all upon the lakes, and whatever has taken place under the Convention has been recognized by the Home Government and Dominion Government, in concert with that of the United States.

It also is to be assumed that in equity it is perfectly open to Canada to establish her own training-ships for her own Naval Militia on the lakes, in the same manner as America has done, whenever she may desire and determine to do so.

If Canada is to maintain a navy of her own for the protection of her lake frontier, such a step becomes in the future essential; and with regard

¹ The militia is a State, not a Federal, matter in the American Union.

to this, the writer of the prize essay¹ offered by the Navy League of Canada for the best paper on "Shall Canada have a Navy of her Own?" reflected doubtless the feeling of the Dominion when she said: "In establishing training stations it seems desirable to bring them to the people—to localize them. We may therefore, perhaps, besides establishing such stations in or near some of our Atlantic and Pacific ports, follow the lead of our neighbours, who do not look upon training naval stations in ports of the great lakes as contrary to existing treaty provisions."

The United States, apart from what that lead has given them, have advantages in the size and resources of their large cities and ports bordering the Great Lakes, which should make it impossible for them to misconstrue any action Canada might take towards training her own seamen on her own lake shores. Among these ports we need only mention Chicago, Milwaukee, and Manitowoc, on or near Lake Michigan; Bay City, on Lake Huron, with Sandusky, Cleveland, Erie, and Buffalo, on or near Lake Erie,² though there are others on these, and on the remaining lakes.

Of recent years, along the American shore of the lakes, there has been a wave of enthusiasm in the direction of forming Volunteer Naval Brigades, and from this source many volunteers came, it is

¹ Mrs. W. Hews Oliphant, of Toronto. This essay was published on April 16, 1909.

² And dredging and other operations for the improvement of these ports are constantly going on. See Annual Report of the Lake Carriers' Association, p. 1909 (Detroit, 1910). The Port of Erie is, in effect, the Presqu'île of 1812-14.

said, during the late war with Spain. Naval Militia organizations were established also at Chicago, Detroit, Toledo, and Cleveland.

An article in the *Chicago Tribune* of January 30, 1898, enters largely into what had been accomplished in that respect up to twelve years ago; and although it is not an official paper, it evinces a knowledge of details¹ which makes it well worth perusing.

The arrangements then made are said to provide for the rapid conversion, into fighting vessels for lake service, of suitable steamers and merchant ships, as well as for their manning and armament, so that over 200 specially selected steamers could be quickly placed upon the upper lakes; also some thousands of officers and men from the National Guard and Naval Reserves of Illinois, and any number of rapid-firing guns, adapted to this service, from the arsenal at Washington.

The article deals with the defence of Chicago against an attack from the Canadian border through the Straits of Mackinac into Lake Michigan, and illustrates what measures the United States have, in the undoubted exercise of their rights, taken to protect their own shores.

One must, however, recognize that the organization and resources which provide for the defence of Chicago would assist also to secure the passage of the Straits of Mackinac² into Lake Huron,

¹ As these are of interest, the article is given nearly in extenso in Appendix I. Attention was at this period naturally directed to the matters dealt with, as 1898 was the year of the Spanish-American War.

² The Port of Mackinac, which commands these Straits, was restored to the United States in 1814 (see p. 91).

and transport troops to the Canadian shore. This affects materially the defence of Canada; and should armed vessels be able to force an entry from Lake Huron into Lake Erie, they could there be met by vessels from Buffalo, Cleveland,¹ etc.

The obligations which, with the creation of a Canadian Navy, must devolve largely upon that navy—obligations due to the Canadian people and cities on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard, and on the Canadian shores of the lakes, as well as to the general cause of Imperial defence—are exactly those which the United States owe, and have shown that they are alive to, with respect to their own people and their own cities, such as Chicago.

The conclusion seems to be that Canada must follow the example of the United States, and establish a Naval Militia, or its equivalent, at such stations as will afford convenient opportunities for the training of the officers and men who are to form it.

Such a movement would also encourage the development of the Canadian shipbuilding industry, which, although it had been comparatively dormant for a long period, is now reviving.

In 1907 no large iron or steam vessels had been built on the St. Lawrence or on the Atlantic coast of Canada,² but there are now steel works at St. John (New Brunswick), at Sydney in Cape

¹ See *The Military Aspect of Canada*, by Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) T. B. Strange, R.A., Dominion Inspector of Artillery, delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, May 2, 1879

² *Canada's Resources and Possibilities*, by J. S. Jeans (1907), *The Canadian Annual Review* (1907); House of Commons Debates (Ottawa); and other sources.

Breton, and at other places ; while on the Canadian shores of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, of the St. Lawrence, and of the lakes, there are excellent ports, at some of which dockyards and shipyards now exist, or where, if not existing or of insufficient size, they could be readily constructed. Many varied considerations enter necessarily into the questions of what constitutes a suitable naval port adaptable to the requirements of war ; and where it is most desirable that shipbuilding and refitting facilities should be developed. Only experts can pronounce advisedly as to this ; but, at all events, there is in Canada no want of good harbours.

We may mention Québec, Montreal, Halifax, St. John, Gaspé, Sydney, Esquimalt, Prince Rupert, Vancouver, Collingwood, and Midland (both on the Georgian Bay, Lake Huron),¹ and Kingston.

Very large steam vessels have been recently turned out from Canadian yards,² and freight traffic upon the upper lakes, and along the St. Lawrence to Montreal, is increasing enormously. It is a striking fact that the wheat shipments in vessels from Montreal in 1908 (nearly 28,000,000 tons) was one-third more than in 1907, and double that of 1906, the great bulk of this being Canadian grown wheat. In this year also about 100,000 cattle were shipped.

The growth in number of Canadian vessels

¹ Important, in a defensive sense, from their position on this lake. It was in Matchedash Bay that it was contemplated in 1814 to establish a naval port had the war gone on.

² One built recently at Collingwood, for instance, for the Northern Navigation Company has a length of 365 feet, carries 400 first-class and 70 second-class passengers, with over 3,000 tons of freight ; but her draught of 27 feet at present precludes her from passing through the Welland Canal, between Lakes Erie and Ontario.

plying the waters of the great lakes has recently excited considerable comment in reports upon lake navigation. In 1874 the registry of Canadian tonnage on the lakes comprised 815 vessels, of a total gross tonnage of 118,008 tons. On December 31, 1908, the total number of Canadian owned vessels plying on the lakes (although some were registered elsewhere) is said to have been 2,070, of a gross tonnage of 265,188 tons, and it is steadily increasing.

The stream of vessels (under different flags) passing through that portion of the Upper St. Lawrence termed the Detroit River is constant. It represented in 1909 the passage of a vessel about every fourteen one-fifth minutes, and of 218 tons of freight per minute of the twenty-four hours.

Very interesting particulars regarding the ports on both shores of the great lakes, and the rapid development of shipping and commerce upon the waters of the St. Lawrence route, are to be found in the various official reports on these subjects.¹ Here we cannot enter at length into them, but only touch briefly upon the facilities of some among several of the Canadian lake ports in Appendix III.

Fleets of steamers run upon these lakes and on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in connection with

¹ Such as the Port Directory of Principal Canadian Ports and Harbours; Department of Marine and Fisheries, Ottawa, August, 1909. Reports of Harbour Commissioners and Port-Wardens; Department of Marine and Fisheries, Ottawa, 1909. Annual Report of the Lake Carriers' Association for 1909, Detroit, U.S. (1910). Great Lakes Port Facilities (reprint of Hydrographic Information); Washington, D.C., March 24, 1910. And Statistical Report of Lake Commerce passing through Canals at Sault St. Marie, Michigan, and Ontario during season of 1909; compiled from official records.

the great Canadian transcontinental railways, and there seems no reason why Canada should not in a few years, from her maritime resources and population, organize a powerful auxiliary volunteer fleet.

One great change since 1874 affecting naval defence in Canada, as well as elsewhere, has been, of course, the supersession of sailing vessels by steamers, and the general

INTRODUCTION OF STEAM AND ELECTRICITY

in many forms.

In the future, the operations of war will move faster than in the past, and the control of the lakes will possibly be decided in days, if not hours, instead of in months or years.

The time when fleets manœuvred for weeks, as did those of Yeo and Chauncey, on Lake Ontario, seeking for the weather gauge, or some advantage from the wind, will not recur; and the co-operation between fleets and between naval and military forces, through steam, and the telegraph both wireless and in other forms, can be carried out with greater certainty than was possible a century ago.

The progress of science in this direction alone—not to speak here of aeroplanes and balloons—will favour prompt concentration for either defence or attack, and also make more easy and more rapid the landing of troops upon an enemy's shores.

Another important change bearing upon defence which has taken place since 1814, and which is

connected with the great lakes, has been the construction of

CANALS,

to turn the rapids, upon the rivers which link these lakes together.

These complete the through water communication to the Atlantic, and some of the earlier were undertaken as the result of the experience of the war of 1812-14.

Very large sums of money indeed—about 80,000,000 pounds sterling—have been spent upon the construction, deepening, and maintenance of the Canadian canals, which are of much importance to the Dominion in both a commercial and a military sense.

The River St. Lawrence,¹ with the canals established along its course, now affords communication by water for vessels under 14 feet draught between Lake Superior and Montreal, where ocean navigation commences. The width of these canals varies from about 144 to 164 feet, the locks, forty-eight in number, being designed to accommodate vessels of 255 feet in length, with 44 feet beam. When originally constructed, their depth averaged about 10 feet only; this is now being increased throughout from 14 feet to 22 feet, while in many other respects they have been improved.

The following table² shows the St. Lawrence

¹ Under its various names, see p. 28.

² From the *Annual Report of the Department of Railways and Canals* (Ottawa, 1909); also from *Canada: An Encyclopædia* ("Her Waterways"), by Castell Hopkins.

water route from Montreal to Port Arthur, on Lake Superior, the length of the various stretches of canal along it having for convenience been placed in a column separate from that giving the length of the lake and river portions. From this can be seen at a glance the extent of narrow canal to be protected in war.¹

	Length in Miles.	Length in Miles.
Lachine Canal	8½	—
Lake St. Louis and River St. Lawrence ...	—	16
Soulanges Canal	14	—
Lake St. Francis and River St. Lawrence ...	—	33
Cornwall Canal	11	—
River St. Lawrence	—	5
Farren's Point Canal	1	—
River St. Lawrence	—	10
Rapide Plat Canal	3½	—
River St. Lawrence	—	4
Galops Canal	7½	—
River St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario ...	—	236
Welland Canal	26½	—
Lake Erie, Detroit River, Lake St. Clair, Lake Huron, etc.	—	580
Sault St. Marie Canal	1½	—
Lake Superior to Port Arthur	—	206
	73½	1,160

The canal approaches are well defined, lighted with gas-buoys, and admit of safe navigation, under competent pilots, by day or night; and the Sault St. Marie, Welland, Cornwall, Soulanges, and Lachine canals are electrically lighted and operated.

It is of interest to say a few words about each of these St. Lawrence canals, taking them in order.

¹ See map facing p. 174.

² The Farren's Point, Rapide Plat, and Galops Canals, taken together, are often termed the "Williamaburg Canal System."

The *Lachine*, from Montreal to Lachine, turns the St. Louis or Lachine Rapids above Montreal. It was voted, for military purposes mainly, in 1815, begun in 1821, and opened in 1825.

The *Soulanges* turns the Cascade, Cedar, and Coteau Rapids. It has superseded the old Beauharnais Canal.

The *Cornwall* was begun in 1882, and finished in 1848. It turns the Longue Sault Rapids above Cornwall.

The *Williamsburg* canals (*Farren's Point*, *Rapide Plat*, and *Galops*) turn a series of rapids between the Longue Sault and Lake Ontario. Descending vessels, however, often run these.

The *Welland* Canal, between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, turns the Falls of Niagara. This canal is also important for military purposes, though it is close to the frontier. It was projected by Mr. William Hamilton Merritt, who served actively in the war of 1812-14, and the Duke of Wellington encouraged the enterprise by taking several shares in it. It was begun in 1825, and completed about 1841.

Between this canal and the Sault St. Marie Canal, connecting Lakes Huron and Superior, there is deep water communication for very large vessels. The Sault St. Marie Canal was begun only in 1889, the object being mainly to avoid the payment of duties to the adjoining American canal, and complete an "all red" route from the head of the great lakes to the sea. It is cut through St. Mary's Island, on the north side of the Sault St. Marie Rapids, in the St. Mary's River.

A reference to the map facing the concluding page will show the immense advantage it will be, in a commercial as well as military sense, to Canada to deepen the canal system and water-channels, so that the largest ocean-going vessels can pass through from Lake Superior to the Atlantic, and *vice versa*.¹

At present vessels of 10,000 tons and upwards are employed to carry ocean freight from the western lake ports to Buffalo, at the head of the Niagara River (in the United States); but, owing to the insufficient depth of the Welland and other canals lower than this point, much of the freight is here transferred, and conveyed through the United States (either by American railways or by the Erie Canal, which is being enlarged, and the Hudson River) to New York, as the best route to the ocean. Three-fourths, perhaps, of the large grain and other traffic of the West formerly found its way thus to the sea through United States and not Canadian territory.

Could this traffic, without breaking bulk, be taken through to Montreal and the ocean, the distance to tidal water would be about as short, while the route would lie throughout over Canadian water, and the cost, it is said, be little more than one-half.

But the St. Lawrence canals form by no means all the canals of Canada. In addition to these we must mention also the following, among others of less prominence :

¹ The largest vessels constructed and plying on the upper lakes cannot now pass further eastward than the eastern point of Lake Erie.

The Rideau Canal.—This was constructed by Great Britain, chiefly for military purposes, at the instance of the Duke of Wellington, the want of it having been much felt in the war of 1812-14. Its object was to connect Ottawa, the present capital of the Dominion, with Kingston, on Lake Ontario (about 126 miles), by a water route north of the frontier, and available for the conveyance of troops and stores. It was commenced in 1812, carried out under Colonel By,¹ R.E., and finished in 1832. Its depth does not exceed 9 feet.

Montreal also now communicates with Kingston through the Lachine Canal, the Ottawa River, with its canals, and the Rideau Canal.

The Richelieu and Lake Champlain Canal system commences at Sorel, at the confluence of the Richelieu and St. Lawrence below Montreal, and affords communication via the River Richelieu with Lake Champlain, a distance of eighty-one miles to the American frontier north of the lake. The average canal depth is about 7 feet.

This canal was also suggested by the experience of the war of 1812-14. It was begun in 1830, and completed in 1843.

In American territory south of Lake Champlain there is communication by American canal with Albany, on the Hudson.

The *Trent Canal* was in 1907 open as far as Lake Simcoe. It is intended to connect Lake Ontario, from a point near Kingston, with Lake Huron—200 miles—via the River Trent, various


¹ Hence the old name of Ottawa, which was "Bytown."

lakes (including Lake Simcoe), and the River Severn. The actual canal distance is short (about twenty miles). It has a depth of about 6 feet only, but in war would be useful for the conveyance of troops and stores.

When it is understood that from these main canals run also subsidiary branches, too many to be here enumerated, it can be seen what a considerable part they play in the communications of Canada.

A further projected canal, not as yet begun, but which has been practically approved and its route fully surveyed, must be specially mentioned. This is the *Georgian Bay Canal*, which it is calculated will take ten years or so to complete, at a cost of about 2,000,000 pounds sterling a year throughout that period. Commercially it will be of great importance, its object being to connect Montreal—i.e., ocean navigation—with the northern end of Lake Huron (the Georgian Bay) via the River Ottawa and Lake Nipissing. The total distance is about 440 miles, but of this the greater part will consist of rivers and small lakes, not of canal; and the route will provide a water passage between Lake Superior and the Atlantic, in addition to that by the St. Lawrence and through Lakes Erie and Ontario. The depth is to be not less than 22 feet throughout to Montreal, which will accommodate the large lake vessels of about 600 feet in length, 60-inch beam, and usually with a draught of some 20 feet.


The distance from Port Arthur, on Lake Superior, through this canal, to Montreal, the



Stanford's Geog. Estab^l; London.

MAP OF PART OF EASTERN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

*Comprised between Prescott on the R. St. Lawrence (below Kingston),
Montreal, the R. Richelieu, and Lake Champlain.*





head of ocean navigation, will be 984 miles, and materially less than that by any other route.

At present, by the St. Lawrence route to Montreal, it is about 1,216 miles; and by Lake Erie, Buffalo, and the United States to the Atlantic, it is more.

From Port Arthur to Liverpool by this canal will be about 4,128 miles. It is now, via New York, about 4,929 miles.

It will bring the shores of the Georgian Bay within seventy hours of Montreal, but the determination to construct it is not founded especially on the time which will be saved in transit through it, for the greater speed which can be kept up on the St. Lawrence route, when on the open water of the lakes, much reduces any advantage on this head.

The point, perhaps, most strikingly illustrated by the resolution to build it is the pressing importance of the increasing traffic between Western and Eastern Canada, and between both and Europe, which it is considered will find ample employment for more than the other existing or projected channels of communication, by water (including that via Hudson Bay and Straits), as well as by rail.

This canal is expected to be free from ice from about May to November.

The advantage it would be in a military sense is very obvious, affording as it would a secure route in war well to the north of Lakes Erie and Ontario, running through Canadian territory, and connecting Montreal and the sea with Lake Huron.

The Canals which we have enumerated above have certainly contributed greatly, since 1814, to improve the military communications throughout Canada, and in this sense facilitate Canadian defence; but, on the other hand, it must never be overlooked that, in order to reap the advantages which they confer, they must in war be very carefully watched and protected.

They are in some instances particularly open to raids; and this necessitates the defence of a considerable length of canal by land forces, because war vessels alone upon the rivers and lakes adjoining them, even if in the ascendant on those waters, cannot be relied upon to keep them open.

Another change since the war of 1812-14 bearing very vitally upon Canadian defence has been the construction of

RAILWAYS,

both in Canada, and to the south of her southern frontier.

Under the conditions which prevailed during that war, and when the Duke of Wellington wrote his letter to Sir George Murray, on December 22, 1814,¹ the theatre of war to be considered in relation to the operations upon Canadian territory of armies accompanied by artillery and heavy transport for supplies was practically limited on the north to the northern fringe of the great lakes, and to the west and east did not extend beyond Lake Huron and

¹ Facing title-page.

Montreal (or Quebec), the country beyond these limits being, as we have before said, difficult of access, and the land communications for an army very bad.¹

Now, this is not only changed, but is becoming so rapidly and increasingly altered day by day with the opening up of the country, that in writing upon Canadian defence it is absolutely necessary to consider not simply what exists now, but what is almost certain to come within the next very few years, in some cases even within a year or two years.²

What was trackless wilderness in 1814 is now covered with railways, which traverse both Canada, and the United States close to her frontier, in many directions, connecting all the chief cities and towns, and linking by more than one railway line the Atlantic and Pacific Seas.

Most probably in the next war Canada will have to defend territory northward to Hudson Bay and westward to the Pacific Ocean.

To this we shall again advert farther on, but first of all must mention the most important of the railways which now traverse Canada, some running east and west, nearly parallel to the frontier, and others from various points along that frontier in a northerly direction.

¹ Nevertheless, in the summer of 1814 a small party of about 600 Canadians with one gun succeeded in moving from Mackinac to Prairie du Chien, on the Mississippi, 250 miles, capturing a fortified post there; but this does not affect the fact that the serious conflict between the main armies was limited to the smaller area.

² The rate of progress in certain places of railway construction is astonishing. On the prairie section of the Canadian Pacific Railway six miles of new line were sometimes laid in one day.

It will indicate what a great change has been created by the construction of railways since the war of 1812-14 to say that if anyone standing at a central point—say Toronto (formerly York)—could survey the entire country around, he would see railways running to all points of the compass.

For instance, to the north and north-west, towards the Georgian Bay (through which district it was so difficult to supply Mackinac in the war); to other points on Lake Huron; and to Lake Nipissing.

To the south-west, towards Amherstburg and Detroit (the scene of Brock's success in 1812); and along the Thames (the line of Proctor's retreat in 1813).

To the south, towards Lake Erie and the Niagara district (where, from bad roads and failure of food and necessaries, Barclay and De Rottenburg endured so much in 1813).

And to the north-east—bordering Lake Ontario—towards Kingston and Montreal (to which points in the war the only main road became at times impracticable for heavy transport).

He would see now in these directions a complete network of railways, uniting, often by more than one line, the main cities and towns, such as Montreal, Kingston, Hamilton, and very many others, crossing also the St. Lawrence (under its various names of St. Lawrence, Niagara, and Detroit, etc.) at more than one point, and connecting, beyond the Canadian boundary, with the railways of the United States, which to the southern side of the frontier come down also in all

directions to the towns on the southern fringe of the lakes and the St. Lawrence.

It is much the same thing with the country south of Montreal bordering Lake Champlain.

Also, to the north of the old theatre of war, and far outside its limits, important transcontinental lines now entirely cross Canada, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, carried, with much labour and at a great expense, over the passes of the Rocky Mountains.

Without attempting to allude to all the railways which together make up the nearly 30,000 miles of line throughout the Canadian Dominion,¹ we may give a sufficient idea of these by referring to the five chief railways (which have now absorbed into their system many of the others).

These five railways are the Intercolonial, the Grand Trunk, the Canadian Pacific, the Grand Trunk Pacific, which is part of the Grand Trunk system, and the Canadian Northern.² See map facing p. 134.

These are all either in full operation, partial operation, or just on the eve of completion.

THE INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY

was begun after the passing of the Confederation Act of 1867, and opened for traffic in 1876, being built

¹ The railway mileage of Canada is per head of her population greater than that of any other country in the world.

² For several of the details as to these railways we are indebted to "The Railway Development of Canada," by Dr. George R. Parkin, C.M.G. (*Scottish Geographical Magazine*, May, 1909), and also to *Imperial Outposts*, by Colonel (now Major-General) A. M. Murray (1907), and the *Gates of Our Empire*, by T. Miller-Maguire, M.A., LL.D. (1910).

partly for commercial but also partly for military purposes, in order to unite the Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia (comprising Cape Breton¹), New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island (including the ports of Halifax, Sydney, North Sydney, and St. John) in connection by rail through Canada with the provinces of Quebec and Ontario.

The line was run entirely through Canadian territory, and as far as possible to the east of the American frontier. From Halifax—and also from St. John and Sydney—it passes to Moncton, thence by the Bay of Chaleur, and round close to the St. Lawrence, through Rivière de Loup, to Quebec and Montreal, where it connects with various other Dominion lines.

The Canadian Government is, it is said, about to spend a considerable sum of money upon Gaspé Harbour, at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, as a port, to be used in connection with a new line of fast steamers to Liverpool. This will form the shortest route from Canada to Liverpool.

THE GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY

was originally incorporated in 1852, and has since been much extended. Its system includes a large part of those lines which have been already alluded to as covering the old theatre of war of 1812-14.²

It connects the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, at various points of the Canadian frontier, with the railway lines of the United States, thus communicating with all the chief cities of the Union.

¹ Incorporated with Nova Scotia.

² It has practically absorbed the Northern Railway, begun in 1850, and the Great Western, commenced about 1853.

It links Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, and the Niagara frontier with each other.

From Toronto it runs north towards the Georgian Bay and Lake Nipissing, and west to Port Sarnia at the southern end of Lake Huron, continuing on to Detroit and Chicago in the United States.

From Montreal it runs south-east to the American Atlantic port of Portland; south to La Colle, joining with the Central Vermont Railway, which skirts Lake Champlain and passes on to Albany and New York; to the west it runs to Ottawa and the Georgian Bay.

It also connects with the Intercolonial Railway and the maritime provinces, by the Atlantic, Quebec and Western Railway.

THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY.

This is a very important railway strategically both for Canada¹ and the Empire.

It was opened in 1886, having been promoted largely by a few far-seeing men, among whom were Sir John Macdonald, Premier of Canada; Sir George Stephen, now Lord Mountstephen; and Sir Donald Smith, now Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal. It opened a way through Canadian territory to the Pacific, and to the mineral and agricultural

¹ The extent also commercially of the operations of this line may be gathered from the statement of its president, Sir Thomas Shaughnessy, at the annual meeting of 1906, that throughout the last six years the rolling-stock had been increased at the rate of one locomotive (i.e., engine) every three working days, one passenger car every two, and fourteen freight cars every day, and was still behind what was required to cope with the traffic.

resources of the Far West,¹ and links with its steamship lines on the Atlantic and Pacific, by an entirely British service, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, India, Japan, and China.

Its through and branch lines run to Quebec, Montreal, Toronto, St. John (New Brunswick), Halifax, and many other important points of the Dominion, and on to the United States; but in respect to defence, its chief feature is the through trans-continental route from ocean to ocean. By this the transit from Quebec to the Pacific port of Vancouver, some 8,000 miles, is effected within about five days; while the distance from Liverpool to various points in China, Japan, and on the Pacific coast, has been reduced by from 1,000 to 1,200 miles.

Yokohama is brought within a little over 10,000 miles of Liverpool, as compared with over 11,000 miles from Plymouth (the nearest point in England), via the Suez Canal.

It runs, however, at certain places, and for some distance along portions of its route, especially to the west of Lake Superior, close to the American frontier.

In connection with the Canadian Pacific Railway the New Zealand Shipping Company has just established a line of steamers for cargo only from Eastern Canadian ports to Melbourne, Sydney, Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton, and Dunedin.

¹ Before its construction this traffic all passed virtually by the American trans-continental lines.

THE GRAND TRUNK PACIFIC RAILWAY,

which, as we have said, forms part of the system of the Grand Trunk, though not as yet in full operation, is on the point of becoming so, its completion being expected before the close of next year (1911).

This line, in a defensive sense, has a special value. It will form an all-British line of about 8,600 miles, from Moncton, in New Brunswick, by Quebec, and well to the north of Lake Nipigon and the great lakes, to Winnipeg, and thence by Edmonton and the Yellowhead Pass¹ to Prince Rupert, in British Columbia, a very fine land-locked harbour on the Pacific Coast, north of Vancouver Island.

This will still further shorten the distance from London to Yokohama, in comparison with any other route, by some 200 miles. From Moncton a branch line will run to St. John; and Halifax will be reached by the Intercolonial Railway.

Branch lines will also be run from the main route, southerly to Fort William, and Port Arthur (on Lake Superior); towards the Georgian Bay, connecting with the Grand Trunk line; and also to Montreal.

This railway, moreover, reserves power to construct, if desired, several other branch lines, of which we may mention the following: One from a point between Winnipeg and Edmonton, northward, to the shores of Hudson Bay, in the vicinity of Fort Churchill; one from a point between Edmonton

¹ The most favourable spot to cross the Rocky Mountain range to be found at any point of it. Recently difficulties, connected with labour-supply, have made it probable that the line cannot be carried through the mountains as early as the close of 1911.

and Prince Rupert, southward to Vancouver and northward to Dawson, on the Yukon ; and others to Regina and Calgary. A steamship line in connection with this railway is to run between Prince Rupert, Vancouver, Victoria, and the islands on the coast of British Columbia.

THE CANADIAN NORTHERN RAILWAY.

This line, now in construction, connects Port Arthur, at the head of Lake Superior, with Winnipeg and Edmonton, and is being pushed through the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific.¹ It has also sections west of Winnipeg, opening out the country towards Prince Albert and Regina. Eastward from Winnipeg it will connect with Port Arthur the Georgian Bay and Toronto. It has many miles constructed in the province of Quebec ; and, in the direction of Hudson Bay, a portion has been already completed as far as the Pas Mission (100 miles), running from a point west of Lake Winnipeg, along the valley of the Nelson River towards Port Nelson.² Before long it will doubtless reach Hudson Bay, and contribute to the opening up of the valuable grain and pasture districts of the Saskatchewan and Peace Rivers.

What the completed line to Hudson Bay will accomplish is thus alluded to in Stanford's *Compendium of Geography and Travel* :

"Churchill Harbour is situated near the centre of the North American continent—i.e., halfway to

¹ Through the Yellowhead Pass to New Westminster and Vancouver, and ultimately to Quatsino, north point of Vancouver Island.

² It is understood also that the construction, by an independent syndicate, of a line to Fort Churchill has been arranged.

the Pacific—and yet, owing to the convergence of the meridians towards the north, it is actually nearer to Liverpool than either Montreal or New York. The distance from Churchill Harbour to Liverpool, via Hudson Straits, is about 2,926 miles; from Montreal, via Cape Race, it is 2,990; and from New York, via Cape Clear,¹ 3,040 miles, showing 64 miles in favour of Churchill as compared with Montreal, and 114 miles as compared with New York. Churchill Harbour is only 400 miles from the edge of the greatest wheat-fields in the world.”²

In connection with the Great Northern Railway, a line (the Royal Line) of large and fast steamers has just been opened by two twin vessels, the *Royal Edward* and *Royal George*, to run between Bristol, Quebec, and Montreal in the summer, and probably Bristol and Halifax in the winter.

The above railways may in war be found of far-reaching importance to the Empire and to Canada. Until the Canadian Pacific was built, it would have been almost impossible to have concentrated troops or supplies required for the defence of the frontier west of the Mississippi; or reinforced, from Canada,

¹ South point of Ireland. By other routes taken, the distance is rather greater.

² “Of what consequence this route may become, is realized by the consideration that from Liverpool to Winnipeg it will save inland carriage of about 2,000 miles, as compared with the route via New York or Halifax. It would reduce the distance from Liverpool to Japan to 9,734 miles—i.e., to a distance of 2,352 miles less than that via New York and San Francisco, which is 12,078 miles. Professor Hind, of Canada, considered in 1878 that, with strongly-built steamers, using the magneto-electric light, Hudson Straits could be navigated from June to October inclusive.”—See Stanford's *Compendium of Geography and Travel*, p. 317.

posts on the Pacific coast, such as Esquimalt, which has recently been taken over by the Dominion for the Home Government.

Imperial interests in the Pacific Ocean are now likely to become greater year by year. The rise of Japan, the projected Panama Canal, with the situation of New Zealand and Australia, all point to this ; and the trans-continental lines which now bring the Pacific shore and the food-supplies of the West within almost ten days of England are strategically of great value. They would also facilitate the occupation of a second or third line of defence north of the great lakes.

But while speaking of railways it must be said also that those to the south of the Canadian frontier, of which there are many, would facilitate an enemy's concentration for attack, just as those to the north of it would facilitate Canadian defence ; and that the defensive value of the Dominion railways depends much upon their direction with respect to the frontier, their vicinity to it, and the power of protecting them.

If from their position they can be easily and rapidly reached, they are liable to be cut, or perhaps seized and utilized, by an enemy.

Those railways farthest from the frontier are from their situation necessarily the most secure.

We have said that Canada will in the next war have probably to defend territory northward to Hudson Bay and westward to the Pacific Ocean.

Already it is clear that many important cities between Lake Superior and the Pacific, and also ports on that sea, such as Vancouver, Esquimalt,

and Prince Rupert, must be defended, and this part of the Dominion may be regarded as forming a separate section of defence from that between Lake Superior and the Atlantic.

With respect more particularly to Hudson Bay, it may seem, perhaps, to some unnecessary, even absurd, to consider this district, not as yet opened up, from the point of view of defence. Part of it is most difficult to traverse, but, nevertheless, Hudson Bay is not, from its southern shore (James Bay), more than 500 miles from Montreal, or Ottawa, or Toronto, and less from Lakes Superior and Huron. When we reflect that railways will pretty certainly soon reach that bay at more than one point;¹ that across its waters an increasing commerce will in the future be borne in the open season eastward to Great Britain and Europe; that its distance from the great lakes is little more than from Berwick to Land's End, in England, and not nearly as far as from Cape Town to Pretoria, in South Africa, it seems no wild speculation that in the next war, were Hudson Straits not made secure, an enemy's naval and military force might pass through, dominate the bay, and strike at Canada from the north.

Everything seems to point to the conclusion that Canada is not commencing to build her navy before her interests on the Atlantic and Pacific

¹ A few years ago it was contemplated to run a railway north from Toronto to James Bay on Hudson Bay, and though apparently this has not as yet been determined on, it is more than probable that before very long the silver and mineral districts lying between the Georgian Bay and Hudson Bay will be traversed by rail.

coasts and on her inland waters absolutely require the protection of such a navy as well as of the Navy of Great Britain; and, further, that for her southern frontier she wants an efficient and numerically strong land force.

Another point in which a change which bears upon defensive arrangements has taken place in Canada since 1814 is the

INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS

on or near the frontier line, such as Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, and others, the strategic positions of which must probably make them, with the railways connecting them, the special objects of an enemy's attack.


The great consequence it is to Canada that preparations should be made to ensure their defence is undoubted. If it be thought that, if left undefended, they will not in modern war be bombarded or injured, it must not be overlooked that they will then, at all events, be almost certainly occupied, with the disastrous consequences, in a military and financial sense, which this must entail.

Years ago, before the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, the Canada Defence Act provided for the guaranteed loan of 1,000,000 pounds sterling for the building of forts round Montreal, and for a free gift for the armament of those forts, and of others at Quebec, and Levis

¹ The Canadian forts and fortifications of 1812-14 are necessarily, where they still exist, no longer formidable as defensive works.

ARCTIC OCEAN

MAP OF PORTION OF NORTH AMERICA, SHOWING BOUNDARIES



Scale of English Miles

London

SHOWING BOUNDARIES OF CANADA AND THE TRANS-CONTINENTAL RAILWAYS.



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opposite. This was apparently declined by the Dominion Government,¹ in favour of a transfer of this guaranteed loan of £1,000,000 to the Canadian Pacific Railway.

This, as has before been said, was a measure which time has entirely vindicated; but the original provision of this loan indicates the military consequence attached at that period to the defence of these points, and which nothing has since occurred to materially alter. The Dominion now practically possesses more than one Trans-Continental Railway, and the following considerations, therefore, seem those which at the present moment more immediately require to be weighed.

I. That, if in war, through want of adequate preparation to maintain them, the posts of Quebec, Montreal, or Kingston were to fall to an enemy, the benefit of previous expenditure in other directions upon defensive measures might be largely, if not entirely, neutralized.

II. That Canada would suffer a greater disaster than at any time befell her in the war of 1812-14; and

III. That both British and foreign critics of other nations upon the operations of that war accept this, in addition to the importance of the command of the lakes, as among the main lessons of that contest.²

What is meditated for the future in connection

¹ Lecture on "The Military Aspect of Canada," by Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) T. B. Strange, R.S., Dominion Inspector of Artillery, delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, May 2, 1879.

² See pp. 67-70, 93-95.

with the defence of Canadian cities and posts is known to and rests with the Dominion authorities. We merely allude here to the importance of these posts in relation to Canadian defence.

Finally, among the changes affecting defence which have taken place since 1812-14, one—viz., the change in the character of

MODERN WEAPONS AND WARFARE

—has been far reaching, and is constantly going on. War has become much more complex. But a few years ago even, ... Cavalry Divisional Signal Squadron, organized with wireless and cable telegraph signalling and despatch-riding troops, motor cyclists, and motor cars; and artillery designed to oppose aeroplanes, were things undreamt of. The introduction of rifled and long-range cannon and small arms, of the telegraph and telephone, of steamers, of motors, of cycles, of balloons and dirigible airships and aeroplanes, electrical mines, torpedoes, and other scientific inventions in the art of warfare, have modified the methods of defending ports and towns in a material degree. The system of protecting them by works of stone or masonry (which require a numerically strong garrison for their defence) has been to some extent superseded in recent years by other systems, such as that of a few very powerful guns at certain points, earthworks, and a mobile land force in support.

But among changing systems, one point remains unaltered, which is that guns, whether naval,

garrison, field, or horse, to be of full value, must not be such as are partially obsolete, or liable to be outclassed by the artillery to which they may be opposed,¹ and which, from a distance, can put them out of action with but little risk of damage to themselves. Defence to be thoroughly effective must be up-to-date.

In conclusion, it is only the system, not the necessity of the defence of posts, which has changed.

¹ During the late South African War, in the operations before Ladysmith, this was forcibly illustrated.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

What the preceding chapters indicate—Some points of naval and military defence considered—Importance of a mobile, well-equipped land force—The assistance which such a force may derive from modern science in defence of a water frontier—Aeroplanes, etc.—Value of close concert in naval and military action—Facilities for defence possessed by Canada—Creation, under the Imperial Defence Conference recommendations, of a Canadian Headquarters Section of the Imperial General Staff.

To what nature of defensive measures, then, do the character of the Canadian boundary line, the experience of the war of 1812-14, the views of the Duke of Wellington as to the *sine qua non* of Canadian defence, the changes affecting defence which have taken place since 1814, the present situation on the lakes, and the circumstances of Canada to-day, seem to point as best adapted to maintain the integrity of the Canadian frontier?

As to this, it must be expected that opinions will vary; but it is proposed in this concluding chapter, and although it must involve occasional repetition of what has been already said, to sum up what is apparently indicated.

In the first place, the dictum of Wellington and his recommendations for the defence of Canada ¹

¹ See p. 23.

remain in their spirit and in substance as applicable now as when they were written, although, were he alive to-day, he might no doubt have added to them, in consequence of the development of the Dominion since 1814.

It is evident that an enemy with a naval force of fast, well-armed vessels under steam, completely dominant upon the lakes, could continually threaten Canada with invasion at so many points of her southern frontier, that it would keep her defending land forces on a *qui vive* so perpetual that it would tend to weary out the defence.

Also, that such a naval force would almost certainly have the power in the end to carry through a descent at some point where it might not be possible to concentrate a land force in time sufficient to prevent it; and the hostile warships, if armed with ordnance of greater range and power than the artillery of the land defence, would have the railways along the Canadian water-border, with the undefended cities and towns, under effective fire without danger to themselves, and without landing troops at all.

A defensive land force alone, without support from a naval one upon the lakes, must be from the first most heavily handicapped, and unfairly pitted against an enemy whose ascendancy upon the lake waters had become so established that his war-vessels could traverse them safely and at will from point to point.

Moreover, without naval power on the water boundary, an active, as distinguished from a merely passive (and therefore incomplete), defence

of the frontier would become almost impracticable for Canada in the region of the lakes; and for her to yield up voluntarily her power of assuming the offensive in war beyond her water boundary would be to deliberately sacrifice one of the strongest points of her position as regards defence, and ignore the teaching of 1812-14.

Therefore Canada, if the integrity of her southern frontier is to be preserved, cannot afford to-day, any more than she could in 1812-14, to suffer the control of the lakes and the St. Lawrence to pass to an enemy. But such control of the water can never be either obtained or maintained by a land force alone.

Canada also has to make provision for the defence, not of the lake frontier only, but of her Atlantic and Pacific ports; and to provide such a description of defence as will be available the instant war breaks out. It cannot be anticipated that time will be given to receive naval reinforcements from a distance before some hostile blow is struck.

Even if the contest should be with a European—i.e., a comparatively distant—naval Power it is clear that “no longer, as in Monroe’s time, does a vast Atlantic Ocean separate the Western Continent from Europe. Man’s ingenuity has reduced it to a small stream, across which the fleets of European Powers can cross in less time than it took Monroe to post from Washington to Boston.”¹

If the contest should be with an enemy on the southern frontier, then the lakes and seaports of

¹ *The Valor of Ignorance*, by Homer Lea (1900).

Canada may become still more rapidly the scene of hostilities.

Although the British Navy may be able both to watch and account for the main battle fleet of the enemy, it certainly cannot be expected to safeguard the Canadian frontier from invasion during the first weeks, possibly months, of war between Great Britain and a first-class naval Power, not to say two such Powers. That security must at the outset mainly and unavoidably depend upon Canada herself.

Finally, water transport when it can be resorted to remains to-day in war, in spite of the introduction of railways, superior as a carrying power to land transport in many respects.

"The volume of a river's flow is intangible; it cannot be blown up, or, if sufficiently large, be obstructed."¹ In this connection, and from a defensive point of view, it would seem a mistake to permit, as has at times been suggested, the construction for commercial purposes of a barrage completely across the St. Lawrence, with locks on the American side (thus controlling the passage of the river) between Kingston and Montreal—a greater mistake than to sanction the Channel tunnel between England and France.

"The sea,"² when free from the enemy's warships, offers the best means of communication—not only on account of the speed of modern steamers and their carrying capacity, but from the fact that their

¹ *Imperial Defence*, by Lieutenant-Colonel (now Brigadier-General) E. S. May, 1902, p. 109.

² And the same applies to the great lakes of Canada.

lines can be as numerous as are the ports controlled on the enemy's seaboard."¹ But neither sea, nor lake, nor river, transport is available in war to any safe extent where there is not naval control of the water.

Thus, for Canada naval ascendancy on her sea-coasts, inland waters, and lakes—and especially does this apply to Lake Ontario—cannot consistently with the security of her frontier be yielded to any foe. The lakes on her water frontier, if ascendancy upon them is held by her, form a formidable obstacle to an enemy; but if their control is in the hands of that enemy, they become a danger to herself.

As a consequence, an efficient Canadian Navy, as well as British naval power on the ocean, would seem to be essential to an efficient Canadian defence.

Passing on from the subject of naval defence to land defence, it must be borne in mind that Canada is not an island, although from her geographical and strategical position her future (within the Empire) may be that of an important naval Power.

She cannot from a naval force alone, whether it be her own or that of Great Britain, obtain that comparative security from sudden invasion which is enjoyed by the British Isles, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand, all countries to attack whose borders an enemy must be brought on ships, and by ships alone. She is also now more vulnerable by land than in 1814, owing to the greater

¹ *The Veil of Ignorance*, by Homer Lea (1909).

extent of her territory which may become the theatre of war, and to the development, in military resources and power, of possible enemies.

Her southern water frontier is in parts so narrow that from the opposite bank it can be commanded by modern guns, and her southern purely land frontier is of very great length. She might also now, as happened more than once in 1812-14, and in spite of all naval efforts, lose temporarily, at all events, the control of one or more of the lakes.

Thus she may be driven by circumstances to rely, and rely mainly, upon her land forces to protect her frontier, especially her southern frontier, with the cities and towns in its vicinity, from aggression. But happily, to counterbalance this, she may hope—should the control of the lakes be unfortunately lost to her—to use those land forces more rapidly, uninterruptedly, and effectively than in the past, because the land communications of Canada have entirely altered in character since 1814.

When the Duke of Wellington wrote his letter of December 22 in that year, so bad at certain periods were the roads which formed these communications that, if water transport were interrupted or closed, the land forces suffered very severe distress; they fell short at times of food, equipment, and ammunition, and became temporarily unfit to march or carry on concerted military operations.¹ Railways and better roads, provided they can be protected from the enemy, have, at all

¹ As, for instance, in 1813, on the Niagara frontier and in the west about Amherstburg, shortly before Barclay's defeat on Lake Erie (see Chapter IV.).

events, since 1814 modified Canadian land communication to the advantage of Canada.

In addition, modern military science makes it comparatively more possible now than formerly for a strong and effective land force alone—i.e., a force well armed, organized, trained, and commanded, with a capable staff, and thoroughly well equipped—to protect a water frontier. This implies, however, that the force must be a light and mobile one, prepared for war, capable of rapid assembly, complete in modern appliances for shore defence, and also in all its various departments, so that it can, on the shortest notice, take and keep the field.

Submarine mines, torpedoes, and other methods of shore defence, are now available, which were not in 1814; and ships can be attacked, under certain circumstances, on the water, from above the water, and under the water, by other engines of war than the guns of opposing vessels.

The balloon, the dirigible airship, and the aeroplane, added to mounted infantry and cyclist corps, form means for ascertaining the position and intentions of an enemy, not employed in 1812-14; and the problem has yet to be determined how far a land force of a nation possessing the control of the air may prevent an enemy's ascendancy over the water which washes that nation's shores.¹

Speaking on this subject, a recent writer says:²

¹ An interesting article upon the question of "How Airships are likely to affect War," by Major B. Baden-Powell, appears in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, May, 1910.

² "The Defence Problem from the Imperial Standpoint." Paper read before the National Defence Association, March 17, 1900, by Mr. L. S. Amery, editor of "*The Times*" *History of the War in South Africa*.

"I am not in the least perturbed by the prospect of a great invasion by foreign hosts in airships or on aeroplanes, but I do not think we can exaggerate the importance which the aeroplane will possess in a few years as a means of scouting. . . . On the Canadian frontier, in view of the enormous industrial development of the United States all along the border, our advantage will not be on our side, though it is very satisfactory to see that Canadians are entering keenly and successfully with their kinsmen over the border into competition for the mastery of the air."

In any case, a mobile land force, supported by a good system of shore defence, and in possession of the means for aerial warfare, will be a more awkward foe for war-vessels to encounter than one unprovided with these auxiliaries, and more formidable on the lake borders than a land force under the circumstances of 1812-14.

One occasionally reads in military works of the advantage which the possession of a so-called "amphibious force" confers upon a nation with free access to the sea, meaning by the word "amphibious"—which is a very far-fetched, though expressive, one—a force composed of seamen and landsmen (navy and army) accustomed to work with each other in defence and offence, by water and by land, and thus aware of each other's weak points which, if lost sight of, may go far to mar their concerted action, and also of their strong points, when combined.

If such a force could be of value anywhere, it should be so upon the water frontier of Canada.

If it be considered that what has been outlined in the preceding pages goes beyond what is practicable, or reasonable, for Canadian defence, the answer must be that what is suggested cannot be acquired in a day or a year; that one is looking forward to what Canada will be five years hence; and that the foundation upon which the superstructure may be built has been already laid under circumstances favourable to its completion.

Canada has at the recent Imperial Conference, not only accepted, but willingly risen to her obligations on the score of defence. She has commenced the organization of her navy, and has on her seacoasts, on her inland waters, and in her maritime population, the material for that navy and also for a Naval Militia (or Volunteer) fleet. She has for the training of her officers the Kingston Military College,¹ and will soon have a naval college. She has her regular local forces, which have taken part in recent wars of the Empire, and require but expansion; she has her military schools and many rifle associations. She can, and does, on her ranches and farms breed horses adapted to and sufficient for all her military wants; she has territories which in forest, lake, and river, afford military training-grounds² for her youth unsurpassed in the world. In that youth she possesses thousands, from the age for boy scouts and cadets onwards, who would be adapted, as they grow up, to form mounted infantry, cyclists' corps, and intelligence corps; who are at home on horseback and with

¹ There are now (1910) about 134 former cadets from this college serving in His Majesty's Regular Forces.

² One specially good and extensive training camp is at Petewawa.

their cycles, in the woods and on the water, with the rifle, the gun, and the canoe, and who, if training were added to a natural aptitude for military life, could hold the Canadian frontier against any invader.¹

Lastly, she has in her militia as it exists the *principle* admitted that everyone is liable to military service for his country, and that national defence is an obligatory duty upon all.²

Lord Kitchener, in his recent official report of February 12, 1910, upon the defence of Australia, writes :

"It must be distinctly recognized that a national force, maintained at a high standard of efficiency, can only be produced by the work of years, and that such work must be steady and continuous. . . . If plans and essential preparations have been deferred until an emergency arises, it will then be found too late to act, because the strain of passing from peace to war will entirely absorb the energies of all engaged, even when every possible contingency has been foreseen."

If upon the foundation now existing, the superstructure of organization, training, departmental

¹ The interest taken in the Boy Scout Movement in Canada was strongly brought out during the recent visit of General Sir R. Baden-Powell to the Dominion. There were on March 31, 1909, 176 Cadet Corps in Canada with a membership of 11,000, under the supervision and control of the Department of Militia and Defence (since, no doubt, largely increased). The "Strathcona Trust" (1909) provides an annual fund of about £2,000 a year for the encouragement of physical and military training in the Canadian public schools (*The Army Year-Book*, 1910, edited by Major B. F. S. Baden-Powell and Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Brunker).

² Every Canadian, between the ages of eighteen and sixty, is liable to serve, if required, in the Militia; and the Governor-General can call out a *levée en masse*.

requirements, and provision of factories for war *matériel*—a very important want for such a naval and military force as Canada requires for her defence—were begun now, it must be some time before the coping-stone is laid.

Necessarily, of course, the subject of defence must be looked at from the financial as well as from the purely military standpoint; but, fortunately, the prosperity of the Dominion is both steadily and rapidly advancing.

The military conscription of the continent of Europe is neither required nor thought of for Canada, or any part of the British Empire; but no one can be blind to the defensive advantages which the organized military training of youth and a modified form of universal service¹ would be to the Dominion, apart from the excellent physical and disciplinary effect (in a moral sense) which it would bring with it. If the full strength of her defensive power were thus put forth, and if, as may be anticipated, the old spirit continues to animate her people, Canada may hope confidently to maintain in war the integrity of her soil.

In respect of resources, population, army and navy, and her position as a member of a powerful Empire, she should at least enter into any future contest under circumstances as favourable, if not more favourable, than those of 1812-14.²

But preparation beforehand is to-day more than ever necessary, and to build up such a naval and military force as would deter any enemy from attempting aggression requires time.

¹ Now being strongly advocated in many parts of Canada. ² See p. 89.

Lord Grey's speech at the prorogation of the Dominion Parliament¹ may well be quoted here :

"I feel as convinced as I am that to-morrow's sun will rise that if you keep true to the highest ideals of duty and disinterested service, nothing can prevent you from becoming, perhaps before the close of the present century, not only the granary, but the heart, soul, and rudder of the Empire."

The foregoing pages may, it is hoped, assist in some degree to draw general attention to the subject of Canadian defence, which, apart from naval or military professional details, has many aspects of much interest to the general public ; and to say more here would secure no useful purpose.²

It has been one of the most valuable results of the late Imperial Defence Conference that there is now in Canada a Canadian Headquarters Section³ of the Imperial General Staff, which, in confidential touch on the spot with all that relates to Canadian defence in its many details, will (in communication with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in Great Britain) have to consider those naval and military arrangements which, according to the circumstances of the moment, bear upon the security of the frontier of Canada.

A well-known student of and writer upon Imperial and military questions has recently said :⁴

"In modern times each nation that has made

¹ Alluding to the future of Canada (Ottawa, May 4, 1910).

² For reasons touched upon on p. 22.

³ See Appendix IV.

⁴ Mr. Spencer Wilkinson, Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford, lecture upon "Thoughts on Imperial Defence," delivered at the Royal Colonial Institute, June 7, 1910.

its mark has first made its own tactics. . . . The French revolutionary armies in the first four years of the war against all Europe acquired a suppleness of manœuvre and of tactical judgment which made them for fourteen years superior on every battlefield on which they appeared, except in the Peninsula, where they had to face Wellington, whose tactical judgment was superior to their own."

Canada has already a military history within her own borders, and inherits also the naval and military history of Great Britain and of France. In now entering upon the creation of her own navy and further organizing her defences, she does so under the advantage of recent and valuable suggestions¹ and advice from men who have deeply studied Imperial defence, and have had wide and practical experience of the requirements of war in all quarters of the globe.

Thus the foundation of her defensive system has been well and thoughtfully laid, and justifies the belief that the zeal and patriotism of her people will be so directed in the future upon her training-grounds of sea and lake and land as to develop able naval and military leaders, and such a system of tactics (adapted to her frontiers and forces) as will, through peace or war, increase her prestige as a nation, and maintain her territory an inviolate portion of the British Empire.

¹ Made at the Imperial Defence Conference of last year. Also by Lord Kitchener in his recent report upon the land forces of Australia; and by General Sir John French in connection with his more recent inspection of her own land forces as they exist at this moment.

APPENDIX I

EXTRACTS FROM THE "CHICAGO TRIBUNE" OF JANUARY 30, 1898.¹

THE naval authorities at Washington have thoroughly investigated the situation of Chicago in the event of attack from the Canadian shore, and, after doing some figuring and drawing up some simple plans, have dismissed the matter as settled for ever.

There are but four ways for an enemy to reach Chicago, and three of these are by land. From the Atlantic coast the city is separated by 1,000 miles, and no foe could penetrate the country. It is a like distance from the Gulf States, and an invading army would be annihilated long before it reached the Mason and Dixie line.

The idea of an invading army landing in San Francisco and crossing the Sierra Nevadas and the Rockies en route for Chicago is so preposterous as to require no attention whatever.

The only possible point from which an enemy could hope to reach this city is by way of the great lakes. If vessels could be fitted out with guns, and despatched here from the Canadian border, and if Chicago and the Government did not raise a hand to prevent, an army might be landed on the lake front, and ships might train guns upon the city.

But they will never do it. The auxiliary navy that Chicago has now and at all times within her harbour is sufficient to blow out of the water any possible squadron that would be sent against us.

¹ This was the year of the Spanish-American War (see p. 112).

POWERFUL FLEET AT HAND.

Few realize what a really powerful fleet is at hand, ready to be transformed into a fighting force. It is often said that the Government is entirely unprepared for an attack upon these waters, and the treaty between this country and Great Britain is referred to in proof. That treaty stipulates that neither country shall maintain more than four warships upon the lakes, and that these ships shall not be larger than 100 tons, armed with one 18-pound gun. This treaty was adopted by both countries during the year 1817, and the provisions have been practically ignored by both countries.

There are now on the lakes one United States war-vessel, the side-wheel barque *Michigan*, which was constructed in Pittsburg, removed in sections to Erie, and there put together in 1841. The *Michigan* created a storm of remonstrance on the part of the British, who claimed that this country had broken its agreement. As a matter of fact, the *Michigan* is a 498-ton vessel, armed with two 8-inch guns and four 32-pound carronades. While the vessel is of an obsolete type, it is a formidable foe to any vessel that could be brought against it by the Canadians.

But Uncle Sam has other vessels that may be turned into fighting ships. They are not called warships, but revenue cutters. They are fleet, and are able to do as much in the way of a sea-fight as any other vessels of their tonnage.

Foremost among the three cutters is the new *Gresham*, a splendid steel screw-steamer, built with a ram-bow, of 770 tons, one long rapid-fire gun, and the rest¹ for half a dozen more if occasion requires. The *Gresham* is in reality a superb cruiser.

The *Fessenden* is an old side-wheel cutter of 350 tons, which carries four good-sized guns of old style, but capable of good execution. This vessel is regarded as fast, and would certainly sink any merchantman that sought to encounter it.

Chicagoans are familiar with the graceful cutter that is

¹ Meaning probably "emplacement."

stationed here, and which was christened the *Cahmet* out of compliment to this city. This cutter is of the swift tug-boat model, is a steel craft, strong and seaworthy, and is armed with a formidable Hotchkiss rifle that would throw a shell three miles, and send its projectile clear through the iron sides of any boat afloat on the lakes.

These boats form the nucleus of a squadron that would keep any foreign vessels far from the point where they could bombard the city.

LARGE AUXILIARY NAVY.

The auxiliary navy, which may be called out within a week's notice, numbers anywhere between 100 and 200 huge lake freighters, as strong and stanch as heavy timbers and selected steel can make them. At the present moment there lie in the rivers 119 craft of all kinds. There ply in and out of the harbour several hundred steam-vessels other than passenger-boats, and of these 206 are over 250 feet in length, and are enumerated within the auxiliary navy list.

It was with a view to arming and turning these huge lakers, and their counterparts on the Atlantic and Pacific, into cruisers that the Naval Militia was organized. While that arm of the service is yet in its infancy, it has already accomplished a vast good, and already some 400 young men resident in this State have a practical knowledge of the handling of big guns aboard ship.

In the event of an attack by a foreign foe, the first thing that the War Department would do would be to co-operate with the navy. The National Guard nearest the threatened point would be called to arms, and the members probably to a considerable extent distributed among the auxiliary cruisers to act as a marine detail. The warship *Michigan* and the revenue cutters would be ordered here, and all, or as many as needed, of the freighters, would be levied upon and instantly transformed into fighting ships.

A glance over the list herewith furnished will show that many really formidable vessels are among these, some as huge

and as weighty as men-of-war. Their stability and carrying capacity enable them to carry heavy guns and to afford a stable float for gunnery operations.

The vessels that happened to be in port or immediately due would be selected and protected. The protection added would be in the shape of iron ore placed about the boiler-rooms, and the engines and chains stretched along the sides or hung from the decks. These protections would turn the steel vessels into fairly invulnerable fighting ships.

GUNS ARE ALL READY.

But where are the guns to come from?

The Government has provided for that. It is notorious that no Government takes the world into its confidence in the matter of military preparations. For some years back the War Department has been quietly turning out siege-guns for harbour defence, and the Navy Department has been at work constructing 4, 5, and 6 inch rapid-fire guns, and hundreds of 6-pound and 1-pound rapid-fire rifles. These guns are designed for use upon the auxiliary fleets wherever they may be required. They have not been distributed, and never will be, save in real emergency, being held in the arsenals in Washington, whence they may be despatched at a moment's notice to the threatened point.

If an Atlantic port were threatened, the guns would be sent to New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. If the objective point were the Gulf, guns would be sent by freight to the Gulf ports. The same thing would result if danger threatened San Francisco. If danger threatens the lake cities, these guns would be loaded upon cars and sent here. Two days would be sufficient to send 100 here. As soon as they arrived they would be placed aboard the waiting steamers, which would already have coaled, and protected their boilers and engines with iron ore.

The guns in question are specially designed for merchant vessels. They have a strong shield fitted over the breech to

protect the gunners. Each gun is designed for a certain class of vessel, and the Navy Department knows just what vessels it needs and just where the guns must be placed.

SMALL GUNS PRINCIPALLY NEEDED.

Lake vessels are smaller than Atlantic steamers, and consequently smaller guns suffice for them. Some of the big Atlantic liners are fitted with 6-inch rifles of rapid-firing pattern. The largest gun designed for lake vessels is 5-inch measurement, and but sixteen vessels are listed that can carry these.

As before stated, all vessels are to be divided into classes. Those of 1,600 tons will be given four 4-inch guns, four 6-pounders, and two 1-pounders. Vessels of 2,000 tons will carry six 4-inch guns, four 6-pounders, and a couple of 1-pounders. In fact, two or more of these light 1-pounders are designed to be carried on all vessels. Vessels of from 2,500 to 2,600 tons will carry six 4-inch and six 6-pounders; 3,000-ton vessels, six 5-inch guns and six 6-pounders. Vessels of 3,500 tons and upwards are to carry eight 5-inch guns and four 6-pounders. The largest number of big guns that any lake steamer will carry will be twelve, as described in the last class.

Each vessel is also rated by size for officers and crews. Vessels of 2,600 tons and under will be assigned 10 officers and from 185 to 190 men in the crew. Those above 2,600 tons, and not exceeding 3,500 tons, will carry 12 officers and a crew of 200. The largest size vessels will have a complement of 15 officers and 350 seamen.

To man the 206 vessels enumerated in the lists, were all to be called into the service at once, would require 2,114 officers of all grades and 39,970 men. It would be quite impossible to secure so many trained seamen, but it is contemplated that the regular crews of the freighters would stand by their duty and see to the actual sailing of the vessel. Thus each steamer would carry its own crew, augmented by enlisted

landsmen, Naval Militiamen who would act as gunners and officers, and National Guardsmen sent aboard as marines and sharp-shooters.

FORCE PRACTICALLY UNLIMITED.

In this way a practically unlimited force could be got together in an incredibly short time, and it would be an organized force, for officers of the navy would be in high command, the vessels would be navigated by their Captains, and worked by their regular crews, and the fighting men would be free to operate the guns and pick off the enemy with rifles.

Just imagine such a flotilla drawn across the harbour four or five miles from the sea-wall. What possible chance would the foe have to shell the city, much less land a formidable land force?

The signal corps would be stationed on the sky-scrapers, and would command with their glasses the lake for twenty miles.

The troops from Fort Sheridan would guard the bluffs to the northward. No foe would attempt to steal to the southward, where he surely would be hemmed in and cut to pieces.

There are in this city two batteries of four guns each, and one battery is located at Fort Sheridan. These guns, twelve in number, would probably be placed on board a couple of vessels, and the members of the Federal and National Guard batteries would be distributed throughout the fleet as gunners.

There are in the National Guard of Illinois 415 officers and 6,245 enlisted men. All of these men are familiar with the use of arms, and many of them are used to siege-gun practice. The Naval Reserves of the State number 48 officers and 498 enlisted men. These men are capable of working 100 guns.


In addition to the forces that reside here or are stationed in the State, the Navy Department would hurry here several hundred seamen from the Atlantic Squadron, among them a large number of trained gunners, so that it will be seen that the question of furnishing crews is not a serious one.

And it must also be borne in mind that it is extremely improbable that more than twenty or thirty of the steamers would be called upon. It would appear as though that number would be more than adequate to cope with any force that could be sent against us.

The list of available vessels that are listed for emergency does not include a hundred or more whalebacks, which some competent authorities believe to be the most formidable of all the vessels that sail the lakes. Indeed, Captain Alexander McDougall, who is at the head of the whaleback concern, has for some years been in consultation with the authorities in Washington with a view to perfecting plans for making these vessels instantly available for war service, both on the lakes and on the open sea. The Captain has prepared plans, which the Navy Department is said to have approved, which make the "pigs" ideal cruisers.


To begin with, they all have several watertight compartments, so that they may be ballasted to any depth that may be required. In fact, if desired, they may be sunk almost entirely beneath the water, their forward turrets and after-works alone appearing above the surface. This feature renders them almost impossible to hit with a shot. It is well known that the whalebacks have a narrow snout—that is the termination of a small watertight compartment in the bow. Captain McDougall proposes to adjust a movable steel shutter, similar to the ports of an old-fashioned man-o'-war, over the snout of a whaleback, and place a powerful rifled gun in this position. There is ample room for working the gun. The whaleback, which is speedy, would approach a foe presenting practically no mark for its shot. The projectiles that struck its rounded steel sides would glance off harmlessly. At the proper moment the long gun would be thrust out, sighted, fired, and run back, the hood, or shutter, automatically closing as the gun delivered its fire and receded.

Captain J. G. Keith, of this city, who is an enthusiast on whaleback subjects, has in his possession a drawing of the *Christopher Columbus*, the big whaleback passenger steamer



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that plies between this city and Milwaukee, wherein are shown the modellings requisite to turn the flier into the swiftest cruiser afloat.

"The *Christopher Columbus* has ten watertight compartments," said Captain Keith, "and carries water ballast. It is possible to sink the boat to any level. It can catch and pass any vessel on the lakes. If properly armed and fitted up, it could sweep the enemy from the lakes, and could not be seriously damaged in return.

"There are ten steel turrets distributed along the 362 feet of the hull. These turrets are built of $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch steel. Within two days the turrets could be reinforced with extra plates of boiler-iron placed inside, and the intervening space packed with cotton or other material.

"Port-holes could be cut in these turrets on the sides, fore and aft, and in this manner seats and protection for ten guns, two in each of five turrets, could be provided. Then one of the long rifled rapid-firing guns could be placed in the compartment under the snout, and, if required, smaller guns could be distributed all over the vessel. The smoke-stack could be reinforced by additional plates of boiler-iron bent on, and the boiler-room and engines could be protected by heavy anchor chains dropped over the side. But little would be exposed to the shots of the enemy, and if the bow guns were dispensed with, the hull could be sunk so deep by flooding one or more of the compartments that it would be impossible to put a shot into the boiler-room. Then, the upper deck is of steel, covered with planks.

"The enemy could shoot away at the top works all day, and could not harm the vessel if they were all carried away, for in reality they are but a deck resting upon the turrets. The wheel-house would be protected with boiler-iron. You could not sink the *Columbus*, even if you could put a shot through her below the water-line, for you could fill half of her compartments and still she would float.

"Moreover, the vessel would carry all the troops that are stationed in Chicago and be a regular fort. The Naval

Department knows what can be done with the *Christopher Columbus*, and these plans are drawn with an object in view."

The guns that are being made for the auxiliary navy are said to be the finest models turned out in the history of gunnery. The work is under the supervision of Commodore Charles O'Neill, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy. The 6-inch guns each weigh 5 tons, and throw a solid shot weighing 100 pounds a distance of six and a half miles. However, in actual warfare the range is rarely over 5,000 yards. The chances of hitting a ship at a greater distance are so small as to render the long ranges impracticable.

It will be noticed that none of the passenger vessels are included in the list of available ships. The reason for the omission is not because they are not staunch vessels, but because their top works are unsuited to warfare. The wood-work would be reduced to dangerous splinters by the shot of the enemy; hence the cabins would have to be removed. They are also in the way of the guns, and prevent their free use. It would consume considerable time and involve large expense to prepare passenger steamers for fighting. Moreover, they stand high out of the water, and their machinery is more exposed than in the freighters, so that their usual superior speed is more than offset.

In preparing merchantmen for fighting, the small boats must be got out of the way, so that they will not be torn from the davits. Heavy planking must be laid upon the decks in the gun positions, for in the majority of cases it will be considered best to locate the big guns on the main deck, two in the bows and two aft, the others distributed along the bulwarks. The guns are not much more exposed on deck than they would be if ports were cut through the vessel's sheathing, for the plating of the steel ship is rarely more than $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{3}{4}$ inch, and it must be remembered that the guns carry a shield that protects the gunners.

There is a division of opinion as to whether wooden or steel ships will prove the better for the auxiliary navy. It is claimed that the wooden vessels will stand more hard usage

before sinking. Where the steel vessel is not divided into compartments, it certainly would sink if pierced below the water-line, while a wooden vessel would float until the breach could be stopped.

Taken all for all, it is probable that both styles of freighters have their advantages. The Government seems to select them indiscriminately. In one respect both types of vessel are at an immense advantage over an ordinary cruiser, and that is the enormous coal stores that they can carry. These big lakers can load up a regular cargo of coal, which will not only afford them steam for long periods, but will sink them, so as to leave their vulnerable parts less exposed, and the coal will act as a secondary armour.

Thus is the harbour of Chicago safe from the attacks of armed foes. Not only is the geographical position of the city such as to render a land invasion impossible, but the navy at hand is far stronger than required to repel any fleet that Canada can scrape together, for Canada is the only Power that can war upon us from the lakes. The shipping owned by the Canadians is hardly 1 per cent of the total, and they own practically none of the larger vessels. It would be practically impossible for Canadian war-vessels to pass into Lake Michigan from the lakes on either hand, for the narrow straits are easily commanded from the shore, and torpedoes would prove an impossible barrier.

To sum up what is stated in the above paper, the vessels which in 1898 (or twelve years ago) were available upon the lakes for conversion upon emergency, at Chicago, into fighting ships of an American auxiliary naval force, numbered approximately 208 large lake freighters, and 100 powerful whalebacks. Of this last class, the proposed conversion of the *Christopher Columbus*, one of the largest and swiftest, is given in detail. These 308 vessels are exclusive of passenger steamers, which are deemed as a class, for reasons fully explained, to be less suitable for fighting purposes than freighters and whalebacks.

Of these 308 vessels it is estimated that not more than about thirty selected ships (or one-tenth) would be sufficient at first to meet any requirements of lake warfare.

For armament, many 4, 5, and 6 inch rapid-firing guns, and hundreds of 6 and 7 lb. rapid-firing rifles, adapted for the requirements of auxiliary fleets of converted merchant vessels, had been provided, and were in the arsenals at Washington.¹

For crews, 415 officers and 6,245 enlisted men of the National Guard of Illinois,² many of them used to siege-gun practice; and 48 officers and 498 enlisted men of the Naval Reserves of the State, capable of working 100 guns (in addition to the crews of the vessels and enlisted landmen), are available.³

¹ As well as big siege guns designed for harbour defence.

² Chicago is in the State of Illinois.

³ It is estimated that to man 208 lake freighters, were all called out for service at once, would require some 2,114 officers and 770 men.

APPENDIX II

AS TO ROUSE'S POINT,
AT THE NORTHERN END OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

EXTRACTS from *Lake George and Lake Champlain*, by
W. MAX REID (New York, 1910), p. 332:

"I am indebted to State Historian Victor Hugo Paltsitts for the following valuable information, which he derived from an examination of Professor John Bassett Moore's *History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party*, vol. i. (Washington, 1898), pp. 80, 104-5, 106, 112, 119, 127, 135-6, 150-1:

"After the Treaty of Ghent, Great Britain and the United States appointed Commissioners for surveying and exploring the boundaries between the United States and Canada. It was during the life of this joint Commission that most surprising differences arose over the 45th parallel of north latitude.¹

"In the autumn of 1818 Dr. Tiarks and Mr. Hassler, then the British and American astronomers, discovered, apparently to the consternation of both of them, that just east of Lake Champlain the true parallel lay about three-fourths of a

¹ Along which a portion of the boundary, as defined in 1783, ran at this point (see p. 24). On early maps the lines of latitude were not always accurately laid down, and thus do not agree. For instance, in Jeffrey's map of 1775 the 45th parallel north latitude is drawn four miles north of Rouse's Point; in Claude J. Gauthier's of 1776, less than half a mile north of it; in Arrowsmith's, of February 15, 1842, a little to the south of it. In all modern maps it is drawn to the north of it.—C.W.R.

mile south of the 'old line,' which was surveyed in the preceding century.

"Less than half a mile to the south of this line lay the fort at Rouse Point, which had been constructed by the United States at a cost of a million dollars, and which was believed to be of great strategic value;¹ and near by was a new work in course of construction; so that it seemed that both forts were in British territory.

"There was no doubt as to the fact—the old line was in part erroneous. The British and American Commissioners disagreed, and adjourned in 1821, subject to the pleasure of their respective Governments. . . .

"As now known, they referred the matter to King William of the Netherlands, who on January 10, 1831, rendered his award as arbitrator, including the following opinion—viz.:

"That in determining the latitude of places it is customary to follow the principle of the observed latitude; and that the Government of the United States of America has erected certain fortifications at the place called Rouse Point under the impression that the ground formed part of their territory—an impression sufficiently authorized by the circumstance that the line had until then been reputed to correspond with the 45th degree of north latitude:

"We are of opinion that it would be suitable to proceed to fresh operations to measure the observed latitude, in order to mark out the boundary from the River Connecticut along the parallel of the 45th degree of north latitude to the River St. Lawrence, named in the treaties Iroquois or Cataraqui—in such manner, however, that in all cases, at the place called Rouse Point, the territory of the United States of America shall extend to the fort erected at that place, and shall include said fort and its kilometrical radius (*rayon kilométrique*)."

"In effect, the arbitrator held² that the 45th parallel

¹ And necessarily is so to the United States in relation to naval ascendancy on Lake Champlain.—C. W. R.

² The award of the King of the Netherlands was not accepted by the United States, so the matter still continued open until the Ashburton Treaty of 1842.—C. W. R.

of north latitude should be determined by the customary principle of observed latitude, without regard to prior surveys, but expressed the opinion that the United States should be left in the possession of the fort at Rouse Point. This opinion was actually accepted by the Ashburton Treaty of 1842."

Mr. Max Reid also gives the following extract from "The Northern Traveller" (published by A. T. Godrich, New York, 1826), p. 186:

"ROUSE POINT.

"There is a village by this name, on the western side, and a mile beyond it is.

"The fort, which is a kind of large castle, is built of hewn stone, with perpendicular walls and three tiers of embrasures. It stands at the end of a low point, and was built to command the passage of the lake during the last war. On running the line of the United States and Canada, the Commissioners at first fixed the boundary a little south of this place, so as to bring the fort within the limits of the latter;¹ but, in consequence of the line agreed on by the treaty coming too near Quebec, it was determined that an arrangement should be made for the benefit of both parties, and the boundary has been left in its former place. An opening through the woods, like a road, marks the place, about half a mile north of the fort."

Mr. Reid also gives the following extract from *French's Gazetteer* of 1860:

"Rouse Point is named from Jacques Rouse, a Canadian who settled here in 1753. A bridge a mile long here crosses the lake. A floating draw of 300 feet, opened and shut by steam, admits the passage of vessels.

"About one mile north of the village, upon the banks of

¹ I.e., Canada.

the lake, Fort Montgomery is situated. This fort commands the entrance to the lake. It was begun soon after the war of 1812, but in 1818 it was found to be within the limits of Canada, and the work was abandoned. It became known as 'Fort Blunder,' but by the Webster Treaty¹ of 1842 it was ceded again to the United States. Work upon it has been resumed, and it is estimated that the completed works will cost \$600,000, of which \$275,000 has already been expended."

¹ In which Lord Ashburton represented Great Britain.

APPENDIX III

SOME HARBOURS AND PORTS OF CANADA.¹

Among these, the following, with the facilities which they offer, may be mentioned :

LOWER ST. LAWRENCE.²

Gaspé (Gulf of St. Lawrence).—Here there is sufficient water to accommodate a large fleet, and access is easy. The harbour is about four and a half miles long, with a general width of one mile ; depth of water, from 4 to 11 fathoms, with mud bottom. It is completely sheltered. In the future this port will probably be further developed (see p. 128).

Quebec.—The harbour affords excellent anchorage and wharfing accommodation. There is a wet dock, being an enclosed basin of 40 acres water-surface ; entrance, 66 feet wide ; depth, 28 feet over sill at high tide ; general depth, 25 feet.

The Government dry dock is at Levis, on the opposite side of the river ; 600 feet long, on blocks ; breadth of entrance, 62 feet ; depth of water on the sill, 26½ feet, and 23½ feet on the blocks at high water, spring tides. There are floating docks also at Levis, owned by various firms.

Repairs can now be made to large steamers at Quebec (covering hull, machinery, and boiler repairs), and supplies, stores, and provisions can be procured. Ferry steamers cross

¹ Information as to these has been mainly taken from the authorities quoted in note to p. 115.

² From the Gulf of St. Lawrence up to Montreal, inclusive, to these ports there is access from the ocean.

between Quebec and Levis all the year round, being specially equipped and strengthened for ice.

For some years past the Quebec Harbour Commissioners have urged an increase to the dock accommodation for commercial reasons. The beam of large passenger and freight steamers is now occasionally 88 feet and over, and consequently they could not enter the Levis dry dock (62 feet in breadth), and had to go for dock facilities to New York and elsewhere. For this reason, and also in connection with the requirements of the Canadian Navy now being organized, the docking facilities at this port will probably be before long materially increased.

Sorel.—At the mouth of the Richelieu River, which empties into the St. Lawrence. For two miles within the mouth of the river the depth is from 4 to 5 fathoms. Good anchorage. There are four shipyards, the principal of which is a Government one, where Government and other vessels are constructed. Here the plan for deepening and widening the St. Lawrence ship-channel remains in winter.

Montreal Harbour, to which ocean vessels have access for between eight and nine months in the year, is one of the largest ports of Canada. It contains two small dry docks, for light-draught vessels only, each 400 feet long, with 10 feet of water on the sill.

Vessels from the great lakes enter Montreal through the Lachine Canal, which has a depth of 14 feet.

The ship channel from Montreal to the ocean, which is well lighted and buoyed, is now completed throughout to a minimum depth of 30 feet¹ at extreme low water; minimum width, 450 feet, except in Lake St. Peter, where it is somewhat less. Supplies and materials for vessels can be purchased, and steel castings of large size are here turned out.

Montreal is a port of great commercial importance. The shipping using it in 1908 amounted to between five and six million tons, and it is well equipped with elevators and all

¹ To be further increased, it is expected, to 35 feet within the next few years.

machinery for loading and unloading vessels and handling and storing freight. From it daily and weekly lines of ocean-going steamers run to every quarter of the world; and railways to all parts of the Dominion, connecting with those of the United States.

But what the facilities of Montreal as a port will be in docks and other directions within the next few years is not to be fully estimated by the above particulars, as great energy is at present being devoted to meet the increasing volume¹ of business, to make Montreal a great world-port, and the St. Lawrence route the imperial highway of commerce in North America.

The Port Warden of Montreal states that the adoption of the Marconi wireless telegraph system has been of great advantage in the River and Gulf of St. Lawrence in ascertaining the condition of the ice at all times, and thus enabling vessels to use with greater safety and for a longer period the Straits of Belle Isle route.

ATLANTIC PORTS.

Halifax (Nova Scotia).—One of the finest and safest harbours of the Dominion, and a winter port free from ice throughout the year; the terminus of the Intercolonial Railway, and in railway, telegraphic, and steamer communication with many parts of the world.

Halifax, the upkeep and defence of which port has been recently taken over by the Dominion for the Imperial Government, is a naval station of consequence. There is a good dockyard, under the control of the Department of Marine and fisheries; and a graving dock, belonging to the Halifax Graving Dock Company, 600 feet long; breadth of entrance, 87½ feet; depth, 30 feet on the sill at high water.

North Sydney (Cape Breton, Nova Scotia).—A safe harbour, easy of access. Depth of water, over 46 feet at high tide, 42 feet at low. The water area is about twelve square

¹ Estimated to be greater per month at present than that of any other North American port, except New York.

miles. An important coal-shipping port. The Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, the Dominion Coal Company, and the Dominion Iron and Steel Company do a large business here.

Sydney (Cape Breton, Nova Scotia).—An important harbour, entirely land-locked, with a depth of water of from 6 to 10 fathoms, the area of water between 6 and 7 fathoms deep being about $2\frac{1}{4}$ square miles. The Dominion Coal Company have two piers here (known as the International Piers), at which four steamers can be berthed, loaded, or bunkered at one time, and the Dominion Steel Company two piers.

St. John (New Brunswick), where the St. John River enters the Bay of Fundy.—A safe, commodious harbour, and always accessible, as the rise and fall of the tide keeps it free from ice. The depth of water in the eastern channel (which is being further deepened) is from 22 to 30 feet. There are fifteen water berths for ocean steamers, and the anchorage grounds in and adjacent to the harbour extend over a wide area. The port is an important winter one for the shipment to Europe of lumber, grain, cattle, and agricultural products.

St. John is the terminus of several steamship lines in winter, and the Intercolonial, the Canadian Pacific, and the New Brunswick Southern Railways have many wharves and sheds here.

PACIFIC PORTS.

Victoria (Vancouver Island, British Columbia).—Good anchorage, in some 12 to 20 fathoms of water, in the Royal Roads, but the entrance to the port is rather intricate. Materials for shipbuilding and repairs can be obtained. Two miles off is

Esquimaux (British Columbia).—Good anchorage and shelter in water of from 5 to 10 fathoms deep. Here there is a graving dock, about 480 feet long and 430 feet on the blocks, 65 feet wide at entrance, and $26\frac{1}{2}$ feet of water over the sill at high tide.

Large vessels can be repaired here. The maintenance and defence of this port has recently been taken over by the Dominion from the Imperial Government.

Vancouver (British Columbia), within Burrard's Inlet.—Easy of access, and inside the narrows is a fine, spacious, and secure harbour, from 15 to 36 fathoms in depth. The Government of Canada has entered into an arrangement to subsidize a steel floating dock, to be equipped with all modern appliances, and of sufficient capacity to take any size of steam vessel trading on the Pacific coast.

Vancouver Harbour is the western terminus of the Canadian Pacific (trans-continental) Railway.

The Great Northern Railway from Washington, D.C. (United States), runs into Vancouver, and the city has communication by steam with China, Japan, and Australia.

All kinds of ships' stores can be procured here.

Prince Rupert (British Columbia, east of Queen Charlotte Island) is the selected terminus of the Grand Trunk Pacific (trans-continental) Railway, and one of the best harbours on the Pacific coast, having great depth of water.

It will no doubt rise greatly in importance with the approaching completion of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway (see p. 131).

UPPER ST. LAWRENCE AND LAKE PORTS.¹

Kingston (on the St. Lawrence River, at the north-east extremity of Lake Ontario).—The Cataraqui River empties into the St. Lawrence at Kingston, and the mouth of it forms part of the harbour.

The extent of the harbour from west to east is about three and three-quarter miles, the depth of water being from 12 to 20 feet at the wharves to 40 feet opposite the city, in the St. Lawrence River. Good wharf accommodation. There are two dry docks for repairing vessels: one small one, belonging to Government, is 305 feet long by 70 feet wide at coping level, 47 feet at floor level, with 13 feet 7 inches over

¹ From Kingston (inclusive) westwards.

the sill; the other (Davis's lock), for vessels of light draught, is 175 feet long by 32 feet at the entrance, and depth of water 4 feet 6 inches over the sill.

Desoronto (north shore of the Bay of Quinté, near Kingston) affords good shelter and anchorage. There is depth enough at the wharves for vessels up to 14 feet draught, and the channel from Desoronto to Lake Ontario (going east) is of good depth and safe for navigation. Fair repair facilities for wooden vessels, in a well-situated shipyard, can be obtained.

Toronto (north shore of Lake Ontario; area, about two and a half square miles) is land-locked, a formation of sand, called the "Island," extending the whole length of the southerly limit of Toronto Bay. The average depth of water in the harbour is about 20 feet, and 14 feet along the wharf frontage.

The shipbuilding industry is carried on at the Polson Iron Works and at the Toronto shipyards, in which steel and wooden vessels are built. Extensive repairs of all kinds can be carried out, and ships' stores and *matériel* purchased. In the Polson Iron Works shipyards four canal-sized steamers can be laid down at one time.

Hamilton Harbour (Lake Ontario) is practically Burlington Bay, at the extreme west end of the lake. The harbour is approximately six miles long by one mile wide, and is land-locked; the anchorage good, in 50 feet of water.

The Hamilton Steel and Iron Company have works here.

Port Dalhousie (at the northern entrance of the Welland Canal).—Good anchorage, in a depth of water of 18 feet. One small dry dock, capable of taking canal vessels up to 200 feet in length.

Port Colborne (at the entrance, near the eastern end of Lake Erie, to the Welland Canal).—There is a depth of 22 feet of water in the outer harbour, and 16 feet over the remainder and into the canal. A great extent of wharfage (three miles). The harbour is closed by ice from about the middle of December to the end of March. The harbour was originally made by a corporate company, and is not among

the harbours controlled by the Government Department of Marine and Fisheries.

Amherstburg (near the mouth of the Detroit River, where it enters Lake Erie).—A naval port in the war of 1812-14; now chiefly used as a coaling station. There is a channel 600 feet wide, with 14 to 16 feet depth of water, and over 20 feet for about 1,800 feet between the shore and Bois Blanc Island. Anchorage opposite the eastern end of this island, on the Amherstburg side; depth of water, about 19½ feet; well sheltered.

Collingwood (south side of the Georgian Bay, in Nottawasaga Bay, Lake Huron).—A capacious, well-protected harbour, with 22 feet depth of water. The docking accommodation superior to that of any port on the Canadian side of the great lakes. One is 545 feet long, 75 feet wide, average depth of water over sill 16½ feet; another, 400 feet long and 100 feet wide; and a third is contemplated. Also a landing slip, 1,000 feet long, for further mooring accommodation of vessels while undergoing repairs. Good wharfage facilities and complete shipbuilding and repairing plant. Marine engines are here constructed, and steel, composite, and wooden hulls of large-size vessels built,¹ heavy castings and forgings made, and boiler-plates turned for boiler-construction.

Midland, with suburb of *Tiffin* (south-east side of the Georgian Bay, in Midland Bay, Lake Huron).—The harbour is spacious, well-sheltered, and with, except on the middle shoal, ample depth of water (25 to 100 feet), and good anchorage. No storms interfere with loading and discharging, and many large steamers put in here.

There are no dry docks, but one is said to be contemplated. Good wharfage accommodation.

The Canadian Government is stated to be making of "Midland-Tiffin" the finest port on the Canadian Lakes; and the Canadian Pacific Railway are building a new terminus in Victoria Harbour, a continuation of Midland Bay,

¹ See note to p. 114.

which will be very complete in coal-receiving plant, freight sheds, etc. Tugs of the Midland Towing and Wrecking Company are employed in keeping open navigation as far as possible by making passages in the newly-formed ice.

Good repair facilities. The works of the Steel Works and Canada Iron Furnace Company are of a substantial character.

Owen Sound (southern end of Georgian Bay, Lake Huron).—Eight miles wide at the entrance. Well sheltered; anchorage good; depth of water, 6 to 7 fathoms. No docks.

Port Arthur (north-western shore of Lake Superior, in Thunder Bay).—The inner harbour is artificial but safe, having been formed by the construction of breakwaters, which it is proposed to extend so as to unite with the harbour of Fort William (see below). The basin is being gradually dredged to a depth of 25 feet.

Port Arthur is a very important grain port¹ and railway centre, the Canadian Pacific, Grand Trunk Pacific, and Canadian Northern all running through it. A dry dock is contemplated here; an efficient wrecking outfit is maintained; repair facilities and wharfage accommodation are good. The port is kept free from ice later and opened earlier in the season by means of a powerful ice-breaking tug.

Fort William (adjoining Port Arthur [see above], on the northern shore of Lake Superior).—An important grain port, vessels carrying cargo of all kinds to it being sure of a return one of grain. The bay is a fine sheet of water, having a depth from about 3½ fathoms at the mouth of the Kaministiquia River (where the harbour is situated) to 40 fathoms out in the bay.

The towns growing up at Fort William and Port Arthur, and adjoining each other, are practically twin ones. The arrangements for breaking the ice, etc., are similar to those at Port Arthur.

¹ Containing a number of very large grain-elevators, one (the largest in the world) having a capacity of between seven and eight million bushels.

In conclusion, it may be mentioned that the Department of Marine and Fisheries of the Dominion has its ice-breaking fleet of strong steel steamers—the *Stanley*, the *Minto*, the *Montcalm*, the *Lady Grey*, the *Champlain*, the *Earl Grey*, etc.—for cutting channels through the ice of the River St. Lawrence and of various harbours, and keeping the navigation open longer than without them would be possible. What could be done in this respect in Hudson's Bay and Straits may be eventually of consequence. These steamers are able to break with ease ice forming in harbours, bays, and rivers, and what is called "field ice"; but the difficulty is with ice piled up layer upon layer, either by currents or wind, and called "rafted" or "piled" ice.

At Ottawa there is a large factory for the manufacture of acetylene buoys and beacons, and there are over twenty wireless telegraph stations on the east and west coasts of the Dominion and the St. Lawrence River.

APPENDIX IV

ARRANGEMENTS AND DUTIES OF A LOCAL HEADQUARTERS SECTION OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.¹

CHIEF OF SECTION.

- Advice on local military policy to be pursued.
- Organization of local forces in accordance with State policy.
- Plans for local defence.
- Supervision of training of troops.
- Education of officers.
- Selection of officers of local forces for study at Imperial Staff Colleges.

OPERATIONS BRANCH.

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS.

1. Information about its own Dominion and neighbouring States
2. Preparation of plans for local defence.
3. Preparation of plans for concentration and movements of Imperial contingents based on information supplied by Imperial Headquarters.
4. Mapping and reconnaissance of its own Dominion.
5. War establishments, following Imperial establishments as far as possible.
6. Most suitable equipment to adopt, study of questions relating to.
7. Strategic distribution of the local force.
8. Application of principles laid down in Field Service Regulations.

NOTE.—In commands and districts the Staff to remain as at present constituted. Imperial General Staff Officers to be gradually appointed as they become available. There should be only one General Staff—i.e., the Imperial General Staff. It would seem undesirable to create a second form of General Staff, which could only be temporary.

Applicable to the Canadian Headquarters Section. (From the Blue Book on the Imperial Defence Conference of 1906.)

TRAINING BRANCH.

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES.

1. Instruction and training of the local forces for war on lines laid down in Field Service Regulations, etc.
2. Manœuvres.
3. Education of officers. Local educational establishments.
4. Training Manuals.
5. Staff organization—Staff rides—Record of officers suitable for Staff employ.
6. Intercommunication services.

Training Branch.

Staff Duties Branch.

- War Training: Manœuvres.
- Organization of the Staff of the Army. Officers' education.
- Imperial General Staff Officers to be

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